VENIZELOS

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

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Venizelos

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



VENIZELOS

BY

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, PH.D., LITT.D.
Author of "The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire," etc.

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS

SECOND EDITION, ENLARGED

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TO

MY DEAR FRIEND

ALEXANDER SOUTER, D.LITT.

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF HUMANITY

IN THE

UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN

"Greece is the Piedmont of the East, the only hope of reorganization of the future, to those who look for freedom."

LORD ROSEBERY, speaking at Manchester in 1879

"First of all, the chieftain of the isle
Set in the sparkling sea where free airs blew
And filled his soul with Glory, as the wind
Fills the fain sail that has been sick with calm,
And, now, a larger voyage still must shape —
Call, Hellas, call thy Venizelos home,
And set him over all — who has the hearts of all!"

EDITH M. THOMAS

"The works of a man for which we vest him
Were done in the dark and the cold."

BROWNING

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

A FEW days after the original edition of this book was published, Venizelos lost the general election of November 14, 1920, which was fought largely on the personal issue of choosing between him and the exiled ex-King Constantine. Two years of startling changes in the Near East have followed. Europe has once more been brought to the verge of war. The Turkish Nationalist movement has succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of its sponsors, and the Conference of Lausanne bids fair to mark the beginning of the end of the Paris peace settlement. For the five treaties, named after the suburbs of Paris in which they were signed, are integral parts of the same general settlement. They were conceived in the same spirit, couched in the same terms as to details, and the signature to them was secured by the same method. Admit the vanquished Turks to the right to discuss peace terms on the ground of equality, obliterating their war guilt and war crimes, and scrap the Treaty of Sèvres, and the Entente Powers will have created the precedent for making the same change of front toward the other defeated nations. Thus is the work seemingly accomplished after the World War already in the process of disintegration.

In all this the fortunes of Eleutherios Venizelos and of Greece have been so inextricably bound up with the most vital questions of international diplomacy and have had so important a bearing upon the peace of the world that it is unnecessary to justify a new and revised edition of the biography of the Great Cretan.

Two new chapters, "The Repudiation of Venizelos by Greece" and "The New Eclipse of Hellenism," are added, bringing the story down to the end of 1922.

Acknowledgments are due to Professor Edward Capps of Princeton University, late American Minister to Greece, and to many friends in Athens, Constantinople, and Asia Minor, who helped me when I was observing the course of this story on the spot during the past spring and summer. If I were to name these, among them would be the three premiers and the late Minister of War and Minister of Foreign Affairs who met a tragic end, facing a firing squad at Athens on November 27, 1922.

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

Princeton, January 2, 1923

PREFACE

THE biographer of a living man, especially of a living man whose career is in the making, must perforce deal with moot questions and problems not yet solved. He must renounce the historian's privilege of forming judgments upon solid bases. He does not know how policies will work out. Much documentary evidence is still in diplomatic archives. No actor in the story has taken the world wholly into his confidence. The biographer is conscious of the element of special pleading in public statements of policy, in collections of official documents, in every explanation by this or that man of the reason for having done this or that thing.

But the reporter (for this is what the writer on contemporary events really is) enjoys advantages, denied to the historians of to-morrow, upon which he has the right to insist. He has been an eye-witness of the events he describes. He has come into close personal contact with makers of history at the moment the history was made. The judgments of the later writer may be more valuable in the sense of recording and interpreting the motives of statesmen and the merits of their policies. But he will go astray unless he reads what we of to-day write. Docu-

ments and memoirs alone cannot reconstitute the atmosphere of the great drama. Nor are motives and policies to be judged solely by their success or failure. So the contemporary biographer or reporter must be consulted to find out what were the psychological factors that shaped motives, that influenced — sometimes irresistibly — acts.

To be specific, within the field of this biography, without the observations of the reporter who knew how the people felt at the moment, it would be impossible for the future historian to estimate accurately the factors that precipitated the Second Balkan War, that kept Greece neutral in 1915 and 1916, and that dictated the policy of Venizelos at the Peace Conference.

I make no secret of my deep sympathy with the cause of Hellenism and my admiration for my subject. But this book is neither panegyric nor propaganda. Warm friends I have had, and still have, among the Bulgarians, and as a college teacher in the Near East during the period under survey, I came into intimate association with all the Balkan nationalities and the Turks as well. Each race has its good qualities. Each race has suffered from the blight of the Ottoman yoke.

In the preparation of this volume I have had the aid of competent authorities on the Balkans. Much of the story has come from Premier Venizelos himself and from M. Politis, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1917.

These main actors in the regeneration of Greece have been gracious enough to read my manuscript and call my attention to errors of fact. Others who have been helpful are Mr. J. D. Bourchier, of the London *Times;* Professor Andreades of the University of Athens; M. Tsolianos, private secretary to Premier Venizelos; Dr. A. P. Savvidis, of Harvard University; Professor Westermann, of the University of Wisconsin; Senator Moses, former American Minister to Greece; Mr. Michail Dorizas, of the University of Pennsylvania; Mr. M. Kaltchas, a graduate of Robert College; and my wife, who has worked with me in the Balkans and at Paris for more than ten years in the preparation of this material.

As in the case of my previous volumes on the Near East, the unusual opportunities I have enjoyed of travel and study on the spot are due to the constant interest and direction of the late James Gordon Bennett and of Mr. Rodman Wanamaker.

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

Princeton, October 1, 1920

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EPIRUS
EUBOEA
CRETE
ÆGEAN SEA
SEA OF CANDIA
IONIAN SEA
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SMYRNA
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DENESLI
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Samothrace
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Lemnos
Dardanelles
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Thasos
ENOS
DEDEAGATCH
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DEMIRHISSAR
SERES
DRAMA
KAVALA
STRUMNITZ
MONASTIR
Prespa
FLORINA
VODENA
KONITZA
JANINA
ARTA
PREVESA
Leucade
Ithaca
Cephalonia
Zante
Corfu
VALONA
HORITZA
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VENIZELOS

CHAPTER I

THE BOYHOOD AND EARLY MANHOOD OF AN UNREDEEMED GREEK

AMONG island Greeks fecundity is too common to be looked upon as a particular favor of the gods. How many children a woman has does not count. The crowning blessing of heaven is the ability, the good fortune, to rear children. Poor and untutored mothers expect to lose more than half their babies, but when the third child of Kyriakos Venizelos did not survive the first year, Cretan women shook their heads. A rich merchant was in a position to give his wife the best of care and to fight for his babies; it must be that Despina Venizelos had no luck.

The housewives of Mourmies lifted their hands in despair when the birth of a fourth Venizelos was announced. Once more the mother had come up from Canea to the little village on the mountain-side. The news went the rounds on an August morning in 1864. And the name! Eleutherios, indeed! Why stake freedom against fate? The contemporaries of Sophocles accepted the teaching that one cannot escape his destiny. The natural tendency

to fatalism was deepened by twenty-three centuries of bitter experience. Contact with and subjection to Islam, while it provoked resistance, confirmed the conviction of the utter hopelessness of pitting the human will against what was foreordained. It is impossible for the freeman to comprehend the paralysis of the slave's will, his resignation, his superstitious regulating of life and conduct by signs. No Hellenes had more reason to despair than the Cretans. They kicked blindly and passionately against the pricks. On several memorable occasions during the century of the world-wide growth of national consciousness and gradual winning of freedom by subject races, in which their own had been partly successful elsewhere, the Cretans had risen against the Turks. But each time they had been stirred up by outside events, and looked for emancipation to outside intervention. In themselves they had no faith: for in their own destiny they had no hope.

An omen is good or bad according to what happens. Had Eleutherios died, the ill luck of Despina Venizelos in children would have been confirmed. Since he lived, and with that name, the superstitiously minded, which meant everybody who had ever heard of the baby, claimed for the child a wonderful career under kindly stars.

Venizelos came just in time to be born an unredeemed Greek. Another fruitless revolution broke out when he was two years old. His father, ardent partisan of union

with Greece, was involved in the movement, and exiled by the Ottoman authorities. The family went for a few years to Cythera, and thence to Syra, where Venizelos learned his first letters.

Memories of free Greece, however, must have been dim to the boy, for the amnesty of 1872 enabled the family to return to Canea. The elder Venizelos had all his property and interests in Crete, and it was home there, despite the Turkish flag. The Cretans have the right to claim the liberator of Crete and the savior of Hellas as their own. From the age of eight to twenty Venizelos attended the lower schools and high school of Canea. He grew up an unredeemed Greek, coming gradually to the consciousness of the terrible humiliation of alien rule. The Turks were a dominant race, contributing nothing to the community, but arrogating to themselves privileges which cut deep into the souls of the Cretans, and obstructing the agricultural and commercial development of the country. The menace of the Turkish jail, of confiscation of property, even of death, was always in the air. When the Turkish garrisons left the island, and autonomy was granted, the overlordship of Constantinople was still annoying and irritating. The Moslem population, a strong minority in Canea, would not submit to laws and regulations. The Sublime Porte interfered to hamper every measure of progress and to forbid natural intercourse with free Greece.

The Powers sustained the Turks. There was no future for Crete or for the Cretans.

Ardent patriot as he had proved himself in his earlier days, Kyriakos Venizelos felt that to send his boy to Greece for further schooling would make for unhappiness. To the Ottoman Greek the consolation for his political bondage was to forget himself in trade. In a material way, at least, there was compensation. The higher education at Athens fitted the unredeemed Greek only for a life of unrest and uncertainty and vicissitudes. The man with a fortune risked its confiscation; with a business, its ruin. The professional man, after finishing the university, could enjoy freedom, but at the price of living in exile, away from his family and of no service to his compatriots. If he returned home, he had to submit to the Turks or become a revolutionary. The former course destroyed his soul; the latter involved the security of his family. When Eleutherios begged to be allowed to continue his studies and become a lawyer, his father refused. Like all men who have gone through hard times in their youth and then prospered, Kyriakos Venizelos wanted his son to learn by his experience and share his success. He insisted that Eleutherios go into business with him at Canea. If the boy studied at Athens, he would return to become a political agitator. That did not pay. Nor would it help. If Crete became free, it would be by some outside upheaval

BIRTHPLACE OF VENIZELOS; DESTROYED BY TURKISH TROOPS

The tablet on the wall reads: "House of Kyriakos P. Venizelos in which was born Eleutherios Venizelos on August 10th, 1864." The inscription in Greek script reads: "Here is the little house in which was born the giant leader of the Greek people Eleutherios Venizelos."

in Europe to bring about which and in which the Cretans themselves could play no part.

Fortunately for Crete and Hellenism, the Greek Consul-General at Canea was a frequent visitor in the Venizelos home. Georgios Zigomalas had long observed the remarkable intellectual gifts of Eleutherios, not only from his record in the high school, but also from discussions around the dinner-table. The cause of Hellenism could not afford to lose the combination of enthusiasm and common sense, of brains and courage, of energy and self-possession, so rare in the Greek race and virtually lacking in the Cretans. Zigomalas may not have foreseen the rôle Eleutherios Venizelos could play in the regeneration of Greece, but he did know that men with the qualities of leadership were not to be found among the Cretans, that the younger Venizelos possessed those qualities to a remarkable degree, and that the essential first step in the emancipation of unredeemed Greece was the union of Crete with the Kingdom of Greece. Zigomalas told the elder Venizelos that he had not the right to deprive Crete of her potential leader. It took two years of pleading, during which Eleutherios remained in his father's counting-room. Finally he was sent to the University of Athens to study law.

Did a great man ever plan his career in his youth and follow it step by step? Some, in retrospect, have said that they did, but they have probably been led into deceiving

themselves by the insidious temptation of hindsight. They may have succeeded in realizing dreams, they may have reached cherished goals; but Dick Whittingtons have no path to the lord mayoralty marked out. The rungs of the ladder appear one by one as the man of will, energy, and aspirations mounts. It is possible, however, for the man who leads his fellows to have a programme from his youth up, and to go forward by making every step conform to the principles of that programme. Experience modifies the details, but does not change the ideals. In this sense we can say that the life-work of Venizelos was decided upon and entered upon from the moment he began his studies at Athens.

Greeks love to talk. They do their thinking aloud, and ideas come with words. Perhaps in this they do not differ greatly from other races rich in historical and philosophical literature. New races, or rather races new in civilization building, have the good fortune not to be bound by their past. They are free agents. They do not have the problem of re-creating a national life upon old foundations. They do not know the meaning of that wonderful expression born of the recent war — "to carry on." Pioneers, they build where and as they please. Their evolution is shaped by circumstances. Occidental writers and travelers of the nineteenth century blamed severely, even ridiculed, the Greeks for being too ambitious in their concep-

tion of the rôle of modern Greece in the Near East. The relationship between ancient and modern Greece was denied in learned treatises, and the Greeks were scolded for not being content with the little kingdom at the tip of the Balkan peninsula. When I first visited Athens in 1908, an English archæologist told me that the Greeks were hopeless. "The moment these people get a little education," he complained, "they dream of restoring Hellas — an absurd and impossible aspiration that is paralyzing the life of this country."

If the archæologist had been able to get the dust of his ruins out of his eyes and see that the Hellenes, bound together by language and literature and Church, were never more alive than at the beginning of the twentieth century, he would have understood the dissatisfaction of the educated Greeks with their lot and would have realized that their conception of a new Hellas inevitably transcended the narrow confines of the artificial little kingdom set up by the European Powers. The corollary of the weakness and approaching dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was the advocacy by the Greeks of the reversion to them of what they had formerly owned.

The reasonable hope of a renascence of Hellenism was just beginning to be entertained in university circles when Venizelos went to complete his studies at Athens. It was the decade after the Turko-Russian War. Six years

before, the Congress of Berlin had passed judgment on the short-lived Treaty of San Stefano, and had attempted to arrange Balkan questions in accordance with the fears and ambitions of rival Powers. Montenegro had been coerced by the Great Powers into returning emancipated districts to Turkey. Greece had recently acquired Thessaly. During the student days of Venizelos, Bulgaria annexed Eastern Rumelia, the war between Bulgaria and Serbia was fought, and the Macedonian question began to divide the Balkan races.

The events of the years 1884–1886 furnished engrossing topics of conversation for the students of the University of Athens. It was realized that the last war with Russia had been a mortal blow for Turkey, and that the Great Powers were not in a position to enforce the decrees of Berlin. By annexing Eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria defied successfully both Turkey and the Powers. The Serbo-Bulgarian War foreshadowed an approaching crisis in the rivalry for the inheritance of Macedonia. Serbia had large backing in her unredeemed lands of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Hapsburg Empire. Bulgarian nationalism was aggressive and the Bulgarians outnumbered the Greeks of the kingdom.

It was during these days that Venizelos came to a realization of the vital necessity of using Athens as the means of liberating Saloniki and Constantinople and

Smyrna. The struggling little kingdom must be strengthened internally and added to, province after province, following the example of Thessaly. Through the Greece created by the Powers the Greek race must pit its strength against the Powers and Turkey combined, and must prevent the absorption of Greek lands by Slavic races. The young Cretan posed before his comrades the problem of the relation of Hellenes to the Kingdom of Greece. He asserted the doctrine of subordinating regionalism and particularism to the ideal of Greek unity. He intended to return to Crete to work for the redemption of his country. But, although redemption meant the union of the Greeks, and not simply union with Greece, the latter must come first.

Venizelos was proud of citing his own ancestry as an illustration of the indissolubility of the idea of Greek national consciousness with the ideal of Greek political unity. He belonged to Hellas, not to Crete. His ancestors were in charge of the great library of Alexandria when it was destroyed by Omar, and his own patronymic went back to the Florentine dukes of Athens. Saint Philothea Venizela, who suffered martyrdom at the hands of Turkish Pashas in 1598, was of his family. There were branches of the Venizeloi in Macedonia and Anatolia. His grandfather had emigrated to Crete from Crevata near Sparta, so his own father was born a Spartan. Was not his family history

typical of the history of the race? The beautiful old definition of Greece — "Hellas is where there are Hellenes" — must be kept in mind by the patriots of the critical period when the Slavic Balkan races were awakening to nationhood and when Hamidian Turkey was skillfully using the rivalry and jealousy among the Great Powers to keep in slavery the subject peoples she could no longer hold down by her own military force and diplomacy alone.

On a July day in 1886 Venizelos stood on the deck of a small steamer looking at the receding shores of redeemed Greece. His eyes were not star-gazing at the Acropolis, but were fixed upon the flutter of blue and white of flags in the harbor of the Piræus. The next morning, as the ship came to anchor in Suda Bay, his thoughts were not of the home-coming, but of the red flag, hateful badge of slavery, that waved from forts and custom-house. He could show his law diploma, with the seal of the University of Athens, and it would be recognized as giving him the right to practice in the courts of his native island. But nearly a quarter of a century was to pass before the boy of twenty-two could claim any privilege from the far more precious certificate which testified that he was a citizen of Greece. Through his father he was a free man: but through his mother and his birth in Crete he was an Ottoman subject. Abroad he could have enjoyed the honor and privileges of Greek citizenship. But he returned home, knowingly,

gladly, to live under the Ottoman flag and thus assume the burdens and share the handicaps of his fellow-Cretans.

Would he be sensible and take life as it came? The question did not arise in his mind. It had been settled long before he left the university. He thought of Turkey as Cato thought of Carthage. And to the effort he was ready to dedicate his life.

CHAPTER II

A REVOLUTIONARY BY PROFESSION

WHEN the soldiers of Xenophon saw the sea, they realized that they were nearing the end of their long journey. It did not make much difference where they came out on the coast. Just the sight of salt water made them feel at home and secure. There was but one word in their joyous cry. "Θάλαττα!" epitomizes the history of the Greek race. During thirty centuries the Hellenes have never wandered far from the sea. They are to-day where they have always been, in ports, on islands and peninsulas, on coast mountain-ranges, in the valleys not far from the mouths of rivers. The Gulf of Corinth makes the Peloponnesus almost an island, and gives the states of Central Greece a seacoast. Bœotia is an isthmus and Attica a peninsula. Eubœa is an island. When we study carefully the coast and mountain configuration of the Peloponnesus, of Macedonia, Thrace, and the Ægean coast of Asia Minor, we realize that the sea dominates the life of the Greeks on the mainland no less than on the islands. For you have a succession of gulfs and peninsulas. Almost all the islands are elongated and indented.

From the beginning of history Crete has played an im-

portant rôle in the life of the Hellenic race, and no nation that desired to be a maritime influence in the Near East could afford to be indifferent to Crete's political status. Crete stretches for one hundred and fifty miles across the exit from the Ægean to the Mediterranean. With Cythera and Anticythera on the west, and Cassos, Carpathos, and Rhodes on the east, Crete forms a bridge from Europe to Asia. On the north side, Suda Bay is a harbor without parallel in the Mediterranean. The owners of Crete have always been the predominant power in the Ægean. When they gained Crete, they could feel that their control of Constantinople and the Straits was assured. When they lost Crete, their power rapidly diminished in the Ægean coastlands and at Constantinople. This is why history repeated itself in regard to Crete. The island was a prize worth striving for, and, once won, to be held to the last ditch. Several times the Cretans appealed to non-Hellenic races to free them from another foreigner's yoke. But each successive liberator, for the sake of his own naval power and commercial supremacy, frowned upon, and did not hesitate to prevent by force, the union of the Hellenes of Europe and Asia through Crete.

In common with other islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, when the scramble was on for the fragments of the Byzantine Empire, Crete became a shuttlecock between the battledores of Italian city republics, and then fell

under Turkish rule. Unlike earlier invaders, since the days the Greeks themselves came, the Turks brought numerous immigrants in their train. The Turks were successful, however, neither in colonizing nor in seafaring. As on the Ægean coast of Asia Minor, they formed what was miscalled a Turkish element by conversion to Islam. Some of the weak were intimidated: some of the strong were tempted by the promise of immunity from confiscation of their lands. With a slight admixture of non-Turkish adventurers and families of officials and soldiers, these renegades became "the Turks" of Crete. In large majority the island remained Greek Christian.

The Turks took peculiar pride in Crete from the fact that it was their last great conquest. In the Greek war of liberation, the Cretans joined in the general uprising and had every right to expect their emancipation. But the Sublime Porte, seeing the danger of losing Crete, handed the island over to Mohammed Ali in 1830 as a reward for Egyptian aid and as compensation for the ships destroyed at Navarino. When independent Greece was formed, the Powers, united in the policy of keeping the new kingdom weak, tolerated this subterfuge. The Cretans had endured all the sufferings of the war, but reaped none of its rewards. On the other hand, having been born to Hellenic national consciousness in the decade of epic struggle, they could no longer be apathetic to their lot. The Powers knew this.

In 1840, after they had intervened to save Turkey from Mohammed Ali's schemes of conquest, another opportunity presented itself to unite Crete with Greece. But they deliberately sacrificed Crete to their commercial rivalries and political jealousies, and allowed the island to revert to Turkey in fee simple.

Then followed an era of abortive insurrections. Hopeless and yet indomitable, the Cretans rebelled periodically. Had the country not been mountainous, they would have been exterminated by armies of Anatolian soldiers, whose orgies of cruelty and lust are better left undescribed. It is sufficient to say that the population decreased from one million to three hundred thousand. Refugees, escaping to the mainland, carried the story of their sufferings to the redeemed Greeks of the kingdom.

No other propaganda was necessary to bring the Cretan question into the internal politics of the Greek kingdom and to make inevitable a life-and-death struggle between Greek and Turk that would in the end be decided only according to the Darwinian theory. Because of the Cretan insurrections Greece was to incur three hundred million francs of direct expenses, and fight an unsuccessful war with Turkey. Delyannes, precursor of Venizelos, realized that union with Greece was the only possible solution of the Cretan question. At the Congress of Berlin he asked for Thessaly to assure Greece food, but he asked also for

Crete to assure Greece peace. As we read them to-day, the arguments of Delyannes bear witness to his clairvoyance. The Powers refused for the third time to sever the bonds between Turkey and Crete. Waddington alone espoused the cause of the subject race. The other statesmen at Berlin agreed with the British contention that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire must be maintained. They decided that Crete must remain under Ottoman control, subject to a reformed constitution called the Pact of Halepa, which provided a fairly good administration if a capable and sincere governor were chosen. But Crete was none the less still a Turkish vilayet (province).

It was for the General Assembly, as provided for in the Pact of Halepa, that Venizelos announced his candidacy in the autumn of 1886. The two Christian political parties, Conservatives (*Συντηρητικοί*) and Liberals (*Φιλελεύθεροι*), almost invariably alluded to each other by contemptuous nicknames. To the Liberals the Conservatives were the *Καραβάναδες* (empty-headed), and to the Conservatives the Liberals were the *Ξυπόλυτοι* (barefooted). All Near-Eastern peoples are masters of invective. Epimides, a Cretan himself, maintained that all Cretans were liars. Challenging the veracity of friends and foes alike, I have discovered in my travels, seems to be a pan-Mediterranean habit. The atmosphere of intense personal bitterness in which the youthful graduate of Athens University

found himself was probably enhanced by the hatred born of oppression. Not only were Christians and Moslems implacable enemies, but among themselves the Christians showed no tolerance for the opinions of one another. Venizelos, chosen leader of the Liberals, was put to an immediate test. Strong-arm methods were the order of the day, and it was the custom of the majority to exclude the minority. The first and natural proposition, when the Assembly met, was to eliminate the seven or eight deputies of the Opposition. Venizelos met the test. In a discourse that has remained famous, he said:

"A party should be founded not merely on numbers, but on moral principles, without which it can neither accomplish useful work nor inspire confidence."

A new spirit was born in Cretan politics.

The hopelessness of the parliamentary situation and the state of anarchy throughout the island, willed and fostered by the Sublime Porte, gave Abdul Hamid the opportunity for which he had been waiting. Invoking the necessity of reëstablishing order and protecting the Moslem minority, he sent an army of forty thousand to Crete in August, 1889. Making haste slowly, the Sultan allowed several months to elapse before taking the decisive step. The repression was gradual. Time was given to see whether European public opinion would force the hand of the chancelleries. When he felt sure that there would be no concerted action

in favor of Crete on the part of the Powers and that the story of the repression was no longer news, Abdul Hamid sent Admiral Ratib Pasha to publish and enforce a firman (December 7, 1889) canceling the concessions granted to the Cretans by Article XXIII of the Treaty of Berlin. The Powers made only "representations" at Constantinople.

The firman was rigorously executed. As they could not count upon aid from Greece or from Europe, or upon the diversion and embarrassment of an insurrection in any other part of the Empire, there was nothing for the Cretans to do but to await developments. They had to content themselves with the weapon of passive resistance. Venizelos advocated abstention from elections, and set the example by refusing to have anything to do with a parliamentary assembly so long as the firman of 1889 was in force. All the Christians agreed to the election strike, and for five years there was no General Assembly. The Turkish authorities found this policy a difficult one to combat. Administration became increasingly expensive, and revenues dwindled. The Moslem element had to suffer with the Christians in the paralysis of economic life, and became excited and nervous because of the constant menace of a new insurrection. One cannot sit indefinitely on the edge of a volcano and enjoy life. In June, 1894, Governor Mahmoud Djelaleddin Pasha narrowly escaped assassination. He asked for his recall, and told the Sublime Porte

frankly that the Cretan situation was hopeless unless a Christian governor was appointed.

Mahmoud Djelaleddin Pasha was replaced by Karatheodory Pasha, an Ottoman Greek, whose first act was to convoke the General Assembly in a proclamation that promised a liberal régime. In quick succession, Venizelos was called upon to make decisions that affected the whole course of his life and the future of Hellenism. Both times the temptation for a young man was peculiarly insidious. The five years of hopeless deadlock, which demonstrated the strength of Turkey and the determination of the Powers to do nothing to undermine that strength, were used as the potent argument to influence him. The first temptation was to cast in his fortunes with the Ottoman Empire. He was told that fame and wealth and power were his if he supported the new Christian governor, and devoted his talents to reconciling the Cretans to a national life within the Ottoman Empire. It was pointed out to him that a reasonable man must admit that any other course was against his own interests and against the interests and well-being of his fellow-Cretans. The careers of Karatheodory Pasha and other Ottoman Christians were cited. How much more attractive and assured was the future for a statesman under the Ottoman ægis than in pinning his faith to puny, impotent, and strife-ridden Greece! Would Venizelos wreck his life for nothing? And

from patriotic motives alone, the opportunity for serving his race was greater with Turkey than with Greece. Men like Karatheodory Pasha, who had common sense and accepted the inevitable, were the saviors of Hellenism. But Venizelos had no stomach for such an argument. He refused to become a creature of Yildiz Kiosk.

The second temptation was to participate in a new revolution with an attainable objective. Karatheodory Pasha had failed to get the General Assembly together. Christians and Moslems could not agree. The Christian deputies refused to sit in an assembly that would sanction and coöperate in any other form of government than that provided for by the Pact of Halepa. It was futile to advance that Karatheodory Pasha would restore to the Cretans all the privileges provided for in Article XXIII of the Treaty of Berlin. Participating in the government of the island under these circumstances would mean a tacit abandonment of the international status of Crete and acceptance of the direct and unqualified sovereignty of the Sultan. Up to this point friends of Venizelos agreed with his policy. Refusal to recognize the good intentions of Karatheodory Pasha was wise. But why not strike while the iron was hot, capitalize the failure of the reappointment of a Christian governor and compel the intervention of the Powers to make Crete autonomous within the Ottoman Empire?

This temptation was stronger than the first, and it cropped up over and over again during the next twenty years. On the surface, suzerainty seemed a reasonable alternative to sovereignty. The choice involved no degradation or dishonor, no betrayal of the immediate interests of Crete. On the other hand, by limiting the objective, the horror of a new Turkish invasion, with the invariable concomitant of massacre and pillage, might be avoided. For there was a semi-official intimation from a high British source that the Foreign Office would favor intervention, immediately after the insurrection broke out, to compel the Sublime Porte to grant complete autonomy to Crete. Moreover, many prominent Cretans then and later sincerely believed that autonomy, if properly safeguarded by the Powers, would serve better the economic interests of Crete than union with Greece. Thrown into the balance also was the opinion of some Greeks of the kingdom that Greece was being threatened in her political stability and economic prosperity by the eternal propaganda and agitation of the annexionists.

Had Venizelos been simply a Cretan politician or patriot, with only the thought of what was best for Crete in his mind, he would have yielded to the autonomists, if not in 1894, certainly during one of the crises of later years. We cannot understand the leadership and policy of Venizelos in Crete unless we appreciate the fact that

from the beginning of his public life he thought in terms of Hellas and acted as a Hellene.

On September 16, 1895, the autonomist revolution broke out. Venizelos believed that it was ill-timed and that, if the Powers did intervene, the movement would not serve the interests of the Greek race. Not only did he have the moral courage to accept the opprobrium of abstaining from any part in the revolution, but he risked his prestige and leadership by declaring against it. He said he would fight for no cause but that of union with Greece. It was at this time that the Athens newspapers began to mention his name. He was spoken of as a politician of ability and as a "prominent lawyer." But his attitude puzzled those who were disposed to admire him. He was regarded as obstinate and unpractical, qualities difficult to reconcile with his evident mental suppleness and the logical faculty that had already impressed itself upon all who had heard him argue cases in the Canea courts. Before events proved otherwise, Venizelos was a visionary, like Abraham Lincoln, with a *penchant* for butting his head against a stone wall.

A new army was sent to Crete. Goaded to desperation, the revolutionaries succeeded in besieging the Turkish garrison at Vamos. Winter and the forbidding mountains enabled the Cretans to hold out. But in the spring reinforcements arrived from Anatolia, and in the last week of

May, 1895, the civilized world was shocked by the news of horrible massacres at Canea and all over the island. Troops fresh from Armenia knew how to do their work well.

The Greek Government sent an appeal to the Powers, warning them that if something were not done to save the Cretans, the Greek people would force a declaration of war against Turkey. Thus the Eastern question would be reopened, and Heaven knew where it would lead to! The Armenians had no such potent argument. This was something different from the quickly tided-over wrath of mass meetings! The Powers sent warships to Crete. The orgy of blood-lust was suspended. Realizing that he was putting too great a strain upon European diplomacy, Abdul Hamid called a halt. A firman of August, 1896, accorded autonomy to Crete "under the sovereignty of the Sultan."

The new régime was intended to have only an ephemeral existence. The German *Drang nach Osten*, Anglo-Russian colonial rivalry in Asia, and Anglo-French colonial rivalry in Africa were beginning to affect seriously the harmony among the Powers; the Balkan States were pitted against one another because of Macedonia; and Russia and Austria-Hungary were playing an equivocal game. The Jameson Raid had precipitated a crisis for Great Britain in South Africa. Russian intervention in Korea and the scramble for concessions in China were diverting the attention of the Powers to the Far East.

Fully informed by his Minister in Athens of the state of feeling in Greece, Abdul Hamid felt that the time had come to settle the Cretan issue.

In January, 1897, massacres began again at Canea and Rethymo. Venizelos was campaigning for the new elections when he heard of the massacre. He returned and took command of the insurgents, who had concentrated at Akrotiri, on the mountainous peninsula west of the city. Ready now to adopt his policy, the Cretans proclaimed the union of their island with Greece. The Turks answered by burning the Christian quarters of Canea. The foreign consuls were compelled to take refuge aboard the warships in Suda Bay.

There are times when a nation simply has to fight, come what may. So it was with Greece in 1897. On February 10 Prince George was sent to Crete in command of a flotilla of torpedo-boats. On February 13 two thousand Greek soldiers disembarked, and took possession of the island in the name of King George.

Dismayed at the prospect of war between Greece and Turkey, the Powers unanimously agreed to preserve the peace of the Near East at the expense of the Cretans. They telegraphed Admiral Canevaro, in command of the international fleet, to disembark troops, prevent the Greeks and Turks from fighting, and use force to bring the insurgents to reason. The Greek flag was flying, in

plain sight and within range of the warships, over the Akrotiri camp. On February 20 Venizelos was ordered by the admiral to lower the flag and disband his rebel force. He refused. The next morning the warships opened fire. The flag was struck down and raised again. Later, British and French troops were landed. When called upon to surrender by the British Colonel Egerton, Venizelos replied:

"We have acquired this position at the price of our blood, we have not been driven out by the shells of your warships, and death alone will force us to abandon it."

Several attempts were made to convince Venizelos of the madness of playing a lone hand against the whole world. The consuls at Canea, who knew with whom they had to deal, told the military and naval officers of the Powers that if they could persuade Venizelos, there would be no difficulty in ending the insurrection without fighting. And they realized, too, that once the insurgents retired into the interior, they could not be brought to book. The parleys were fruitless.

A British naval officer, who held the usual preconceived opinion concerning the folly of subject races "stirring up things" as his own ancestors had stirred them up, had an interview with "the brigand." He wrote home a letter in which his astonishment was frankly revealed. He had found Venizelos a quiet, reasonable young man, willing to come to an agreement with the Powers on their own

terms, provided the Powers agreed to work out some *modus vivendi* for Crete that would lead to freedom from Turkey and union with Greece. He was able to put himself in the place of the statesmen of the Powers, and see their difficulties in dealing with Turkey and appreciate their reasons for refusing the wishes of the Cretans; but he wanted these statesmen, on their side, to put themselves in his place, and appreciate why the Cretans could not agree to sacrifice themselves and the Greek ideal for the good of European commercial and political interests.

"Your Foreign Office is in a tight place," he said to the British naval officer, "and you can go as slow as you like with the Sublime Porte. Make a feint of coercing us if you feel you have to. I shall restrain my men. But it must be only a feint. If your soldiers and marines, for whatever reason, go beyond a certain line I shall indicate to you, we shall open fire. Then you will be up against a guerrilla war that will not pay, and that will not help you a bit with your diplomatic game at Constantinople."

"Why do you not put yourselves in our hands? You know we have already freed Crete all except in name, and if you work with the Powers, your day will come more quickly than by forcing our hand and compelling us to oppose you," remonstrated the officer.

The response of Venizelos is the history of the last hundred years in the Near East.

"European policy is invariably the maintenance of the *status quo*, and you will do nothing for the subject races unless we, by taking the initiative, make you realize that helping us against the Turks is the lesser of two evils."

"Damn it all, the beggar is right!" wrote the British officer, "and I hope we shan't have to shoot him."

So fervently shared was this hope by the consuls and naval officers that they advised their governments to refrain from adopting an aggressive policy. The initial demonstrations against Greek troops and Cretan insurgents were sufficient to show the Sublime Porte that the Powers were determined to maintain the union of Crete with Turkey and to warn Greece that she would stand alone in a war against the Ottoman Empire. Venizelos and his band stayed at Akrotiri, visited by European officials and correspondents. The disembarkation of European troops, in fact, was helpful to Venizelos. It kept his headquarters out of the radius of fighting with the Turks, which was being carried on in a desultory fashion in other parts of the island. The city of Canea, already sorely tried, did not have to suffer further atrocities because of the intractability of Venizelos.

At the suggestion of Great Britain, the Powers decided to make Crete autonomous under the suzerainty of the Sultan. On March 2 they communicated this decision to Greece, declaring that Crete should not be annexed and

giving the Greeks six days to recall troops and ships. The Athens Cabinet was powerless in face of the agitation of the pan-Hellenist committee, called "Ethniki Hetairia." Venizelos had now become influential enough to make his voice heard in the councils of the committee. He did not advise against war with Turkey. On the contrary, by his defiance of the Powers at Akrotiri, he helped to make the war inevitable.

Did Venizelos believe that Greece had a chance to win against Turkey? Did he think that the Powers would intervene before the first battle, renounce the blockade of Cretan ports decreed after Greece had refused to yield to the ultimatum of March 2, and decide to permit the union of Crete with Greece as the only means of keeping peace in the Near East? Did he count, as King George counted, upon the influence of the Russian royal family to modify the Russian foreign policy to the extent of making Crete an exception in the formal opposition of Russia to any further development of Hellenic unity? Venizelos has never answered these questions, and he has assured me that he has kept no notes or letters that would furnish the answer. The speeches of Venizelos are voluminous and contain frequent references to his past life. But the references are always for the purpose of illuminating or defending a present policy. Of Akrotiri days he says simply that 1897 was one of those critical moments when the voluntary

compromising of a principle would have been more disastrous than failure to secure its triumph by holding out as long as was humanly possible.

In 1897 Venizelos demanded no more of Greece than he demanded of himself. The ideal of Hellenic unity, like every other ideal, could be realized only if those who believed in it were ready to sacrifice everything to attain it. Europe regarded the Greek war against Turkey as a mad and ridiculous enterprise. It was the same judgment that Europe passed upon Garibaldi's Roman expedition of 1849. But as in Italy 1859 would not have been possible without 1849, so in Greece 1912 would not have been possible without 1897. When men prove that they are willing to give their lives for an ideal, to risk ignominy and failure, to pay the price without stint, then and only then is the ideal in a fair way of realization.

Greece made a poor showing against Turkey. Her soldiers fought well, but her officers were inefficient. Of staff work there was none, and the failure of the service of supplies to function showed how unready Greece was to fight any enemy. The navy had no ammunition. Without the intervention of the Powers, Greece would have been lost.

The troubles of Venizelos began before the impotence of Greece had been demonstrated. Despite the brave showing of the Akrotiri insurgents, Venizelos found, even before

Greece declared war on Turkey, that he could not count upon his fellow-Cretans. As the insurrection spread, it met with ill-disguised hostility. The bulk of the Cretans were sick of the incessant revolutions. Turkish regulars and irregulars were massacring and burning once more. Enemies of Venizelos carried on a propaganda against his candidates. They spread the news that the insurgents of Akrotiri were being attacked by the troops of the Great Powers simply because Venizelos had refused to accept less than a recognition of the union of Crete with Greece. Then the story began to filter in, exaggerated from the beginning, of the Greek reverses in Thessaly. Why another hopeless struggle when there was an alternative that promised well?

Venizelos was elected president of the Revolutionary Assembly, but when he arrived at Arhanes, fifteen miles from Canea, where the Assembly was sitting, he found a body of discouraged men who had had enough and who felt that Cretan public opinion was solidly behind them. At the first session after his arrival, a resolution was introduced moving that the Assembly enter into negotiations with the Powers on the basis of autonomy. The call for a vote was insistent and threatening. Although he knew that only sixteen of his partisans were in the room, Venizelos did not hesitate to protest. He began to speak, calling attention to the fact that the unfortunate war was

being fought by Greece for Crete, and declaring that he and his companions of Akrotiri refused to become traitors and abandon Greece. The discussion became a riot. A deputy rushed upon Venizelos with a knife. Venizelos did not flinch. He stood impassive by the table awaiting the blow, which would have fallen had not a man in the front row tripped up the would-be assassin. The session ended in confusion.

Friends of Venizelos came to him that night and warned him that his death had been decided upon. They begged him to yield and to allow them to assure the plotters that on the morrow Venizelos would no longer oppose the end of the revolution.

Venizelos thought that his own honor and the future of Hellas were more precious than the question of personal security. When his visitors advanced the argument of expediency, he pointed out to them that it was impossible for one who had given the Greeks of the mainland the example and encouragement of the Akrotiri incident to yield to expediency now. One of the visitors then challenged Venizelos to assert that he himself still believed in the possibility of putting through the unionist policy. Venizelos answered that this was not the question at issue. He admitted the failure of their hopes, but he contended that it was vital that the overture for compromise should come from the Athens Government and not from the

Cretans. By this time the howling crowd outside had set fire to the house. Thrusting aside loyal followers who would have formed a bodyguard, Venizelos faced his assailants. He called them traitors to Hellas and unworthy of liberty. In sharp relief against the flames he stood there, ready for martyrdom. Uncertain of the effect of his words upon the others, none raised a hand. Venizelos passed through their midst, and when the sun rose, he was back at Akrotiri, looking down upon the warships at anchor in Suda Bay.

The tragic end of the war with Turkey was apparent. Although he felt that it was possible to keep the Powers in an embarrassed and equivocal position in Crete, Venizelos realized the inadvisability of provoking the chancelleries too far. The intervention of the Powers was the only hope for Greece. So Venizelos went to Athens to negotiate with the Government. What should be the policy of the insurgents of Akrotiri? Up to this point, putting Hellas ahead of Crete, they had remained intractable. In view of the misfortunes of the kingdom and the impending disaster, had not the time come to compromise? Stubbornness is a powerful weapon only when used intelligently. For one to say that he will die rather than yield is strength at one moment: at another moment it is weakness. A large part of genius in human leadership is in knowing when and how far to compromise.

At Athens, Venizelos took counsel with Sfakianakis, a retired Cretan politician who enjoyed the respect of the islanders. After coming to an agreement on the probable course of negotiations for peace and what should be the policy of the Cretan insurgents, Venizelos and Sfakianakis conferred with the Greek Cabinet and the Ministers of the Powers. Venizelos made it clear that he and his followers would not abandon of their own initiative the demand for union with Greece. Nor would they admit that they had to yield to *force majeure*, applied by Turkey and the Powers. But they recognized the fact that Greece had withdrawn her troops from Crete and had made the renunciation to her claim to Crete a condition of her plea for the mediation of the Powers. Consequently, not wishing to embarrass Greece in the negotiations for peace and recognizing the generous aid of the Powers to Greece, the insurgents were ready to accept autonomy. But they asked that the Powers formally guarantee this autonomy under a governor appointed by the Powers. And they stipulated that the withdrawal of the Turkish garrisons should precede the abandonment of the insurgent movement.

The Powers failed to agree with Turkey or among themselves. Although the Turco-Greek Treaty was signed at Constantinople on December 4, 1897, little progress was made in establishing a new status for Crete. Turkey insisted upon the maintenance of the Ottoman garrisons on

the island, and upon naming an Ottoman Christian functionary as governor. This was just what Venizelos feared. He knew that if the Cretans had put themselves in the hands of the Powers, had tamely withdrawn from Akrotiri, and had disbanded the Revolutionary Assembly, the necessary safeguards to autonomous existence would have been waived one after the other in the negotiations at Constantinople. In dealing with the Powers, he displayed a genius for conciliation tempered with firmness, which is the statesman's greatest asset. He was able to oppose the dilatory and temporizing tactics of European diplomacy without coming to an open rupture. He managed to hold in check his own followers, over whom his personal authority was constantly being tested. The Powers, to prove to Turkey their good faith and their control of the situation, increased their zones of occupation.

Over the Convent of Arkadi, far beyond the reach of the guns of the warships, Venizelos hoisted the autonomous flag, which he made very similar to that of Greece. Then, to bear witness to his faith in the good intentions of the Powers, he decided to make Akrotiri, where they could get at him, the seat of the Revolutionary Assembly. With negotiations between the Powers and Turkey still pending at Constantinople, he succeeded in getting his Revolutionary Assembly recognized by the Powers, who were weary of the responsibility of police duty and were ready

to accept almost anything that offered the promise of a stable government.

This gave Venizelos his great opportunity. He constituted an executive commission, with Sfakianakis as president. Despite the international occupation and the presence of the Turks at Candia, the Provisional Government gave a demonstration of its efficiency. Venizelos could now point to the ability of the Cretans to manage their own affairs. The time had come for the simultaneous withdrawal of the Powers and Turkey. The Powers demanded nothing better. Germany and Austria-Hungary declared their intention of washing their hands of the whole Cretan business. But Turkey would not withdraw her troops, and persisted in her claim to appoint a governor. Venizelos warned the Powers that Christians and Moslems could not work together in a parliamentary system so long as there was a Turkish garrison in Crete, and that a governor appointed by the Sublime Porte would have it in his power to prevent the harmonious development of an autonomous administration.

The Powers had three choices: an indefinite occupation of Crete; withdrawal, with the certainty that Cretans and Turks would fight again as soon as they left; or forcing Turkey to accept the conditions of Venizelos. All three had serious "inconveniences," to use the language of the diplomats. The *impasse* was broken by a Moslem attack

upon British troops and Christians at Candia on September 6. The British Vice-Consul and several British soldiers were killed. When foreigners are massacred, Near-Eastern problems always appear in a different light. Turkey was compelled to withdraw her troops on November 12. Russia, Great Britain, France, and Italy decided to make themselves guarantors of the autonomy of Crete. In exchange for the privilege of naming the governor, they promised the Sublime Porte to maintain Ottoman suzerainty and to assure the rights of the Moslem minority.

The Russian Government was afraid of a British scheme to get control of Crete. The thought of Suda Bay as the naval base of a rival had all along been in the minds of the statesmen of the Powers. Russia proposed Prince George of Greece as High Commissioner of the Powers in Crete. France seconded the nomination. It seemed the best solution. But if the Powers had at that time any intention of "preserving the rights of Turkey," they blundered badly. To call the son of the King of Greece to the chief magistracy of an island which had so long aspired to political union with Greece was, in the eyes of all Hellenes, a direct encouragement to their aspirations. How could they think otherwise? The Moslem Cretans, too, regarded this step as the end of Ottoman sovereignty, for they emigrated in so great a number that the Moslem population was soon reduced to the proportion of one in ten.

Venizelos and his followers considered the new régime as purely transitional. This fact must be borne in mind if we are to judge fairly the rôle of Venizelos during the last decade of his service to Hellas in Crete. One cannot read contemporary accounts of Cretan politics from 1899 to 1909 without realizing that up to the very end of his career as a Cretan leader Venizelos was regarded as unreasonable and erratic. Even by those who admired him most he was called a gambler. In the European chancelleries he was looked upon as a dangerous mischief-maker. The High Commissioner and his satellites hated him. The Church denounced him and then excommunicated him. The respectable elements of the community (invariably, as a class, for the maintenance of the *status quo*, whatever it may be) called him unsafe. Newspaper reporters, while often paying tribute to his high quality, gave the impression in their dispatches from Crete that the dashing and picturesque brigand was a sort of a Don Quixote.

Venizelos has himself described his life in Crete and the reason he was compelled to lead it as he did, in a few brief sentences. Speaking to the representatives of the foreign press at a banquet we gave in his honor at the Peace Conference in 1919, Venizelos told us:

"After I finished my studies at Athens, I returned home and hung out my shingle. I had not tried many cases in the courts of my home island before it became necessary

for me to take arms against the Turkish Government. Although my father was born in Greece, I was considered an Ottoman subject — therefore a rebel — because my mother was born under the Turkish flag. At the end of this revolution, I returned again to my town and resumed my legal profession. I did not have time, however, to go far with it; for I had to take arms again and go to the mountains. Soon I reached the point where I had to decide whether I ought to be a lawyer by profession and a revolutionary at intervals, or a revolutionary by profession and a lawyer at intervals. Since my compatriots met with opposition in their efforts to bring about the complete union of Crete with Mother Greece, I naturally became a revolutionary by profession."

If Venizelos had in mind anything less than "efforts to bring about the complete union of Crete with Mother Greece," his actions would indeed be inexplicable after the inauguration of the autonomous administration. But had he not told the Powers, in the name of the insurgents of Akrotiri, that the Cretans did not abandon the hope of union with Greece and regarded the solution of 1898 as purely temporary? Venizelos, then, cannot be accused of bad faith, of unreasonableness, of disloyalty to Prince George because he kept the goal steadily before him, and refused to be diverted from it himself or to allow Crete to be diverted from it. Of course he did exhibit the spirit of a *frondeur*. No one gets very far in this life who is afraid to make a row when he sees what he wants slipping from his grasp.

Venizelos accepted a post in the High Commissioner's government, with the intention of doing everything in his power to make a success of the autonomous administration. The proof of this is the splendid judicial system with which he endowed Crete, and the sound advice he gave Prince George, out of his rich experience, concerning the organization of a gendarmery. What encouraged the Powers most and what they commended Prince George for most was the smooth internal reorganization of the courts and police system of Crete, for which Venizelos was responsible. But when Prince George began to regard Crete as a fief — a principality created for him to rule over — he found that Venizelos was as ready to rebel against him as against Turkey and the Powers. For Venizelos the enemy of Hellas, to be opposed by force of arms, was whoever worked to prevent the redemption and union of Hellas.

When Venizelos was overridden and dismissed from office by Prince George, he retired quietly to Canea, and took up again the practice of law. As the years passed, he kept his party together and strengthened and increased it, never missing an occasion to have the Cretans reiterate their determination to be united to Greece. In the meantime Prince George was becoming enamoured of his job. He answered the call of his Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg and Romanoff blood. He called friends from

Athens and elsewhere to fill the best posts in the administration, denied the dependence of his government upon Parliament, and schemed to assure his virtual dictatorship by disarming the dangerous elements in the population (mostly Venizelists!) and by making the foreign gendarmery answerable only to himself.

This usurpation of power was gradual, and it can be argued that at the beginning it was well-nigh necessary for any governor who had decided to get along without the coöperation of the Venizelist party. It was not without its compensations. Above all things Crete needed a period of rest and of recuperation. Venizelos agreed with the High Commissioner that the political evolution must not be forced, and that absolute liberty could not follow immediately a dictatorial régime. The good offices of the Powers were needed in arranging relations with Turkey. It was not until August, 1901, that the Cretan Government was able to sign a convention with delegates of the Ottoman Public Debt, by which the latter renounced its rights and privileges in the island in return for a fixed annual payment and the concession of the salt monopoly for twenty years. In November, 1901, the Sublime Porte agreed to recognize the Cretan flag and Cretan passports and to hand over to the Cretan Government Cretans sentenced in Turkey for political and common law offenses. A fiscal system had to be worked out. There was much

to be accomplished in establishing the machinery for local administration and law courts, and in adjusting the new relations between Moslems and Christians.

The growing autocracy, discrimination against Cretans in appointments, and the persecution of Venizelists were tolerated. Venizelos confined his opposition and agitation to combating the idea that the autonomous régime should be regarded as a permanent status for Crete. It was over this question, which involved a betrayal of the Hellenic ideal, that Venizelos came into conflict with Prince George.

In November, 1900, Prince George made a tour of the chief European courts ostensibly in behalf of the union of Crete with Greece. He returned with the conviction that his bread was best buttered on the side of autonomy. He wanted the mandate, which had been for three years, renewed by the Powers, and was ready to accept the conditions laid down by European statesmen. It was much better fun to have one's own principality than to be a second son at Athens. At the opening session of the Cretan Assembly, on May 31, 1901, Prince George told the deputies that the Powers declined under the present circumstances to sanction the union with Greece, and wanted the Prince to stay on for three years longer as High Commissioner. The Assembly, ninety per cent of whose members belonged to the Opposition, answered by passing a resolution in favor of union with Greece. The Powers

answered that they did not consider that there was any ground for a change, that infringement of the rights of the Sultan "might seriously endanger the peace of the Near East by subjecting Greece once more to the hostility of Turkey," and that Crete was better off as regarded taxation and simplicity of administration than if the island were incorporated with Greece.

During the second term of Prince George, Venizelos confined himself to Parliamentary opposition to the personal rule of Prince George. He counted upon the growing despotism and inefficiency to discredit Prince George in the eyes of the people. But he thought that an active and tireless propaganda of education should be carried on to instill into the minds of the people that political freedom and economic prosperity were possible for Crete only through union with Greece. The test came in the elections of 1904, in the spring before the expiration of the second term of the Prince's mandate. By this time the Prince had the courts, the press, and the Church well in hand. With the help of a close friend, Eliakis (governor of Western Macedonia in 1919), Venizelos started a newspaper, which he wrote from beginning to end.

Venizelos wielded a powerful pen After a few issues had appeared, Venizelos and Eliakis were haled into court. The charge was an article Venizelos had written against the policy of the Government, which Prince

George declared was subversive. The paper was suspended for three months, and the writer condemned to imprisonment and a fine of two thousand drachmai. Eliakis insisted that he was responsible and that the sentence be passed on him as publisher. When Venizelos demurred, Eliakis convinced him that he should remain free to carry on the campaign. But later, when Eliakis was arrested a second time for an article of Venizelos, Venizelos wrote a letter to the court in which he assumed responsibility for everything in the paper. Despite the protests of Eliakis, Venizelos shouldered the verdict. He went to prison for eleven days. The first charge, for which Eliakis suffered, was virtually that of *lèse-majesté*. The second indictment, on which Venizelos was convicted, was having written an article criticizing the activities of the Archbishop of Crete. At the instance of the Prince, the Archbishop made a tour of Crete, urging from the pulpit a vote in favor of the son of the King and against the revolutionists. To give weight to his plea, the Archbishop formally anathematized Venizelos. Venizelos called the electoral tour of the Archbishop a sacrilege, and wrote that it was sad to see the head of the Church degrading himself!

In August, 1904, delegates from all the provinces presented a petition to Prince George, asking him "to make known to the Protecting Powers the firm resolution of Crete to be united to Greece." As his mandate was again

expiring, Prince George made a second official trip to Europe. He returned, confirmed once more in the High Commissionership, but rebuffed in the demand for the union of Crete with Greece. The annexionists charged that he had been lukewarm in representing their wishes, and had sacrificed Crete to his personal ambition. The Powers then published a joint declaration of their intention to maintain the existing status, and refused to withdraw the international forces whose presence since 1897 had become intolerable to the Cretans. By this time Prince George had come to be regarded as a foreign tyrant, caring for the interests neither of Crete nor of Greece, and relying upon the international army of occupation to prevent and denature the development of Cretan self-government and economic prosperity. The questions at issue with Turkey had been settled only on paper.

On March 23, 1905, six hundred insurgents established themselves at Therisso, in the mountains three miles from Canea, ignored the proclamation of Prince George to disband, and repulsed the gendarmery sent against them. Convinced that a show of force was once more necessary, Venizelos joined the insurgents, and organized a Provisional National Assembly at Therisso. Through the consuls of the Powers of Canea, Venizelos sent a note to the Powers, stating that the Cretans felt it necessary to anticipate the election of April 2, in which the Govern-

ment had made elaborate arrangements to interfere. He contended that a fair election was impossible, and that an overwhelming majority of the Cretans stood behind the Therisso movement. The Powers were begged to protect no longer the government of Prince George.

The unionist movements spread over the whole island. On April 20 the Venizelist Assembly, in which every hamlet was represented, proclaimed the whole of Crete "indissolubly united to her mother Greece under the scepter of King George I." The powers ignored this action, ordered the Greek flags which had been hoisted to be hauled down, and threatened repressive military measures. In a letter to the consuls the insurgents pledged themselves not to resist the forces of the Powers. They stated that their only motive in taking up arms was to defend themselves against the oppressive measures of the Government and to vindicate the right of public meeting which had been unconstitutionally suppressed. The reply of the Powers was that the reforms demanded would be made, but that the insurgents must surrender first. Venizelos felt that the British were sincere, not only in the promises of financial and administrative reforms, but also in intimating that British diplomacy was ready to help to consummate the union of Crete with Greece. Had there been only one Power to deal with, and that Power Great Britain, the events of the summer of 1905 might not have taken place.

Unfortunately Venizelos had a coalition to deal with, each of whose members suspected the motives of the others. Unable to get collective tangible guarantees from the consuls at Canea or reasonable assurances from the Ministers of the four Protecting Powers at Athens, Venizelos felt that the insurgent movement must continue. This decision required extraordinary courage. For, as in 1897, many of the Cretan leaders were wavering and apprehensive, and he risked repudiation by the National Assembly.

The Therisso revolution led to bloodshed. On June 30 there was a serious encounter at Platania between the insurgents and Russian troops, supported by Russian and French warships, and on August 16 a second fight with the Russians near Rethymo. The insurgents were compelled to withdraw into the mountain strongholds. Without ammunition and equipment and without adequate food supplies, Venizelos realized that his movement would collapse when winter came. But after the Rethymo affair, while making successful efforts to prevent the Cretan cause from suffering further by unfortunate collisions with international troops, he judged it still opportune to hamper the Europeans as much as possible. He wanted them to realize that the pacification of Crete threatened to become a gigantic and perilous task. He was anxious to gain time. Perhaps the Protecting Powers would come to think that the game was not worth the candle and put no further ob-

stacles in the way of the union of Crete with Greece. Perhaps the newly formed Entente Cordiale would bring Great Britain and Russia closer together through France. Most important consideration of all, Venizelos hoped to restore the Greek Government to the privileged position it had enjoyed, in the international aspects of the Cretan question, before the war of 1897.

Venizelos had not been idle since 1899. He had been studying carefully the international political situation and had kept abreast of all the changes. He was becoming skilled in the methods of diplomacy, and knew how to detect the *combinazione* of others and how to make his own. He had been a Garibaldi. Now he must be also a Cavour. The Greek Premier, acting on the advice of the Cretan leader, sent a note to the Protecting Powers, recommending the union of Crete with Greece. He acknowledged this move in a cleverly worded statement, impeccable in form and substance. Although the Greek Government agreed with the insurgents as to the best solution of the Cretan question, Greece refused to participate in any action against the Powers and advised the insurgent leaders to seek reforms by peaceable means.

Venizelos sent more than a hundred confidential communications to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He put the revolutionary movement officially on record as not being antidynastic, as not being directed against the per-

son of Prince George, as not seeking to undermine the authority and prestige of the Protecting Powers, as not intending to involve either the Greek Government or the Protecting Powers in difficulties with Turkey. These documents showed the revolutionaries not as desperate rebels, seeking to overthrow constituted authority for partisan ends, or as unreasonable visionaries crying for the moon. The revolutionaries had a constructive programme. Far from being anarchists, they stood between Crete and anarchy. Only by availing themselves of the services of Venizelos and his friends could the Powers hope to extricate themselves from the mess they were in. But the revolutionaries had taken a solemn oath to work for union with the mother country. They were willing to support the present High Commissioner until the realization of that union, but if events independent of their will brought about the withdrawal of Prince George, they bound themselves to oppose the nomination of a foreign High Commissioner, and to accept only a Greek statesman chosen from among the former premiers. Venizelos of course knew that these documents were read *en route* by the representatives of the Powers. He wrote them with that in view. Thus was the rebel of Therisso able to converse indirectly with statesmen who were seeking some graceful way of dropping a hot poker.

Confident that the seed had been properly planted,

Venizelos and his companions negotiated with the consuls, and surrendered on November 19, 1905. Venizelos had not guessed wrong. Very soon after he returned to his law books in Canea, a commission appointed by the Powers came to inquire into the causes of general discontent. First indirectly and then directly, they consulted Venizelos. He discussed reforms with them, but impressed upon them the impossibility of any other permanent solution of the Cretan question than union with Greece. Any transitional régime, decided upon with this end in view, would have his support. Venizelos pointed out that Prince George would not be content to remain as High Commissioner, shorn of his privileges, and that when the time came to appoint a new High Commissioner, the Protecting Powers would have to take a definite stand on the question of the ultimate union with Greece.

Prince George left Crete on September 25, 1906. In a farewell proclamation he urged peace and confidence in his successor "in order to obtain the surest and speediest fulfillment of the national wishes." It was a bitter moment for Prince George. He accepted defeat. But he was unwilling to admit that patriotism, and not personal animosity, had inspired the conduct of the man whom he blamed for his failure.

The Powers seemed to have decided to accept the ultimatum contained in the oath of the revolutionaries of

Therisso. Venizelos himself might have penned the letter they sent to the King of Greece, asking him to appoint a successor to his son. It read:

"The Protecting Powers, in order to manifest their desire to take into account as far as possible the aspirations of the Cretan people, and to recognize in a practical manner the interest which His Hellenic Majesty must always take in the prosperity of Crete, are in accord to propose to His Majesty that hereafter, whenever the post of High Commissioner of Crete shall become vacant, His Majesty, after confidential consultations with the representatives of the Powers at Athens, will designate a candidate capable of exercising the mandate of the Powers in this island."

When the note was published, coupled with it was the announcement that King George had nominated Zaïmis, a former premier of Greece, and that the Powers had appointed Zaïmis to the High Commissionership. His powers were to be virtually those of a Greece viceroy "in order to prepare the island for definite incorporation with Greece."

Turkey naturally protested against the change in the *status quo* which such a step implied, and pointed out that it was a virtual destruction even of the suzerainty of the Sultan. But the situation was far different from that of 1897. Then Greece had acted on her own initiative. In 1906 the close connection of the Greek Government with Cretan affairs was due to the invitation of four great Pow-

ers. Abdul Hamid could not then threaten Greece. Nor was he able to divide the Powers. France and Great Britain had compounded their colonial rivalry. Great Britain and Russia were negotiating an agreement. Neither Italy nor Russia would be loath to find a pretext for picking a quarrel with Turkey. Germany was passing through a great internal electoral crisis. The Sublime Porte had to be content with the assurance that her "rights" would be "safeguarded," whatever that expression might mean, and the promise that the international troops would remain in Crete until the Powers were satisfied that the Moslem minority was going to receive a square deal.

Turkish suzerainty was hereafter to be symbolized by a cast-iron Ottoman flag planted on an island in Suda Bay.

CHAPTER III

VENIZELOS SOLVES THE CRETAN QUESTION

I BECAME a revolutionary by profession and a lawyer at intervals," said Venizelos, explaining his life in Crete. Akrotiri and Therisso had ended in surrender. If we were to judge the "professional" record of Venizelos on the basis of a bald chronological table of the revolutionary events during the twenty years between his graduation from the University of Athens and the departure of Prince George from Crete, we might be tempted to believe that the revolutionary by profession would have done better to stick to law. The Cretans had suffered terribly without winning their goal. Greece had been through the ordeal of an unsuccessful war, entailing the loss of frontier passes, an indemnity, and European control of her finances. The Protecting Powers, despite the concessions they had made, were indisposed toward the Cretans, and were afraid to withdraw the international troops. Partisans of Prince George provoked a disorderly scene in the Assembly, on the eve of the departure of the Prince, and indulged in armed demonstrations in several cities against the Powers and the Venizelists alike.

On the other hand, Venizelos, while he might well be

dismayed by the responsibilities ahead of him, had reason to be satisfied with the changes of twenty years. Ottoman garrisons and Ottoman governors had gone for good. Four great Powers were guaranteeing the autonomy of Crete. Their High Commissioner was to be a Greek, nominated by the Greek Government. The Powers admitted in principle that Crete would eventually be united with Greece and were no longer going to be instigated by the Sublime Porte to put obstacles in the way of union. It was understood that the maintenance of the international occupation was to protect the Moslem minority in its judicial and political rights until the Powers were satisfied with the fair and smooth working of the Cretan judicial and parliamentary institutions.

Venizelos was now definitely and irrevocably in public life. He had already sacrificed his private means and his professional career. When a man has passed his fortieth birthday, and has not settled down, in the bourgeois sense of that expression, he has not much hope of making his living and prospering as an ordinary, everyday member of the community in which he lives. When Venizelos went to Therisso in 1905, he burned his bridges behind him. Canea would see him no more as a private citizen. Having become identified with the national cause as its leader, his future was in politics.

High Commissioner Zaïmis arrived in Crete on October

14, 1906, and was received with enthusiasm. But he had not accepted the High Commissionership with the intention of directing the destinies of Crete. His ambitions as a statesman had been satisfied in Athens. He knew that administering Crete was all risk and no profit for an outsider. He felt also that if there was anything that he could do, it could be done to better advantage in Athens and in the capitals of the Protecting Powers. He had confidence in the ability of Venizelos to organize and administer the island during a transitional period which Greeks and Cretans now felt would be brief. So Zaïmis announced that he was going to devote himself to diplomatic activity in Europe. As soon as a cabinet was formed, with Venizelos as Premier, High Commissioner Zaïmis left Crete.

For two years Venizelos was given an opportunity to prove his ability as a constructive statesman. He had to face bitter political opposition, to keep his own followers from trampling on the rights of Moslem Cretans, and to settle the constant petty but delicate and annoying questions arising from the presence of the international troops. It was no bed of roses. But on the whole Venizelos enjoyed a free hand and was able to make the most of the period of comparative tranquillity. He lived in three small rooms, kept only one servant, and applied himself tirelessly to the tasks of government.

Everything went so well that Crete was forgotten. The

island disappeared from the newspapers. Even the Athens and Constantinople press stopped mentioning Crete. I have searched newspaper files in vain for Cretan news of 1907. When I questioned Venizelos recently about 1907 and the early part of 1908, he told me that one's own memory yields little concerning years when everything went well. "I was simply preparing for union with Greece," he said. "With the knowledge of the Powers I made the gendarmery, the judicial and fiscal systems, the administration, to conform as nearly as possible with Greek institutions. I had in mind to avoid another transitional period."

In the summer of 1908, out of a clear sky, came the event that was to plunge the world into a decade of political unrest, nefarious diplomacy, and wars. On July 25, 1908, the world was electrified by the news that Turkey had become overnight a constitutional monarchy. In a bloodless revolution the Young Turks, who had long been planning their *coup*, forced Abdul Hamid to revive the constitution which he had granted the Ottoman Empire more than thirty years before at the beginning of his reign, and which he had almost immediately suppressed. The Near-Eastern question was revived in all its acuity.

The programme of the Young Turks was disconcerting in its implications: for it challenged the half-measures of the Powers in their dealings with the Ottoman Empire, upset the formulæ of the Congress of Berlin and later

decisions of the Powers, and menaced the security of the former subjects of the Sultan whose clear title to independence had been denied for the sake of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks announced that the revolution had been undertaken for the purpose of saving the Ottoman Empire from dismemberment. Their thesis was simple and alluring. Since the constitution made no distinction between Christian and Moslem, hereafter all Ottoman subjects would enjoy equal rights, privileges, and responsibilities. As Turkey now had a government like that of European countries, there was no longer reason for interference of the Powers with her internal affairs. The capitulations, under which foreigners enjoyed special privileges in Turkey, had been sanctioned by the disparity between Turkish laws and customs and those of other countries. Having no longer a *raison d'être*, they must disappear. As Turkey was now endowed with a constitutional régime, the justification for autonomy and other safeguards for subject races ceased to exist. The Young Turks demanded the reintegration pure and simple in the new and regenerated Ottoman Empire of all the territories to which the Sultan still held title.

The European diplomats were agreed that the capitulations should remain in force. If any sacrifices were to be made to the Young Turks, they would be, of course, at the expense of the races of the Near East. But, since the Pow-

ers were uncertain as to how the disappearance of the old régime was going to affect their influence at Constantinople and each had in mind concessions and privileges present and future, concerted action was impossible. European and American liberal public opinion was decidedly sympathetic to the Young Turks. Their sincerity was not questioned. Their ability to put into force a genuine constitutional régime was taken for granted. If so, why was not their thesis reasonable?

Realizing the crisis that would confront them and discounting both approval and protest on the part of the Great Powers, the countries whose titles were contested anticipated the Young Turks. On October 5 Prince Ferdinand declared the independence of Bulgaria and assumed the rank of Czar; on October 7 Emperor Franz-Josef annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary; on October 12 the Cretan Assembly passed a unanimous resolution, declaring the union of Crete with Greece. A committee of six members was chosen to govern the island in the name of the King of Greece and according to Greek laws, which were to be put in force by decrees. The power of the committee was to end as soon as the Greek Government assumed administration of the island.

Was not Crete in virtually the same position as Eastern Rumelia in 1885, or, in fact, as Bulgaria herself? It was natural that the establishment of the constitutional

régime in Turkey, given the avowed programme of the Young Turks, should lead to a new proclamation of union with Greece. The motives which led to this action were identical with those put forth by Austria-Hungary as a justification of her annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Cretans feared as much as the Bulgarians that the Young Turks would repudiate the obligations assumed by Abdul Hamid, and endeavor to force their country back into the Turkish fold. At the moment Turkey was so engrossed in the question of the Austrian move and the Bulgarian declaration of independence and seizure of the railways of Eastern Rumelia that the Sublime Porte contented itself with a formal protest against the action of the Cretan Assembly.

Turkey could have done nothing had the four Protecting Powers recognized the union with Greece. They were no more bound by treaty to prevent the union of Crete with Greece than they were to prevent the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and the repudiation of the suzerainty of the Sultan by Bulgaria. And if it were a question of obligations, Great Britain was morally bound to hand Cyprus back to Turkey, and let regenerated Turkey have a say in Egypt. But each of the four Powers, regardless of the jeopardy in which Crete was placed and of the interests of the Cretans, was ready to sacrifice the Cretans to the sensibilities of the Young Turks. It was

the same motive that forbade intervention a few months later in the Adana massacres. From 1908 to 1914 the six great Powers were equally guilty of pursuing a policy at Constantinople based upon expediency, striving for special privileges and concessions by stabbing one another in the back. And in 1919, with three of the Powers eliminated, the other three began again the same sordid and shameless game.

The Protecting Powers, although their troops were in the island, made no threats and took no action. Indecision was made worse by the following note, which the four consuls at Candia sent to the self-appointed Provisional Government:

"The undersigned agents of France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, by order of their respective Governments, have the honor of bringing to the knowledge of the Cretan Government that the Protecting Powers consider the union of Crete with Greece as depending upon the assent of the Powers which have contracted obligations towards Turkey. Nevertheless they would not refuse to consider with kindly and sympathetic interest the later discussion of this question with Turkey, provided that it is shown that order can be maintained in the island and the safety of the Moslem population secured."

In vain Venizelos contended that experience had already shown that the Cretans were capable of maintaining order in the island, and that no Moslem had felt any insecurity since the withdrawal of the Turkish before. The Moslems

who emigrated had done so because they refused to live under Christian rule. Bad blood between Christians and Moslems would arise again only if the latter refused to accept the changed *status quo* and conspired to bring back the Turks.

In the spring of 1909 the Protecting Powers realized that they were getting into a bad hole. Germany was beginning to profit, at Athens as well as at Constantinople, by the effort they were making to carry water on both shoulders. The Sublime Porte declared that the Government and people were unanimous in the determination to maintain Turkish sovereignty (the word "suzerainty" had now been abandoned) over Crete. The Cretans answered by making all officials take the oath of allegiance to the King of Greece, and sent appeals from the decisions of local courts to the Court of Appeals at Athens. The Sublime Porte pointed out that the international troops were occupying Crete for the purpose of preventing any infringement of Turkish rights, and wanted the ambassadors of the Protecting Powers to explain why their troops were not performing their duties. But when the Powers hit upon the withdrawal of the troops of occupation as the only way of avoiding a repetition of this embarrassing question, the Turks intimated that the withdrawal would certainly be followed by massacres of Moslems and that they could not be expected to remain passive in such a contingency.

On July 26, 1909, the Protecting Powers withdrew their garrisons. In a proclamation to the Cretans, a copy of which was communicated to the Greek Government, the Powers said that four warships would be stationed permanently in Cretan waters to protect Moslems and to safeguard "the supreme rights of the Ottoman Empire." This arrangement would be provisional, as the political status of the island could not be discussed until a more opportune moment.

By order of their Governments the consuls sang once more the old Siren song. They impressed upon Venizelos the delicate situation of the Protecting Powers, their goodwill toward the Cretans, and their intention of taking action at Constantinople as soon as possible. But the Cretan Premier must coöperate with them by keeping the Cretans from any overt act. They would be under obligations to him which they would not forget at the proper moment, and he would have no cause to regret refraining from rash acts. He knew how they felt, and they knew that he was reasonable and sensible. Venizelos was fully informed as to the diplomatic reasons for indecision and procrastination. The Powers were not considering the Cretan question in terms of Crete or Greece. But they were face to face with a statesman who would not be bluffed or intimidated. He summoned the Powers to state their intentions. He said that he did not wish to run

counter to their orders, but that he would have to raise the flag of Greece over the island when their troops left. He demonstrated that the alternative would mean anarchy.

The Young Turks had decided to do once more what Abdul Hamid had done so successfully in 1897. They knew that Greece was in a state bordering on anarchy and that her treatment of the princes had roused the resentment of the British, Russian, and German courts against Greece. If they could use the Cretan question to humiliate Greece, they would not only give the newly-fledged "Ottoman race" something around which to rally in the creation of national spirit, but they would have the whip hand over Ottoman Greeks whose fidelity to the constitution they wanted to test. The crisis through which Hellenism passed in 1909 and 1910 cannot be too strongly emphasized. We must remember that fully half of the Greek race was still under the Ottoman flag and that the Young Turk movement, under the mask of a specious liberalism, was really an attempt to destroy the Hellenic national life, which five centuries of despotism had not accomplished. These two years were the supreme test for Venizelos. Had his vision been limited to Crete or to Crete and the Kingdom of Greece, Venizelos would never have accomplished his great work. He would not have won the title of savior of Hellas.

The Protecting Powers evacuated Crete on July 26. On July 29 the Greek flag was hoisted at Canea. The Ottoman Government, ready as they thought to force the issue directly with Greece, sent a note to Greece, demanding the recall of Greek officers of militia and gendarmery in Crete. Two days later a second Turkish note, couched in strong terms, pointed out that Greek officers had taken an active part in hoisting the flag in Crete, and asked for a categorical assurance that Greece had no intention of annexing or invading Crete, failing which the Ottoman Minister at Athens would be recalled on unlimited leave. On August 9 Greece answered, with the approval of the Protecting Powers, that she desired to maintain frank and friendly relations with Turkey, that the Greek Government had nothing whatever to do with the annexationist movement, and that Greece was willing to promise to preserve the same correct and loyal attitude as in the past. Since Crete was in the hands of the Protecting Powers, the Greek Government must leave to them the solution of the Cretan question, and would abide by their decision. This explanation was ostensibly accepted by the Sublime Porte. Diplomatic relations were not broken. But in order to impress the Powers and intimidate Greece, the Turks began to boycott Greek ships and Greek goods. At Saloniki, Smyrna, Beirut, and Trebizond the longshoremen refused to unload Greek ships. Committees were

formed to picket and turn buyers from Greek shops. Boycotting had first been used against Austria-Hungary the autumn before as a protest against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Sublime Porte represented it as a popular movement. In truth, as I had excellent opportunities of observing, the boycott movement then and later was organized by the local Turkish authorities. It was an economic weapon used for political purposes. The Turks could not benefit by it economically, as they could neither supply the goods nor do the work of the Greeks.

Instead of accepting the *fait accompli* and admonishing the Sublime Porte that Crete was lost, the Protecting Powers encouraged Turkish chauvinism by dispatching additional warships to Crete. On August 18 they landed marines under the guns of the ships. Venizelos, true to precedent, would not haul down the flag. But this time, as he hoped that the Powers would soon realize the folly of their action and as he wanted to avoid a new national occupation of the island, he did not oppose the landing parties. The affair was like a scene from a comic opera. Four sailors, representing each Power, chopped the flagstaff with axes. A small force was quartered in the port of Canea to prevent any new affront to Turkey.

Did Venizelos believe that the Powers would now tell Turkey that they had done all they could, and refuse to

interfere further in the Cretan question? If so, he was deceived. Did the Powers believe that Venizelos would be convinced of the futility of further annexionist moves? If so, the Powers were deceived. From this time on Venizelos definitely bucked European diplomacy, ignored the advice and warnings of the Powers, and abandoned the hope of saving Hellenism through the coöperation of Europe. He discounted even the good-will of the Powers. Like a true statesman, of course, he sought to maintain friendly relations with all the Powers. The nation-builder can afford to leave no stone unturned. But at the best he hoped now only to be let alone. He knew that the Hellenes could look for no constructive aid and coöperation outside of the Balkan peninsula. The Powers were insensible to the danger Hellenism incurred from the Young Turk movement. Venizelos had arrived at that stage of development as a statesman in which Cavour was when he cried, "*Italiò farò da se!*"

In standing out once more and for all time against Turkey and European diplomacy, in refusing to accept any longer the autonomous *status quo* for Crete, in pitting his own strong and resolute leadership against the dilatory tactics of the Powers, Venizelos was fighting for the very existence of Hellenism, for the precious heritage of every man and woman and child throughout the world who spoke the Greek language. Hellas called for a Moses.

Venizelos answered the call. To maintain the formula of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the Protecting Powers struck down the Greek flag at Canea. By this act they made inevitable a life-and-death struggle between Greeks and Turks that would result in the virtual destruction of the Ottoman Empire. They made inevitable the world war they were attempting to avoid.

On October 7, 1908, when Venizelos had assumed the responsibility of answering the Young Turk pretensions by repudiating the further suzerainty of Turkey, he said to fifteen thousand Cretans on the Champs de Mars at Canea:

"Our revolution is peaceful and is not directed against the Powers. Its sole object is the final and irrevocable union of Crete with the Mother country. Hereafter the Government will act in the name of the Hellenic kingdom, and the Assembly will be opened in the name of the King, the deputies qualifying by taking the oath of allegiance to the King."

From this programme Venizelos never deviated. During 1909 and 1910 other Cretan leaders, dismayed by the fulminations of the Powers and disconcerted by the virtual repudiation of Crete by Greece, thought that modifications and compromises were necessary. Not so Venizelos. He was no autocrat. He let others try out their ideas. But they came back to Venizelos — and to the annexation programme pure and simple.

After the Protecting Powers intervened the Provisional Government resigned. In Greece and Crete the political situation was confused and uncertain. Premier Theotokis had abandoned the premiership at Athens, not believing that war could be undertaken with any success against Turkey. His successor, Rallis, agreed to postpone the general election until 1910 in order to avoid the embarrassment of the arrival in Athens of Cretan deputies to a new Parliament. Of the attempt of the Military League to get control of Greek politics I shall speak in another place.

In December the Sublime Porte sent a new note to the Protecting Powers. It was pointed out that peace in the Near East could be preserved only by a prompt settlement of the Cretan question. Turkey was willing to confirm the autonomy granted to Crete, but on condition that idea of annexation be formally rejected by the Greek Government. This was a subterfuge. The ambassadors of the Powers knew as well as the Cretans did that when the principle of autonomy was accepted as the basis of negotiations, the Young Turks were ready to define "autonomy" in a sense that would take away from Crete many of the privileges enjoyed since 1898. This renewal of pressure upon the Powers at Constantinople had its immediate repercussion in Crete. The stop-gap Government, which had been marking time since August, re-

signed. On December 29, 1909, a new Cabinet was formed, whose members swore allegiance to the King of Greece.

The Sublime Porte became aggressive. In January Turkey protested against Cretan officials' taking the oath of allegiance to the King of Greece and against the application of the Greek code by Cretan courts of justice. In February Turkey informed the Powers that should the Cretans participate in the next Greek parliamentary election, energetic measures would be taken for the defense of Ottoman rights. The Protecting Powers then addressed a strong note to the Cretan Government. The Cretans were told that the oath of allegiance was null and void and must not be exacted of deputies to the next Cretan Assembly. Consular representatives must be allowed to sit in the courts, with the power to see that justice was properly administered. If the Cretans persisted in attempting to elect deputies to the Greek Chamber, the Powers would intervene. No Cretan would be allowed to go to Athens. The Cretans agreed to accept consular representatives in the law court, but only in cases where foreign subjects were involved, as provided for in the capitulations. No reply was made to the other points in the note of the Powers.

What the Young Turks had in mind is proved by their programme, which was published in April in the *Tanine*, at that time the official organ of the Committee of Union

and Progress, which controlled the Cabinet and Parliament. The minimum which the Porte would accept in the definite and permanent solution of the status of Crete was set forth in five points:

1. Formal recognition of the rights of the Sultan.
2. The right of the Sultan to name the Governor-General of the island among three Cretan candidates elected by the General Assembly.
3. The right of the *Sheik-ul-Islam* to name the religious chiefs of the Cretan Moslems.
4. Establishment in the Bay of Suda of a coaling-station for the Ottoman fleet, and the maintenance there of a permanent *stationnaire* like the *stationnaires* of the Embassies at Constantinople.
5. Restriction of the rights of the Cretan Government in the matter of conclusion of treaties of commerce and agreements with foreign powers.

What the "rights of the Sultan" might be the *Tanine* did not specify. Nor was there any precision in the confused and bellicose debates in the Ottoman Parliament. Articles 4 and 5 were enough to throw Crete into a state of wildest excitement. The Turks, after having lost the island, were trying to win it back.

To the casual reader, at the time and since, the Young Turks programme seemed reasonable. Animated by sympathy for the Young Turks in the movement to redeem and liberalize the Ottoman Empire, the European and American press was hostile to the Cretans. The rôle of

Venizelos was more unfavorably presented than in any of the previous crises. This was partly due to the fact that his international importance was beginning to be realized, where before he had been regarded as a brigand chief. But main reasons were an ignorance of Turkish psychology and Turkish motives and a belief that racial and religious questions could be solved by an international guarantee of "the rights of minorities." The statesmen of the Protecting Powers were quick to see how the support of public opinion could be won by invoking the specter of the oppressor becoming the oppressed. When one is emancipated, he must expect to see the sympathy that goes to the under dog transferred to the ex-master.

The protection of minorities in a newly created country or in districts changed from one sovereignty to another is a troublesome question. If outside Powers reserve for themselves by treaty the right of intervention to protect minorities, two abuses arise: the encouragement to the minority in question to create a state within a state and to appeal constantly to the guarantor, and the temptation to the guarantor to fish in troubled waters in order to secure for himself political and economical advantages. Where there are several guarantors, each becomes suspicious of the other when the question of intervention is raised. The aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference is demonstrating the difficulties of the minority question

where only racial issues are involved. Where the Jews enter in, the problem becomes more complicated. With a Christian majority and Moslem minority, or *vice versa*, it is altogether hopeless. In the minds of Moslems religious and political rights cannot be divorced. A full discussion of this problem is reserved for our chapter on the Peace Treaties. The stand taken by Venizelos in 1919 and 1920 was the justification for and the explanation of the stand he took in 1910. Venizelos knew that so long as the Protecting Powers and Turkey, jointly or singly, claimed the right to protect the Moslem minority in Crete, the Moslems would never be reconciled to Greek sovereignty or coöperate loyally even in an autonomous form of government.

On May 9, 1910, the Cretan Assembly was opened in the name of George I, King of the Hellenes. The Christian deputies took the oath of allegiance to King George, and wanted to force the Moslem deputies to do the same. Although he stood alone in his opinion, Venizelos urged that the Moslem deputies should be excused from taking the oath if they would expressly declare that they considered themselves to be under the protection of the Powers, and unable to associate themselves with their Christian fellow-countrymen in a *coup d'état* which ran counter to their aspirations. For the moment the counsel of Venizelos prevailed, and the Moslem deputies were not required to

take the oath. But they themselves forced the issue. They presented a protest in which they rejected the sovereignty of Greece over Crete. The Assembly replied by passing a resolution that all deputies should take the oath. The Moslem deputies then presented a motion declaring that the Sultan of Turkey held "sovereign rights" in the island. This motion was rejected by acclamation. Then the Moslem deputies, in the name of their constituents, protested against what they called an attempt to change the legal status of Crete, and refused to take the oath.

Ignoring the Moslem protest, the Assembly on May 17 changed itself into a Constituent Assembly and appointed an executive committee to act as the Government, with Venizelos for President. Venizelos accepted the office. He announced that the Government would work for the recognition of annexation to Greece, and would protect the Moslem minority. But the Moslems must accept the new *de facto status quo.*

The next day the consuls of the Powers upbraided Venizelos for having abandoned his attitude of the previous week concerning the Moslem deputies. They warned him that "any attempt to exclude the Moslem deputies from the Cretan Assembly would have serious consequences." Venizelos answered that he had given a chance to the Moslem deputies to avoid taking the oath of allegiance. He did not want to go against their sentiments or

religious instincts. But instead of adopting a passive attitude, they had proved themselves agents of the Sublime Porte and were trying to stir up trouble. He wanted to be tolerant and spare their feelings. The interference of the Powers, which raised false hopes, was the cause of the difficulty. On May 19 the Moslem deputies were excluded by unanimous vote of the Christian majority, and the sittings suspended for forty days to see what the Powers would do. Venizelos signed a decree, preventing Moslem officials from exercising legal functions until they consented to take the oath of allegiance, and notified the Powers that they must solve the question by recognizing the union of Crete with Greece.

Instead of boldly cutting the Gordian knot, and resigning themselves to the lesser of two evils, the Protecting Powers gave the Near East an exhibition of irresolution and lack of sincerity. Their note to Venizelos was a mixture of bullying and pleading. No Moslem officials were to be prevented from discharging duties or deprived of pay because they had not sworn allegiance to King George, and if on the same pretext the Moslem deputies were once more excluded when the Cretan Assembly met again, the Powers would "consider what steps were required to regularize the situation." The Cretans must not make changes which might give rise to a breach of peace in the Near East. Additional warships were ordered to Cretan waters

and a threat made to reoccupy Crete. At the same time, in a note to the Sublime Porte the Protecting Powers declared that they had "given proof of their intention and desire to safeguard the sovereign rights of the Sultan." But if the Ottoman Government wanted a definite settlement of the Cretan question, it must address itself to all six Powers that were signatories of the Treaty of Berlin. Turkey must in the meantime put an end to the agitation in the empire, the continuance of which "was not justified by the attitude of Greece and could not fail to provoke regrettable incidents."

Ballplatz and Wilhelmstrasse gave no sign of life. The boycott of Greek goods continued in Turkey. The Turks began to mobilize troops on the Thessaly frontier. In desperation the Protecting Powers presented an ultimatum to Crete, declaring that if the Assembly did not yield to their demands troops would be landed in the principal port and the customs receipts seized. Venizelos asked the Powers to define "the steps required to regularize the situation" in their earlier note, and also what they meant by "intention to safeguard the sovereign rights of the Sultan" in the note to Turkey. The Protecting Powers simply reiterated their ultimatum. The Assembly assented to the conditions of the Powers.

Venizelos saw that his work in Crete was finished. He realized that the Powers were determined to continue

their negative rôle. Crete could be annexed to Greece only by Greece proving herself stronger than Turkey, and not by diplomatic maneuvers. And since the Young Turk Revolution Crete had been by no means the most serious problem for Hellenism. The Greek race was being threatened with extinction in Turkey. How could he hope to solve the Cretan question, then, by keeping up an utterly futile exchange of notes with the Protecting Powers? Venizelos had long been in close touch with the leaders of the Military League. In the eyes of the Greeks he already symbolized the defense and the aspirations of Hellenism. So he consented to become a candidate in an Athens constituency for the Greek Chamber of Deputies.

After Crete yielded to the ultimatum of the Protecting Powers, Venizelos went to Switzerland ostensibly for a vacation. In Lausanne he could confer more freely than at Canea or at Athens with his Greek friends. There, on August 21, 1910, he received the telegram announcing his election by an overwhelming majority. The leaders of the Military League had known beforehand his conditions. The vote indicated their acceptance of the conditions, and their willingness to put into his hands the movement they had started for the regeneration of Greece and the salvation of Hellenism.

Venizelos returned to Crete, and resigned the presidency of the Provisional Government, designating as his

successor Maris, a tried friend. Some of his Cretan followers were in dismay. But Venizelos reminded them of the lessons of two decades, and convinced them that he could best serve Crete by attempting to make Greece strong. He begged them to keep assuring the Cretans that Venizelos would not forget the goal for which they had been working and suffering together. What he would have to do at Athens might puzzle them, but they must not lose faith in him.

It was a foregone conclusion that Venizelos would have immediately a place in the Cabinet. A delegation of deputies and other prominent persons, charged to accompany "the new Minister," arrived in Crete. On September 17 the city of Canea offered Venizelos a farewell banquet. Standing before those whom he had to forsake in order to continue to lead them, he started a speech that he had long been preparing. Its theme was to be the salvation of Crete through the strength of Greece. Venizelos started, "My dear fellow-citizens —"

For the first and only time in his life Venizelos was unable to make a speech. He repeated the three words. Then he broke down. Rare in the lives of Greeks is a moment of silence. But the twenty-four years that were ending could not be spoken of: and the future was in the hands of God.

CHAPTER IV

VENIZELOS INTERVENES IN GREECE

ON the very day that Mahmoud Shevket Pasha declared in the Ottoman Parliament that if Greece did not make a public statement to the effect that she had no intention at any time to extend her sovereignty over Crete, a million Turkish bayonets would gleam upon the plains of Thessaly, Eleutherios Venizelos was slipping out of Suda Bay bound for Athens. The Ottoman general added that the Turkish armies were strong enough to turn the tide in a general European war, and that no European Power dared to risk offending Turkey by espousing the cause of the Cretans. It is because these statements reflected the opinion of the Committee of Union and Progress, which was in a position to precipitate a new war against Greece, and because the Powers all thought they had to reckon with the regenerated military power of Turkey in their diplomatic calculations, that Venizelos knew he could no longer stay in Crete.

The Young Turks were relying upon the nervousness of the Great Powers to prevent Italy from taking Tripoli and Greece from taking Crete. There was compensation for the loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the growing friction

between Austria-Hungary and Russia, as the latter, checked in the Far East and having compounded her differences with Great Britain, was intriguing once more in the Balkans. Germany was standing behind Austria-Hungary, and was active in Rumania and Bulgaria. There seemed to be no danger of a *rapprochement* between Greece and Italy. The Balkan States were at loggerheads over Macedonia. Greece was torn with intestine quarrels.

The Young Turks appreciated more than the Europeans the high qualities of Venizelos. I was in Constantinople when Venizelos intervened in Greece, and followed the comments of the Turkish press. If they had not feared him, the Turks would scarcely have been so bitter. Adopting the thesis that Cretans were Ottoman subjects, they denounced Venizelos as a traitor, and declared that he would be condemned to death and his possessions confiscated when they reoccupied Crete. The reconquest of Crete, either directly or through an invasion of Greece, was what they announced as their object, and they sought a *casus belli*.

Three other Cretans were elected to the Chamber of Deputies by constituencies of the kingdom. The Sublime Porte took the stand that as Cretans were Ottoman subjects, their admission to the Greek Parliament would lead to a rupture of diplomatic relations. The threat of war was backed by mobilization on the Thessaly frontier.

Anti-Greek agitation was at a fever heat. Greek steamship owners and Ottoman Greek merchants faced ruin from the boycott.

Fortunately, Venizelos was able to prove his Greek citizenship. His father was born in the kingdom, and when he was a student at the University he was registered as a citizen of the Piræus. Although he had always lived in Crete, he was technically within his rights. It is only in the United States that a man is required to have a *bona fide* residence in the circumscription which he represents. European custom allows a candidate to stand for election in any constituency he may choose.

The Cretan colleagues of Venizelos had no claim to Greek citizenship other than the proclamation of the annexation of the island to the Kingdom of Greece. As annexation had been disavowed by the Protecting Powers and not accepted by Greece, the other Cretans resigned. The time had not come to force the issue. In fact, the moment Venizelos set foot in Greece he adopted the policy of doing everything in his power to avoid a rupture with Turkey. Greece was no more ready for war than she had been in 1897. The Greeks knew this. The most exalted members of the Military League recognized the folly of Greece attempting to withstand Turkey alone. It was the universal dismay of the Greeks at the possibility of a war that put them in the frame of mind of being willing to lis-

ten to Venizelos and to follow him. In their utter hopelessness he was the *deus ex machina.*

This was all that Venizelos had in his favor. Everything else was against him. Despite the reputation that preceded him, he was a stranger. His intervention had been made possible by an organization that had been in open rebellion against the dynasty and the government. The Military League would naturally try to dominate him. The part he had played in Crete against Prince George made the royal family view him with suspicion. The old-fashioned politicians could hardly have been expected to welcome the newcomer. No human being could have won against such odds, then or in later crises, had it not been for the unwavering confidence and support of Greek merchants, who, during the decade of constant and glorious struggle, have backed Venizelos against Church and Court and politicians.

It does not detract from the genius of Venizelos, nor from the miracles that genius has achieved, to point out his dependence upon the most virile and wholesome element in Hellenic national life. The prosperity of Greece, the very existence of Greece, is due to trading and shipping. The cream of the Greek race is in her merchant class. In great majority they come of families the foundation of whose fortune was laid in "unredeemed Greece" and in Greek communities in foreign lands. During the past cen-

tury they looked upon the Kingdom of Greece not as a mother country from which they derived their origin and to which they owed allegiance, but as the means of accomplishing the redemption, the regeneration, the union of Hellas. Solely because the tip of the Balkan peninsula was free, and not because of ancient Sparta and Athens, have Greek patriots built their ideal of united Hellas upon the foundation of the Kingdom of Greece. The little Kingdom of Greece has been simply the Piedmont of the Greek race, with the Hellenic Rome unredeemed. Constantinople, not Athens, is the center of Hellas. When Venizelos went to Athens in 1910, Greece was in the Piedmont stage of her unification. She was still in the Piedmont stage when Venizelos went to the Conference of Paris in 1919. Greek irredentism is different from that of Italy and Germany and other nations because the force has been centripetal rather than centrifugal.

The Greek merchant class saw in Venizelos the embodiment of its ideal. And it saw, too, a leader whose methods it understood. Among business men there are as many idealists, mystics even, as in any other class of society. Business men are often accused of timidity and coldness, where their lack of enthusiasm is due not to failure to appreciate the merit of a cause, but to instinctive questioning of ways and means and to the dictates of experience. The record of Venizelos in Crete inspired confidence. Here

was the leader, wise, courageous, energetic, magnetic, who would never sacrifice Græcia irredenta to his own career. Venizelos came to Athens as the representative of "unredeemed Greece." To become and remain the big frog in the little pool of a Balkan kingdom was no more of a temptation to him than to be master of Crete. The merchants of Hellas, good business men, ardent patriots, thinking always of their kinsfolk in the Ottoman Empire, decided to back Venizelos to the end.

The Military League, and the politicians who identified themselves with this movement, could not be counted upon to be loyal to the new leader. They were uncertain as to their own aims and too undisciplined in their methods to last long. The first decisive step in the career of many a man — the step which makes or breaks him — is to repudiate the right of those who have called him to office to control him. The test came to Venizelos on the very day of his arrival in Athens. The members of the Military League took for granted that Venizelos was anti-dynastic, although he had warned the chiefs of the League that he would work to strengthen the authority and prestige of the crown. The merchants, whose contact with the outside world caused them to realize the value to Greece of the royal family with its unrivaled connections in Europe, knew that Venizelos was not anti-dynastic. The members of the Military League, immoderate and unrea-

soning because of the quasi-success of the revolutionary movement, interpreted the new leadership of Greece as an occasion for cutting loose from old moorings. The merchants, posted by Zaïmis as to the clear vision of Venizelos, felt sure that he was willing to build on the old foundations, and would destroy nothing before he had something to take its place. The Military League had been causing them a great deal of anxiety. In its inception the revolution was necessary for the salvation of Greece just as the Young Turk Revolution had been necessary for the salvation of Turkey. Young Turkey developed no leader capable of dominating the revolution and guiding it in the right direction to attainable aims. Without Venizelos it might have been the same with Young Greece.

On September 18, 1910, Venizelos arrived at the Piræus. Harbor craft were ablaze with flags. Whistles blew and bells rang. The whole town turned out to greet its fellow-citizen. At Athens, Venizelos had difficulty in getting to his hotel. Summoned to the balcony, he made his first speech to the people who knew him only as a legendary Cretan hero.

"I shall collaborate with those who want to lift Greece morally and materially to the level of modern states and to make her the factor of civilization and progress in the Orient," he cried.

The crowd went wild. This was the kind of talk they

wanted to hear. But when the new leader went on to point out that the Greeks must group themselves around the King, because it was to the interest of the nation to demonstrate its attachment to the dynasty, it was like a cold *douche*. Were these the words of a revolutionary? On shipboard the deputies who went to Crete to meet him had tipped off Venizelos as to the feeling of the people. There was a glorious chance for a demagogue to overthrow the Government. Everybody was in favor of considering the newly elected Chamber a Constituent Assembly, which would endow Greece with a new constitution, changing the country to a republic if it wanted to. It was the moment for a dictator.

But, to the astonishment and bewilderment of those who had placed high hopes on his coming, Venizelos declared that the Assembly must remain revisionist.

An angry and excited cry went up. "Constituent! Constituent!" yelled the crowd, instigated by agents of the extreme wing of the Military League.

When the clamor died down, Venizelos said calmly, "I said revisionist."

The Athenians redoubled their cries. "Constituent! Constituent! Down with the Danes!"

Again Venizelos waited until he could be heard. As he had so often done in Crete, he bucked the crowd, raising his voice and shaking his fist at those who had come to

acclaim him. "Again I say revisionist!" he thundered. "We have been elected for certain purposes and have contracted obligations toward those who chose us. The covenant is definite. It behooves us, therefore, to fulfill those purposes and to carry out the terms of the covenant. The Assembly, elected to revise the constitution, cannot make a new constitution."

There were murmurs, followed by cold silence. The Cretan continued his speech. Gradually the crowd warmed to him again, and when he finished, acclamations broke out afresh, more restrained, perhaps, than the first greetings inspired of hero-worship, but more intelligent. The people were frankly disappointed. But that afternoon a leader imposed his will upon them. In a few brief moments he won the greatest battle of his life. From that time on, although the Athenians have more than once outwardly rejected him, Venizelos has dominated Greece.

Venizelos won out with the people, transforming the enthusiastic welcome into a real acceptance of him by minds and hearts. He had yet to reckon with politicians and the Court. In the negotiations before his arrival in Athens, Venizelos succeeded in getting adopted his point of view concerning the necessity of a new Chamber to revise the constitution by using the Military League, which threatened force if Cabinet and King did not agree. The August elections were a severe shock to the old parties

and to the Court. It was their intention to get Venizelos in wrong from the start by ignoring him and forcing him to consort with and use the Military League. If Venizelos thus threw his lot in with the extremists and radicals, he would soon get into trouble with the unruly elements and at the same time be discredited in the eyes of the Greek people and with the Powers. But by coming out openly in support of the dynasty and opposing the clamor for a Constituent Assembly, Venizelos avoided this trap. The Cretan was a bigger man than his adversaries had expected. With the convening of the revisionist Assembly, Venizelos became immediately the leader of the strong parliamentary party, and no longer needed the League to enforce his point of view.

He had maneuvered himself at the start into a position independent of and stronger than the League. As leader of the League, despite his ability, he would have remained a revolutionary, and Court and politicians would have held the trump cards of administrative power and constituted authority against him. As leader of a political party, with a large number of deputies in the Chamber, Venizelos could not be ignored by the Court and was able to fight the politicians with their own weapons on their own ground.

Venizelos has been criticized for not having seized the opportunity of making a clean sweep of the old order in

Greece on the day of his arrival. His intervention, given his backing and the circumstances, might easily have been made the occasion of transforming Greece into a republic, with the Cretan as President. The same opportunity has occurred several times since. The man whose power has been demonstrated to be greater than that of the sovereign resisted the temptation of substituting himself for the sovereign — as far as the outward show of it all went. In the work that he had ahead of him, whichever way he looked at it, the Crown was a precious asset. The Greeks, new in the art of self-government, might make impossible the functioning of executive authority, if the Cabinet could not appeal in times of crisis to the Crown. In the building-up of a strong army, royal leadership was essential. The immediate interests of Greece, in the matter of alliances, were in the Balkan peninsula. The other Balkan States were monarchies. Greece could ill afford to change her form of government until her neighbors did so. In the equally important field of European relations, Venizelos knew how precious were the advantages of using the personal influence of the reigning family in furthering the political and financial interests of Greece in European capitals.

Venizelos, also, at the moment of his intervention, was not misled by the anti-dynastic character of the Military League movement into believing that the people were pro-

foundly desirous of a change or into assuming that getting rid of the dynasty was a necessary, or even a helpful, step in setting Greece's house in order. Popular feeling must have something tangible against which to demonstrate. But the object of resentment is rarely the cause of political unrest. Hostility to King George and his sons was no more than a symptom of dissatisfaction over the impotence of Greece.

Internally, the crisis in which the Military League arose was at the bottom an economic crisis, due to normal growth. The Kingdom of Greece could not support its population by agriculture. As long as the country's finances were under international control and its administrative system undermined by the sterile strife of political factions, it could not be expected that industrial development would take care of the excess population. The most virile element was emigrating to America. As for shipping, the mainstay of Greece's prosperity, the Young Turk Revolution, culminating in the boycott, was threatening irreparable disaster. Until Greece was strong enough, by reforming and developing her own military and naval resources and by making alliances with her neighbors, to bring Turkey to book, there was little hope of remedying the ills of which Greece was suffering. And in the background loomed the greatest question of all, the redemption of Hellas through the regeneration of the Kingdom of Greece.

Two days before Venizelos arrived in Athens, the Independent party, with which he was supposed to be affiliated, had endeavored to prevent the other members from taking the oath prescribed by the constitution, demanding that the Assembly should "take the oath as a constituent body deriving its mandate from the sovereign people." The Government had to summon soldiers with fixed bayonets to restore order. Into this atmosphere of bitter hatred, of political intolerance as uncompromising as that of the Cretan Assembly, entered Venizelos. And his first public act was to repudiate in the presence of the people of Athens the principal object for which his party was struggling!

During three weeks the battle of words raged. Premier Dragoumis, finding that he was incapable of dealing with the situation, warned the deputies to take a lesson from the fate of Poland. Then he placed in the hands of the King the resignation of his Cabinet.

King George was determined not to call upon Venizelos. He tried every combination possible in the days following the resignation of Dragoumis. When on October 15 the King first sounded Venizelos, the Cretan had ready his programme in detail. He explained it to the King, and said: "If Your Majesty consents to leave me full liberty of action and to ratify this programme, I promise to present to him in five years a renovated Greece, capable of inspiring respect and of supporting its rights."

The Minister of one of the Powers, reporting these negotiations to his Government, expressed astonishment at the confidence of Venizelos. "This man," he wrote, "is beyond question able, but he has not a chance in the world. He does not realize what he has to contend with." It was the Minister who did not realize what Venizelos had already contended with during a quarter of a century in Crete. The fights in the Chamber of Deputies at Athens filled with dismay the European diplomat. Venizelos, having lived for years in the midst of far worse, knew that it was possible to make his ebullitive fellow-Greeks simmer down quickly.

On October 18, 1910, Venizelos became Premier of Greece. He called to the portfolio of Foreign Affairs Gryparis, Greek Minister to Constantinople, a significant appointment which made the people realize that relations with Turkey would have foremost place from now on in the foreign affairs of Greece. But when he presented his Cabinet to the Chamber on October 19, he was received in a spirit which showed that the popularity he had won with the people did not extend to his colleagues. His exposition of the policy of his Cabinet so covered the needs of Greece and the desires of the people that the old politicians could make no direct criticism. So they tried to discredit him by asking whether he had received from the King a promise of dissolving the Chamber if the majority of deputies

voted against him. With the courage that has never deserted him, Venizelos stopped the discussion by asking for a vote of confidence. His opponents did not accept the challenge immediately. But their obstructionist tactics made impossible any beginning of the work for which the Assembly was called.

On October 23 one of Venizelos's supporters, at the instigation of his chief, moved a vote of confidence. The followers of Mavromichalis and Rallis, his two principal opponents, who represented the "old guard" in Greek politics, left the Chamber. They were followed by a number of Independents, who had refused to become reconciled to the decision of Venizelos not to change the Assembly from revisionist to constituent. This left twenty less than a quorum. The motion could not be put. Venizelos immediately handed in his resignation to the King. King George refused to accept it, on the ground that the Chamber had not voted, and requested the Cabinet to present itself again, after having persuaded enough deputies to attend to make a quorum.

In the evening the power of Venizelos over the better elements of Athenian population first manifested itself in unmistakable form. The trade guilds and the University joined to convoke an indignation meeting. Ten thousand people manifested before the Palace and the house of Venizelos. A resolution was sent in to the King, urging

him not to accept the resignation. Venizelos was told that the people were behind him. Venizelos answered that the reactionary maneuvers of politicians would not succeed, because the King and the people were collaborating to realize a programme of reform. He said that he was eager to give the people of Greece a chance to pronounce between him and his opponents.

On October 24, through the return of some of the Independents and the adhesion of Theotokis, the Government received a vote of confidence, 208 for and 31 against. But the Mavromichalis party and the Rallis party again abstained from voting. This made useful work by the existing Assembly impossible. In fact, even without considering the reactionary factions, Venizelos felt that he had no real majority. For some of the Independents made reservations. Venizelos went immediately to the King and recommended dissolution. A decree dissolved the Chamber, and fixed December 11 for new elections and January 8 for the opening of the new Chamber.

The dissolution of the Chamber was a boon for Venizelos. His adversaries quickly realized this. They could have harmed Venizelos more had they not forced the issue. But it was too late. Mavromichalis, Rallis, and Theotokis saw that Venizelos had the country with him. Not wishing to risk defeat, they took the easier course of abstaining from entering candidates. The result was a foregone con-

clusion. Out of 364 seats Venizelos won 300. The way was clear for constructive reforms.

But during the electoral campaign Venizelos did not modify his programme or make any move to gain votes by courting the anti-dynastic and militarist elements. Very adroitly, however, he seized upon the occasion of the new election to widen the scope of the revisionist programme. The new National Assembly, he said, would not have to confine itself to the revision of the clauses of the constitution prescribed by the last Chamber, for he had the assurance of the King that there was no objection on the part of the Crown to an extension of the activity of the new Assembly in the matter of revision, provided the fundamental provisions of the constitution were left intact. Venizelos made the issues of the election the repudiation of the political parties in Greece that had hitherto acted in their own interest and not for public welfare, radical changes in the administration of finances and the levy of taxes, loyalty to the dynasty, and the abstention of the army from any part in politics. To make the last point clear, he issued a circular to the military authorities on October 30, instructing them to urge the officers under their command to devote themselves exclusively to their professional duties and not to take part in politics. This was the final step in freeing himself from the charge that his power rested upon the Military League.

The administrative reforms of Venizelos covered every field of governmental activity. Since Napoleon Bonaparte no statesman has entered into and succeeded in putting new foundations under so many departments of government. Creation rather than reform or reconstruction is the word to describe the reorganization of Greece under Venizelos. The regeneration in administration and finances, in army and navy, in the handling of international relations, which made possible the triumphs in the Balkan wars and the position of Greece after the World War, form a phase of Venizelos's life that needs to be treated separately. And one cannot place chronologically this side of Venizelos's achievements; for the work initiated at the beginning of 1911 has gone on without interruption except during the period when Venizelos was out of the premiership.

Before going on to the crisis in the Balkans which precipitated the common war of liberation against Turkey, we must describe, as the corollary of the intervention of Venizelos in Greece, the final steps of the union of Crete with Greece. When Venizelos left Canea for the wider sphere in Athens, he begged his fellow-Cretans to have faith in him, even though they might not understand. In the midst of other preoccupations Venizelos did not forget Crete. His solution of the Cretan question was to make Greece strong and save Hellas.

Even had he wanted to, Venizelos as Premier of Greece would not have been allowed to forget or neglect Crete. The issue of annexation kept thrusting itself upon him in his new position, to his constant embarrassment in the bigger game he was playing, until the war with Turkey gave him the opportunity of achieving the aspiration to which he had devoted his whole life up to the moment he went to Greece.

The news of the vindication of Venizelos in the December election was received with tremendous enthusiasm in Crete. Once more the Cretan Assembly passed a resolution demanding the annexation of the island to Greece. Once more the consuls informed the Cretan Executive Committee that the Protecting Powers had declared to Turkey that her "sovereign rights over Crete have been and are recognized by the Powers, and that the acts of the Cretan Assembly can have no effect on the determination of the four Powers to maintain the sovereign rights of Turkey."

In May, 1911, yielding to the dictation of the Committee of Union and Progress, which had just held its congress at Saloniki, the Ottoman Government appointed kadis (judges) for the Moslem population of Crete, with instructions to perform civil as well as religious functions. The Cretans resolved in popular meetings to prevent the landing of the kadis by force. But the matter did not go

that far. The right of nominating kadis had been waived by Turkey in 1898. The Constitution of 1907 vested it in the head of the Cretan Government, but the right had not been exercised, as the kadis refused to take the oath prescribed for Cretan functionaries. As this nomination was an infringement upon the rights of autonomous administration granted Crete by the Powers, the Ambassadors made representations at Constantinople, and the Sublime Porte yielded.

The outbreak of war between Italy and Turkey raised new hopes of union with Greece. The renewal of the movement was strongly opposed by the Powers and by Venizelos, who urged the Cretans to keep quiet for the moment, as Greece was not in a position to fight Turkey. However, the annexionists elected deputies to the Greek Parliament, who were only prevented from getting to Athens by the naval forces of the Powers. When they persisted in trying to leave the island, they were arrested and detained on the warships.

In February, 1912, the Powers sent a note to the Cretan Government, stating that if measures were taken to send deputies to Athens and if crimes against Moslems continued in the island, the Powers would once more intervene. In March the Government was overthrown, and a permanent commission elected by the Assembly to take its place. Crete participated in the general election then

being held in Greece, and elected sixty-nine deputies to represent Crete in the Greek Chamber. Some of them were arrested by the British Fleet, and detained as prisoners for six weeks. Twenty-two, however, managed to get to Athens, much to the embarrassment of Venizelos. In May the number of Cretan deputies in Athens increased to forty.

There was naturally much enthusiasm at Athens, and Venizelos was put in a position of opposing with all his might the very cause to which he had given his life. Venizelos begged the Cretans to be reasonable and to realize that their insistence on being admitted to the Chamber, if yielded to, would constitute a *casus belli* for Turkey.

Under the spell of their old chief, whose sincerity they could not question, the Cretans consented to wait. But other influences were working upon them and against Venizelos. Public opinion in Athens was sympathetic to the Cretan demand to enter the Chamber. A great number of deputies was always ready to be led into voting a resolution admitting the Cretans. *Agents provocateurs* were working upon Parliament and the crowd, at the behest of the enemies of Venizelos and genuine enthusiasts who did not appreciate the peril of the moment. As Greeks are peculiarly susceptible to this sort of a game (and skillful in playing it), Venizelos passed through anxious

months. He did not know at what moment a crisis might be precipitated which would involve Greece alone in war and spoil the plans that were being carefully laid for a Balkan alliance against Turkey. The military agreement with Bulgaria, signed after tireless negotiations, contained a clause making the alliance inoperative in case Greece should suddenly become involved with Turkey over the Cretan question. The text mentions specifically the possibility of a rupture of diplomatic relations between Greece and Turkey arising from the admission of the Cretan deputies to the Greek Chamber. This proves that the Bulgarians realized how disastrous a premature outbreak of hostilities would be and also that this eventuality was within the bounds of possibility. Venizelos could take no one into his confidence. He could not reveal to the Cretan deputies nor to overzealous patriots the fragility of an alliance for the salvation of the Balkans, when even its existence had to be kept secret.

The seizure of Rhodes by the Italians and their evident intention to keep the island, and the appeal of Samos to Crete, further complicated the situation. On September 21, three hundred Cretan volunteers landed on Samos, and were expelled by Turkish troops, aided by sailors from French and British cruisers.

When the time arrived for convoking the Chamber, Venizelos made every effort to avoid giving Turkey a

casus belli. He even proposed to the Porte the payment of a small tribute in order to secure from Turkey the recognition of the right of the Cretan deputies to meet in the Greek Parliament.

The Chamber met on October 14, the very day Venizelos had arranged with the premiers of Serbia and Bulgaria to send an ultimatum to Turkey. Montenegro was already at war with Turkey. It was certain that Turkey would ignore the ultimatum, a response to which was demanded within forty-eight hours. So Venizelos felt safe in allowing the Cretan deputies to sit in the Chamber as spectators. In his opening address he said that although Greece would not be left alone to face the difficulties of securing from Turkey an acknowledgment of the union of Crete with Greece, he thought it would be well not to force the issue. He invited the Cretan deputies to return to Crete, to be elected in accordance with Greek laws, and assured them that in event of war the question would be definitely solved.

On May 30, 1913, Turkey agreed in the Treaty of London to cede Crete to Greece. There is no miracle, no lucky turn of the cards, in all this. The achievement followed twenty-six years of preparation. A man of vision, equipped with brains and honesty and courage, grasped an opportunity, and built upon a foundation of unusually rich experience in the situations he was to face, the problems he

would be called upon to solve. He could not be browbeaten, he could not be fooled, he could not be dazzled, he could not be tempted. If genius he has, it consists in knowing in just what cases the bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, and the moment when stubbornness changes from strength to weakness. Since the expression "a man of vision" is often a glittering generality, it is necessary to explain my use of that term to describe Venizelos. A man of vision is one who sees what is in his path without losing sight of the goal, and who makes each situation, each problem, each task he faces yield experience and knowledge to carry him to the goal. The goal of Venizelos is the unity of Greece. Ever since 1886 he has been pushing forward toward it as a man of vision pushes forward.

The annexation of Crete was a step forward in the life-work of Venizelos. Had he regarded it in any other light, had he made it the goal, he would not have accomplished even that much for Hellas.

CHAPTER V

THE BALKAN ALLIANCE SURPRISES EUROPE

THE formation of the Balkan Alliance was as astonishing a phenomenon to European statesmen and diplomats as its quick and decisive success in crushing Turkey. Up to the last moment the Great Powers were skeptical. When the war broke out, it was confidently predicted in the embassy salons at Constantinople that Venizelos would keep Greece out of it. The cautious Greek Premier would never let his country in, said the wiseacres, for a share in the drubbing that was coming to the Bulgarian and Serbian armies. They thought that Greece would stay neutral, and receive rectification of the Epirote and Macedonian frontiers and the gift of Crete for obeying the injunction of the Powers.

The belief of the chancelleries (shared by Turkey, as the desperate last-minute negotiations at Athens proved) was due to the inability of Europe to estimate at its proper value the work of Venizelos in regenerating Greece during the two years he had been at the helm, the systematic and successful effort the representatives of the Powers in Turkey had made to minimize the effect of the boycott, and the astonishing ignorance of the negotiations for the for-

mation of a Balkan Alliance. The British press, for instance, demonstrated scientifically how the Greek navy would be only a mouthful for the Turks in the first encounter on the sea. An English expert declared that Greece could never mobilize more than "a mediocre army of seventy thousand." London, Paris, Berlin, and Rome were virtually agreed that the Greek Government would not stand the test of war and that the Greek army need not be taken seriously. European public opinion was not informed about the fatal consequences of the boycott to Greek trade and did not appreciate how the Greek merchant class was standing solidly behind Venizelos. Little was published about the Balkan Alliance until a division of the spoils began to disrupt it.

Five years later Venizelos himself confessed that the war broke out against his wishes. "I sought to avoid the war," he said, "not because I was doubtful of our harmony and complete coöperation in waging this war for the national rehabilitation of the Balkan States, but because I thought that Greece was not sufficiently prepared within less than two years of her regeneration to wage war with full confidence and security."

Conscious of the risks and responsibilities, Venizelos wanted to postpone the conflict in order to complete the internal administrative reforms and to strengthen further the army and navy. But when the other states would wait

no longer, he was ready to play the game with them. The seed of the alliance had been laboriously sown. It must now bear fruit. Since no help could be expected from the Great Powers, the Balkan States must sink or swim together.

The idea of a Balkan Alliance was first suggested after the disappointment of the Treaty of Berlin. The hope of realizing it was abandoned when Serbia attacked Bulgaria as a result of the aggrandizement of Bulgaria through the incorporation of Eastern Rumelia. The project was revived in the summer of 1891, when the Greek statesman Tricoupis offered to ally his country with Serbia and Bulgaria. He frankly suggested an offensive alliance. But the plan fell through because the three states could arrive at no understanding about the division of Macedonia. This was the rock upon which all later efforts split. The inheritance of Macedonia made and kept bad blood between the three states. Bulgaria felt that if Macedonia were kept as a whole with an autonomous régime under Ottoman suzerainty, it would eventually fall to her. Greece and Serbia wanted to avoid this disaster to their ambitions by a partition. In the war of 1897 Russia and Austria-Hungary united to prevent Serbia and Bulgaria from fighting Turkey. Russia brought strong influence to bear to prevent Bulgaria from accepting Greek overtures, while Austria used Rumania to intimidate Serbia. Four years later

Austria succeeded in getting Greece and Rumania together to oppose Bulgaria. But the compact was short-lived, because the Greeks tried to Hellenize the Wallachian element in Macedonia. In 1905 Russian efforts to unite Serbia and Bulgaria in a customs union were successfully checkmated by Austria. Sultan Abdul Hamid took advantage of the rivalry between the Balkan States and the intrigues of Russia and Austria-Hungary to pit each Balkan element in Macedonia against the others.

The story is too long and involved to relate here.[1] It was a heritage of hatred and suspicion that Venizelos would have found it impossible to overcome had it not been for the common menace to all the Balkan nationalities from the Young Turk Revolution. The alternatives of assimilation or extermination faced the subject Christian races throughout the Ottoman Empire. Owing to the impossibility of reconciling a constitutional régime with a Mohammedan theocracy, to which was added the arrogance of a dominant race inacceptable to Christians and non-Turkish Moslems alike, assimilation failed. When threatened with extermination, the Macedonian peasants compelled the formation of the Balkan coalition.

In the spring of 1910 Turkey decided to disarm Macedonia. There had been no revolt. None was pending. The Macedonian *comitadjis*, as the bands of irregulars were

[1] See my *New Map of Europe*, pp. 161–219.

called, did not molest the Moslems, but rival Christian elements. Abdul Hamid had justly appraised the *comitadjis* as an aid to the maintenance of Turkish rule. Saloniki was the center of the Committee of Union and Progress, however, and the Young Turks believed that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire demanded the subjugation of the Christians of the province which had given birth to the revolution. Religious fanaticism was a means to accomplish a political end. The young Turks really had in mind the solution of the problem of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire by making good Osmanlis out of all the disparate elements of Turkey. For they attempted to disarm Albanian and Arab coreligionists at the same time with Macedonian and other Christians.

The clergy and upper classes of Macedonia, yielding to the pressure of the peasants, let it be known at the Balkan capitals that if help were not forthcoming from the Balkan States, the Macedonian Christians would formulate a plan of resistance of their own. An autonomous Macedonia, under the tutelage of the Powers, was the last thing Serbia and Greece wanted. For it would give Bulgaria a chance to repeat the *coup* of Eastern Rumelia.

The best policy for Bulgaria to have followed would have been to insist upon an autonomous Macedonia. The Bulgarian racial element was the most numerous and most virile. In time Bulgaria might hope to annex Macedonia.

But Bulgaria was threatened by an alliance between Rumania and Turkey. In fact, it was known in all the Balkan capitals that Rumania had offered to combine with the Young Turks in an attack upon Bulgaria. The motive that inspired Rumania was the fear of seeing Bulgaria grow too strong. But the same motive of preserving the balance of power in the Balkans made Greece and Serbia feel that the aggrandizement of Rumania and Turkey at the expense of Bulgaria would seal their own doom. If Bulgaria were crushed, their turn would come next. No help could be expected from the European Powers. The strangle hold of Young Turkey upon Macedonia and Thrace would be tightened.

It was at this moment, when the instinct of self-preservation was preparing the way for a Balkan Alliance, that Venizelos became Premier of Greece. Conditions in Macedonia for all the Christian elements were unbearable. Macedonian partisans of Greece and Bulgaria and Serbia were coming together to face the common danger of Young Turkey. Although Venizelos and Gueshoff, the Bulgarian Premier, were both determined to pursue a policy of conciliation with Turkey, because neither country was ready for war, the policy of repression in Macedonia forced their hand. Following the invariable custom of trekking when the cross replaced the crescent, Moslems had been emigrating from Bosnia into Macedonia. The

Turkish Government was systematically placing these *muhadjirs* (refugees) in strategic points in Macedonia. To make room for them Bulgarians and Greeks were massacred or driven from their villages. The *muhadjirs*, supplied with arms and ammunition and trained by Turkish officers, began to form veritable military colonies.

In April, 1911, Venizelos made the first move toward the Balkan Alliance. He took only King George into his confidence. Premier Gueshoff, in whose moderation and desire for peace Venizelos had confidence, was informed secretly that Greece was willing to make an agreement with Bulgaria for common action to force Turkey to cease persecution of Christians, and to negotiate a defensive alliance against a Turkish attack. The two Premiers were to do all in their power to create public opinion in their respective countries favorable to the eventuality of such an alliance. None was aware of the negotiations. But the first feeler in the proposed *rapprochement* was the Easter visit of Bulgarian students to Athens. I had the privilege of being present when the Bulgarians were received at the Acropolis by the students of the University of Athens, and attended the dinner given afterwards. These young men, representing nations that were hereditary enemies, had no knowledge of the proposed alliance. But they were conscious of the common danger that dictated burying the hatchet, and their toasts foreshadowed the approach-

ing comradeship in arms. When I saw Venizelos the next morning he said nothing of Bulgaria. But he explained to me why it was vital for Greece to cultivate the friendship of Turkey!

During the summer of 1911, although Venizelos and Gueshoff never missed a chance to emphasize the cordiality of Greco-Bulgarian official relations and to foster a better understanding between the two peoples, little progress was made toward an alliance. The Bulgarian Minister at Athens sent encouraging reports to Sofia of the naval and military improvement effected by the British and French instructors. But Gueshoff, not having much faith in the strength and resources of Greece, and afraid that the Cretan question and the boycott might involve Greece in war at any moment, did not want to commit himself. While waiting, he smoothed the path for the alliance by inducing the Bulgarian Parliament to vest in the Crown the power of making treaties. Gueshoff had no faith in the possibility of "open covenants openly arrived at."

The Balkan Alliance was hastened by the war between Italy and Turkey, which broke out at the end of September, 1911. Italy had a limited objective, the seizure of the detached province of Tripoli in Africa. By encouraging the Balkan States to declare war on Turkey, Italy could have aided in the emancipation of the Balkans while bring-

ing her own war to a speedy conclusion. But Italy overestimated the military strength of Turkey. She was also at one with the other Great Powers in desiring to avoid a Balkan conflagration, fearing that Europe would become involved. It was a commonplace of European diplomacy, the truth of which was practically demonstrated, that a change of the *status quo* of the Balkans would lead to a European war. For national as well as international reasons Italy was determined that her war with Turkey should have no repercussion in the Balkans. A Greater Serbia would menace her Adriatic aspirations, and a Greater Greece her Mediterranean aspirations. Far-sighted statesmen like San Giuliano and Giolitti looked beyond the popular cry of *delenda est Austria* to the aftermath. They feared pan-Slavism more than pan-Germanism. The Triple Alliance was not "unnatural" from the standpoint of the statesmen who put coal and commerce and the Slav peril over against the existence of Italia irredenta.

So Italy of her own initiative assured the other Powers that her policy would be "hands off in the Balkans," and sat hard upon the enthusiasm of the father-in-law of her king. When King Nicholas of Montenegro suggested that the Balkan States mobilize against Turkey, he received intimations that such a mad act would not be tolerated or supported. Italy limited her efforts at first to Tripoli.

When the Turks proved more recalcitrant than she had expected, the Dodecanese was seized and naval pressure brought to bear. The Balkans were sedulously kept out of the calculations.

But a long-drawn-out war proved demoralizing for Turkey. The Balkan statesmen, who followed internal events in the Ottoman Empire much more closely than the statesmen of Europe, were encouraged by the military weakness demonstrated in the efforts to put down rebellions in Albania and Arabia. On February 2, 1912, the heirs-apparent of the Balkan States gathered in Sofia to celebrate Prince Boris's birthday. Prince Danilo brought to the gathering a renewed suggestion from Montenegro for the formation of a defensive alliance. It was agreed to in principle, and the terms left for statesmen to negotiate by direct understandings.

Because the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty preceded the Greco-Bulgarian Treaty it was generally supposed that the Balkan Alliance was initiated at Sofia. The delay of Greece in declaring war and the non-participation of Greece in the first armistice seemed to confirm the notion, current at the moment, that Venizelos was playing a lone hand, and that his policy was dictated by opportunism. To a certain extent every statesman is an opportunist, and during the long negotiations Venizelos was not more so than Gueshoff. But Venizelos had more powerful mo-

tives to put off the test of arms than had the Bulgarian, Serbian, and Montenegrin premiers. The Greek army was not as ready, and the risks to Greece were far greater than to her neighbors. Greece had a long and exposed coastline and the islands to think of. A single naval reverse might have proved fatal. The sacrifices of the war would fall immediately upon Greek shipping and Greek goods in Ottoman ports. Venizelos, too, always kept in mind the millions of unredeemed Greeks at the mercy of the Turks.

Venizelos was the father of the alliance. He was convinced that it was essential to the salvation of all the Balkan States. But he did not feel justified in definitely binding Greece to Bulgaria until Bulgaria and Serbia had come to an understanding. There was nothing timorous in this attitude. Venizelos simply looked facts in the face. Then, too, an understanding between Serbia and Greece, the other link in the chain, could not be negotiated until Serbia knew just how she stood with Bulgaria. The complications and delays that inevitably arose in direct *pourparlers* between four rival states, each having to compromise with the other three, were increased by the constant interference of Russia and Austria-Hungary, who used the Balkan States as pawns against each other in a game of which influence in the Balkans was by no means the whole of the stake.

The Serbo-Bulgarian defensive alliance against Turkey was signed on March 13, 1912. It was Serbia who insisted upon a definite division of the spoils in Macedonia. Three zones were marked out, one for Serbia, one for Bulgaria, and the third to be left to the arbitration of the Czar of Russia. Albania and Thrace were not mentioned. The treaty was signed by the sovereigns of the two states. An annex, added two months later, stipulated the respective military contributions and the distribution of the forces. But this was later canceled. When the success of the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations was assured, Gueshoff sent a message to Venizelos, the tenor of which proved that the Bulgarian and Greek premiers understood each other, and that Gueshoff did not think that Venizelos had been holding back unduly or had not yet made up his mind.

Gueshoff used as messenger J. D. Bourchier, the veteran London *Times* correspondent, who was an old friend of Venizelos.[1] Bourchier was an Englishman of liberal and constructive mind who during thirty years had accom-

[1] I am glad to acknowledge my indebtedness throughout this chapter to Mr. J. D. Bourchier, the veteran correspondent of the London *Times* in the Balkan peninsula. The most accurate and illuminating account of the formation of the Balkan Alliance is found in six letters written by Mr. Bourchier, which appeared in the *Times*, June 4, 5, 6, 11, 13, and 16, 1913. Mr. Bourchier told me that he had never found time to work these over for publication in book form, so they can be consulted only in the *Times* file for 1913. In talking about the Balkan Alliance, Premier Venizelos has more than once referred me to these letters. He assured me that they contained the facts, which he believed were not available in any other source.

plished the unique feat of writing accurately about Balkan affairs without fear or prejudice. Despite the seemingly insurmountable difficulties, which none knew better than he, Bourchier believed that it was possible for the Balkan States to unite to free themselves at the same time from bondage to the Great Powers and to Turkey. He carried to Venizelos the following verbal communication: "Our relations with Greece are excellent, but we wish to strengthen them and render them more intimate. We consider that the proposals made to us through your agency furnish a suitable basis for this agreement, and we should be glad if the Greek Government would now transmit them to us through its Minister, M. Panas." Panas had been Greek Minister at Sofia during the trying summer of 1910, and was liked by the Bulgarians. Venizelos took the opening, and began negotiations with the Bulgarian Prime Minister through Panas alone.

The Greco-Bulgarian Treaty, signed by Panas and Gueshoff at Sofia on May 29, 1912, provided for a defensive alliance to remain in force for three years and to be kept secret, on the following terms: If one of the two states is attacked by Turkey, the other will declare war against Turkey; both states are to act jointly in relations with Turkey and the Great Powers, and agree to make joint representations to the Sublime Porte for the protection and defense of Greek and Bulgarian Ottoman

subjects. In an annex, however, the alliance was declared not to be operative in case of a war arising between Greece and Turkey over the admission of Cretans to the Greek Chamber of Deputies.

During the summer of 1912 encouraging progress was made in working out a plan of action for the Greek and Bulgarian military forces in conjunction with the Greek navy. Fortunately the latter was so indispensable that Greece did not have to swallow her pride in discussing the military side of the probable war or to admit that Bulgaria was making the larger contribution. The military convention was signed on September 25, 1912. Bulgaria undertook to place 300,000 and Greece 120,000 men in the field in the initial mobilization, and keep these forces constantly replenished. The Greek fleet was to cut off communications between Asia Minor and European Turkey. Owing to the protected bridge across the Bosphorus, the intervention of the Greek fleet would not have been vital had Asia Minor been provided with an adequate railway system. But only one line led to Constantinople, and the connection with Smyrna was roundabout. Turkey's only means of throwing an Anatolian army quickly into Macedonia or Thrace was by sea.

No definite plan of campaign was provided for in the Greco-Bulgarian convention. Each General Staff was to decide upon its own plan of campaign, keeping the other

informed daily as to movements of troops. Bulgaria expected to remain on the defensive in Thrace, and send a large part of her army into Macedonia. Her astounding successes and the easy conquest of Thrace had much to do with the tragic events that led to the disruption of the alliance.

It is interesting to note that between Greece and Serbia there was no need of a formal treaty to adjust territorial differences. From the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty it was agreed that in case of success Bulgaria would be Greece's neighbor in the north. Whatever adjustments were called for would have to be made by Greece and Serbia with Bulgaria and not with each other. In the military effort, also, direct Greek and Serbian coöperation, independent of Bulgaria, was not anticipated.

An agreement, however, had to be made between Montenegro and Serbia to complete the links of the alliance. King Nicholas had been an early and active advocate of a Balkan understanding. It was he who proposed to the other states taking advantage of the Italian declaration of war, and through his son, Prince Danilo, he raised the question again in February, 1912. Defensive arrangements, without a written treaty, were concluded with Bulgaria in April and with Greece in June. A formal treaty of alliance was signed with Serbia in September regulating the *modus operandi* of the armies in the ap-

proaching war. The General Staffs were to act separately, and friction was to be eliminated by designating the Turkish villages each army was to occupy in event of a Turkish retreat.

The stage was set. Only a meek Sublime Porte could have avoided war. At the last moment, when the storm was about to break, the statesmen of Europe, refusing to believe that a miracle was going to take place, attempted to intimidate Venizelos and his colleagues of the Balkan Alliance. On October 8, 1912, the six Great Powers authorized the Ministers of Austria-Hungary and Russia to present a joint note at Athens, Sofia, Belgrade, and Cettinje, calling attention to the fact that reforms in Macedonia were provided for in Article XXIII of the Treaty of Berlin, and promising to enforce that article. The note ended with an undisguised threat. Said the Powers:

"If, despite this note, war does break out between the Balkan States and the Ottoman Empire, we shall not admit, at the end of the conflict, any modification of the territorial *status quo* in European Turkey."

Apologists of European diplomacy have since maintained that the joint note was intended to protect the Balkan States in case Turkey was victorious. If this be true, it demonstrates the ignorance of the Powers both of Balkan diplomatic and military preparations and of Turkey's weakness as revealed in the Albanian and Hauran

rebellions. If, on the other hand, it was simply a bluff to dampen the bellicose ardor of the Balkan peoples by warning them that they were to gain nothing even if victorious, it failed of its purpose. Balkan statesmen knew as well as Turkish statesmen that "the concert" of the Powers was a fiction.

Hell had been paved with good intentions for thirty-odd years. The work of Venizelos stood the test of pressure from the outside. Within a month the Balkan States, relying solely upon themselves, upset forever "the territorial *status quo* of European Turkey."

CHAPTER VI

TURKEY IS CRUSHED BY HER FORMER BALKAN SUBJECTS

NO Balkan statesman outside of Montenegro welcomed war with Turkey in the autumn of 1912. The Bulgarian and Serbian Premiers were as anxious to avoid hostilities as was Venizelos. The Turkish army was highly rated by Balkan military authorities. Balkan statesmen were mutually afraid of one another's possible successes and their own possible failures. As we have seen, the terms of the alliances did not settle definitely the division of territories in case of victory, and the bases of military coöperation were far from satisfactorily arranged. If the war could have been avoided, Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia would have been glad to accept a compromise. But the Macedonian massacres of the summer of 1912 had embittered Bulgarians and Serbians, while the Greeks were aroused over persecutions in Thrace and Asia Minor and over the boycott. In Balkan countries the connection between the redeemed and unredeemed elements of the race is very close. In the Balkan States everybody knew what was going on in Macedonia and Thrace. The Balkan Cabinets yielded to the pressure of public opinion when

they refused to accept the suggestions in the note of the Great Powers of October 8. Montenegro had declared war on Turkey on the same day. It is doubtful if Venizelos or his colleagues could have prevented war after this act, except through the backing-down of Turkey.

On October 13 Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia informed the Powers that they themselves intended to take up the matter of reforms directly with Turkey, and were going to request of the Ottoman Government that it accord "without delay the reforms that have been demanded, and that it promise to apply them in six months, with the help of the Great Powers, and of the Balkan States whose interests are involved." The time had passed when the Balkan States were content to leave their interests in the hands of the Powers. True to their word, and refusing to listen to the last-minute remonstrances of the Ministers of the Powers at Athens, Sofia, and Belgrade, the three states sent the ultimatum to Turkey on October 14. They asked for a response within forty-eight hours to the following demands: autonomy of the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire; occupation of the provinces by Balkan armies while the reforms were being applied; indemnity for their mobilization as a result of the Ottoman mobilization of September 30; the immediate demobilization of the Turkish army; and the promise that the reforms would be effective within six months.

The ultimatum was tantamount to a declaration of war. The Turkish Ministers at Allied capitals refused even to transmit it to their Government. The Sublime Porte made no direct answer, but endeavored to get the Powers to intervene, and offered concessions to each state separately to detach it from the alliance. The Turks attempted to negotiate directly with Sofia on the basis of a cessation of Moslem immigration into Macedonia and the suspension of enrollment of Macedonian Christians in Mohammedan regiments. Bulgaria referred Turkey to the ultimatum of the day before.

On October 15 fighting began on the Serbo-Turkish frontier. Diplomatic efforts at Belgrade were useless. The Sublime Porte wired its peace delegates who were conferring with the Italians at Ouchy in Switzerland to sign the treaty demanded by Italy, giving up Tripoli, the last Ottoman province in Africa. When the forty-eight hours expired the Balkan States made no sign. But the Serbians were already fighting and the Bulgarians crossed the Thracian frontier. To preserve her dignity Turkey declared war on Bulgaria and Serbia on the morning of October 18.

At Athens, however, the Turks still hoped to save the day. They interpreted the speech of Venizelos to the Cretan deputies and his silence since the ultimatum was delivered as encouraging signs. The Turkish Minister was

authorized to offer Crete to Greece and to promise an autonomous government to some of the Ægean Islands. He was told to do the impossible to avoid a diplomatic rupture, and to remain at his post even if Turkey declared war on Bulgaria and Serbia. How the tables had turned in a few brief weeks! At the beginning of September, Ghalib Bey had scorned the offer of Venizelos to pay a small tribute for Crete in exchange for allowing the Cretan deputies to sit in the Greek Chamber. Before the middle of October, Ghalib Bey had become a suppliant.

Venizelos waited eight hours for the declaration of war. Then he summoned the Turkish Minister and asked him what was the cause of the delay. Ghalib Bey answered that he had no instructions to declare war on Greece. Turkey wanted to remain at peace with Greece. Venizelos cut short the interview. "You will receive your passports immediately," he said. "You put it up to us. Because you have declared war on the allies of Greece, Greece automatically declares war on you."

When war broke out Bulgaria had 300,000 men mobilized, most of whom were massed in three armies on the Turkish frontier. The offensive movement in Thrace, in which the bulk of the Turkish army would be met, was to be undertaken solely by Bulgaria. Only a Bulgarian army of secondary importance was to enter Macedonia, to protect the flank of the main Bulgarian army from a sudden

eastward march of the Turkish Macedonian army. In case of a Turkish collapse the Greeks intended to suggest Seres as an objective of this army. But the Bulgarians intended to demand a joint occupation of Saloniki. No definite plan of coöperation in Macedonia had been agreed upon. In fact, although much has been written to the contrary, I have reason to believe that the question of a joint military programme in Macedonia, in event of sudden and complete victories in Thrace, had not been broached by either General Staff. Venizelos and Gueshoff both realized the necessity of letting sleeping dogs lie. Sufficient unto the day would be the evil thereof.

Serbia and Greece were expected to put about 150,000 troops each into the field. They were to cut off the Turkish army in Albania and Epirus, and keep the Turkish forces in Macedonia from falling upon the Bulgarians advancing southward through Thrace.

In two brilliant battles, at Kirk Kilissé on October 23 and Lulé Burgas from October 29 to 31, the Bulgarians put to rout the Turkish armies in Thrace. Ten days after the war started, the Turks began to fall back upon the defensive positions of Constantinople. Leaving an army to invest Adrianople, General Savoff pushed on after the Turks with the bulk of his forces. In a fortnight he had repaired the railway, brought up his supplies and siege guns, and on November 17 began the attack of the Tcha-

taldja line of fortifications, extending from the Sea of Marmora to the Black Sea twenty miles inland from Constantinople. What was left of the Turkish army in Thrace had in the meantime been thrown back into the Gallipoli peninsula and bottled up there by the Bulgarians.

General Savoff had hardly developed his attack, which would probably have resulted in the capture of Constantinople, when he was halted by a telegram from Sofia. It was generally supposed that the Bulgarian Government was afraid of the task of occupying Constantinople or that the Powers, at the instance of Russia, interposed their veto. But the real reason was the success of Bulgaria's allies in Macedonia, as rapid, as startling, as complete as her own in Thrace.

The Third Serbian Army expelled the Turks from Novi Bazar, so long coveted by Serbia, in five days. In the same time the Second Serbian Army occupied Pristina, which gave them control of the railway from Uskub to the confines of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar. The First Army, under the command of Crown Prince Alexander, routed the Turks in a three days' battle at Kumanova, and entered Uskub on October 26. In an immediate and brilliant advance the Turks were driven back to Monastir, where an army of 40,000 surrendered to the Serbians on November 18.

The Greeks sent a small army into Epirus with Janina

as the objective. The bulk of their forces were led into Thessaly by Crown Prince Constantine. They crossed the frontier without resistance, fought a sharp combat at Elassona on October 19, in which they stood admirably under fire, and threw the army of Tahsin Pasha back upon Monastir. The Turks, unable to retreat up the Vardar because of the defeat of Zekki Pasha by the Serbians, fell back on Saloniki. The rear-guard actions were no more than skirmishes. The only real battle of the Greek campaign was fought at Yenidje on November 3. But even there the Turks did not put up the same sort of a battle as against the Bulgarians at Lulé Burgas and against the Serbians at Kumanova. And the Turks made no effort to defend Saloniki, although the commandant had 30,000 soldiers and plenty of munitions. On November 9 the Turkish army in Saloniki capitulated.

Victories of this sweeping character were too much for the Balkan statesmen to pilot the alliance safely through. Before comradeship in arms was a month old the dissolution of the alliance was in sight. Military necessity led the Serbians to Monastir, the possession of which was one of the principal war aims of Bulgaria and was conceded to Bulgaria in the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement. Nor could the Greeks be blamed for making hay while the sun shone and seizing the opportunity to occupy Saloniki as a city of unredeemed Greece.

General Theodoroff, commanding the Bulgarian Expeditionary Corps for Macedonia, whose mission was to engage the portion of the Turkish Fifth Army which was stationed in the valleys of the Mesta and the Struma to prevent it from assembling and making a flank movement against the main Serbian and Bulgarian armies, was without a job after the first few days. When he realized the demoralization of the Turks and heard that the Greeks were approaching Saloniki with no more serious opposition than that which confronted him, he marched his column toward Saloniki, reinforced by the notorious Sandansky with his Macedonian *comitadjis*. The Bulgarian Princes Boris and Cyril joined him. The cowardice or corruption of Tahsin Pasha made them too late to take part in the negotiations for the surrender of the city. But they entered Saloniki on the 10th at the same time as the army of Crown Prince Constantine. Sandansky and his *comitadjis* hurried to the principal ancient church of the city, for over four hundred years the Saint Sophia of Saloniki, and placed the Bulgarian flag in the minarets before the Greeks knew that they had been outwitted. When the Greek Crown Prince discovered that the Bulgarian Crown Prince was also on hand, he sent a telegram to Athens. On November 12 King George of Greece arrived on a destroyer and took up his residence in Saloniki.

In less than six weeks of fighting the Balkan allies had

swept from the field all the Turkish forces in Europe. What was left of the Turkish armies was cooped up in Constantinople, Adrianople, Gallipoli, Janina, and Scutari. Except at Constantinople and Gallipoli they were besieged, and could expect neither reinforcements nor food supplies. The Greek fleet had conveyed landing parties to Lemnos, Thasos, Imbros, Samothrace, Nikaria, Mitylene, Chios, Samos, and the lesser islands. Only the temporary title given to Italy by the Treaty of Ouchy prevented the occupation of the Dodecanese. Admiral Koundouriotis blocked the Dardanelles.

The state of mind of the Bulgarians, which was to become aggravated in the months ahead and lead them into the abyss, can well be imagined. They had done no better work than their allies. Serbians and Montenegrins had fought as courageously and as brilliantly. If the Greeks had not been put to the test on land, that was not their fault. None could say that they would not have consented to as heavy sacrifices as Bulgarians and Serbians, had they been called upon to make them. And the Greek fleet was an essential factor in the success of the allies, a contribution not to be underestimated in apportioning the credit for the *débâcle* of Turkey. But the Greeks had solved the Cretan question, liberated the Ægean Islands, and the Greeks and the Serbians had been fortunate in fighting in the regions of European Turkey which they desired to

annex. The Bulgarians, on the other hand, were occupying conquered territory the possession of which was not a war aim. They had gone into the war, and had fought the Turks to liberate the Bulgarians in Macedonia, not to become masters of the heterogeneous population of Thrace, largely non-Bulgarian. With the Serbians in Monastir and the valley of the Vardar and the Greeks in the port of Macedonia and spreading back into the hinterland, the Bulgarians at Tchataldja felt that they were holding the sack. They did not want Constantinople and were not disposed to make sacrifices to take the city. But they did want Saloniki!

Premiers Gueshoff and Venizelos were agreed that friction must be avoided. Janina, with Moslem Albania behind it, was still a danger for the Greeks. The Turks were still in Adrianople in the rear of the main Bulgarian army. If the two countries fell out over Macedonia, the Turks might yet retrieve their fortunes. Serbia was in a conciliatory mood owing to the danger of Austro-Hungarian aggression. Under the circumstances, neither Greece nor Serbia wanted to break with Bulgaria, while Bulgarian public opinion was too aroused against Turkey for Bulgarian statesmen to contemplate and try to form the only combination that would have compelled Greeks and Serbians to yield the better part of Macedonia to Bulgaria. Venizelos, who never fails to see and consider all possible

combinations, read the cards in Bulgaria's hand before Bulgaria did, and was determined to prevent a disastrous *volte-face*. He assured Gueshoff that Greece would be ready for compromises when the moment arrived. Gueshoff, as he has since confessed, did not see the danger of Serbia and Greece getting together.

So, as in the negotiations before the alliance was formed, even a tentative solution of the Macedonian problem on general lines was not attempted. The allies decided to conclude an armistice, if Turkey needed it badly enough to agree to drastic conditions, and that Greece need not be party to the armistice, although she should be represented in peace negotiations. Venizelos wanted to prosecute the siege of Janina in order to protect the Epirotes against Moslem Albanians, and it was to the advantage of all the allies that Greece remain mistress of the Ægean under war conditions.

The military disasters in the Balkans brought to the Grand Vizirate for the eighth time Kiamil Pasha, a celebrated statesman of the old régime, who had always been in close relations with the British Foreign Office. Kiamil Pasha did not share the illusions of the Young Turks. The military collapse had been too complete to allow the hope of Turkey bettering her position by keeping up the fight. And Kiamil Pasha knew that neither European intervention nor the disruption of the Balkan Alliance could be

expected until after fighting had ceased. For this reason Nazim Pasha, generalissimo of the Turkish army, and Noradounghian Effendi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, agreed with the Grand Vizir that an armistice must be arranged, whatever the conditions.

The armistice, signed on December 3, was an acknowledgment of Turkey's impotence. Just to give one instance of the humiliating stipulations, Bulgaria was to revictual her army in front of Constantinople by the railway which passed under the guns of Adrianople, while that fortress remained without food. The peace delegates were to meet in London.

At London the Balkan States demanded the cession of European Turkey, except Albania and the tip of Thrace containing Constantinople and the Gallipoli peninsula. Crete and all the islands of the Ægean were to be given up. The boundaries of Albania and its future status were to be decided by the Powers.

Turkey, with her army demoralized, with no diplomatic aid in sight from Europe, and unable to raise money abroad or at home, tried for a month to postpone the inevitable in the hope that the allies would fall out with one another. The hope was vain. The Greek army was fortunately still occupied in Epirus, so it was not hard for Venizelos to avoid friction with the Bulgarians in Macedonia. Scutari in Albania kept the Montenegrins immo-

bilized. The Bulgarians were mounting guard at Tchataldja before Constantinople, at Bulaïr before Gallipoli, and around Adrianople. The Serbians were helping the Montenegrins at Scutari and the Bulgarians at Adrianople. Serbia was watching anxiously Austria-Hungary. Bulgaria was threatened by Rumania. Rumania, in turn, feared Russia.

Kiamil Pasha, despite the clamor of the Young Turks, knew that the cards were stacked against the Ottoman Empire. In an interview which he asked me not to publish, the Grand Vizir expressed himself frankly and unhesitatingly as to the hopelessness of continuing the war. "It is because of the Young Turk visionaries," he said, "that we are in our present humiliating position. They cry out now that we must not accept peace, but they know well that we are powerless to win back any portion of what we have lost."

On January 22 Kiamil Pasha telegraphed to London, directing the Turkish commissioners to consent to the surrender of Adrianople and the other fortresses which were still holding out, and to make peace by ceding the Ottoman territories in Europe beyond a line running from Enos on the Ægean Sea, at the mouth of the Maritza River, to Midia on the Black Sea. The Balkan States were ready to accept this compromise and to waive an indemnity. But the conclusion of peace was thwarted by

the Young Turks. Under Enver Bey, they made a *coup d'état* at Constantinople. Nazim Pasha was assassinated, Kiamil Pasha sent into exile, and Mahmoud Shevket Pasha became Grand Vizir with the programme of *guerre à outrance*.

On January 29 the allies denounced the armistice, and set themselves to reduce Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari. In each case it would have been possible simply to sit and wait, as the Turks had not the ghost of a chance of relieving the fortresses. But the Greeks, smarting under the charge that they had done their part on land with little effort or sacrifice, determined to take Janina by storm. The worst of the winter was not yet over, but plans were made to increase the forces which had been virtually inactive since the siege began. When the Crown Prince arrived, he planned to capture the most troublesome forts and from them to make untenable the formidable hills which commanded the city. The Greeks fought with skill and courage. Position after position was taken until the city was at the mercy of the artillery. Essad Pasha surrendered on March 5. The Crown Prince returned to Saloniki in triumph. A few days later the assassination of King George by a fanatic made him King. This made much more difficult the task Venizelos had set for himself throughout the winter of keeping oil poured on troubled waters. Constantine had become the idol of his troops,

and the military party, whose influence was greatly inferior to that of Venizelos while King George was alive, began to cause the Premier sleepless nights. Venizelos found himself in the position of Bismarck after the battle of Königgratz.

After the fall of Janina the Bulgarian General Staff realized that it was essential to force the capitulation of Adrianople or to take the city by assault. They were in an unenviable position. The bulk of their forces had to be kept before Constantinople and Gallipoli. Neither the Tchataldja nor Bulaïr lines were worth the cost of forcing. For Bulgaria did not want, and could not hope to keep, Constantinople or Gallipoli. But if the Bulgarians had left either of these lines, where their armies had passed inactively a hard winter, the Turks could have overrun Thrace again.

Since the beginning of the war, by geographical ill-luck, the Bulgarians had been making the greatest contribution to the common cause, while their allies were gathering in as liberators regions upon which the heart of the Bulgarians was set. They could not even give themselves the satisfaction of carrying on the operations at Adrianople alone. A Serbian army aided in the assault. Bulgarians and Serbians cut their way with scissors through the tangle of barbed wire. The forts fell one after the other. Czar Ferdinand entered the city with his troops on March 26.

Shukri Pasha, following the old policy of the Turks, which had been successful for centuries in the Balkan peninsula, tried to surrender to the Serbian general, who was too loyal to discipline to fall into this trap. But the Serbian newspapers began to say that it was really the Serbian army which had captured the city, and that Shukri Pasha recognized this fact when he sent to find the Serbian commander. An unedifying duel of newspapers began between Belgrade and Sofia, which showed that the material for conflagration was ready.

The Serbians were fortunate also in being able to coöperate with the Montenegrins in the siege of Scutari. But in February, shortly after the war was resumed, the Turkish commandant at Scutari was assassinated and replaced by Essad Pasha, who continued the resistance in the name of Albania. At the instance of Austria-Hungary and Russia the Powers decided to intervene in Albania, and ordered the Balkan allies to withdraw from before Scutari. Fearing international complications the Serbians abandoned the siege. Nine days later Essad Pasha surrendered Scutari to King Nicholas. The Turkish flag had ceased to wave in European Turkey outside of Gallipoli and Constantinople. The war was over whether the Young Turks would have it so or not.

The Great Powers had long been awaiting an opportunity to mediate. On March 23 they proposed the fol-

lowing basis for renewal of the negotiations at London:

"1. A frontier line from Enos to Midia, which would follow the course of the Maritza, and the cession to the Allies of all the territories west of that line, with the exception of Albania, whose status and frontiers would be decided upon by the Powers.

"2. Decision by the Powers of the question of the Ægean Islands.

"3. Abandonment of Crete by Turkey.

"4. Arrangement of all financial questions at Paris by an international commission, in which the representatives of Turkey and the allies would be allowed to sit. Participation of the allies in the Ottoman Debt, and in the financial obligations of the territories newly acquired. No indemnity of war, in principle.

"5. End of hostilities immediately after the acceptance of this basis of negotiations."

After a month of negotiations, the Balkan States agreed to accept the mediation of the Powers, but only after Venizelos had carried his point that the Ægean Islands were to be ceded directly to the Balkan States and were not to form a subject of discussion with the Powers. They refused also to relinquish the possibility of an indemnity. Hostilities ceased.

When negotiations were reopened in London on May 20, Venizelos represented Greece. After ten days the peace preliminaries were agreed upon and signed. The Sultan of Turkey ceded to the kings of the allied states his dominions in Europe beyond the Enos-Midia line and Crete. To

the Great Powers he left the decision as to the status and frontiers of Albania, the islands in the Ægean Sea, and Mount Athos.

The peace preliminaries of London were never transcribed into a formal treaty. For war broke out between the allies. This enabled Turkey to save Adrianople and most of Thrace. But the dissolution of the alliance came several months too late to prevent any of the Balkan States, except Bulgaria, from profiting to the full from the victory over Turkey.

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND BALKAN WAR AND THE TREATY OF BUKAREST

THE collapse of Turkey was too complete for the maintenance of the solidarity of the Balkan Confederacy, just as the collapse of the Central Empires proved later too complete for the maintenance of the solidarity of the Entente Alliance. Secret treaties for sharing spoils do not stand the test of too much and unexpected spoils, once the emergency which drives nations into a coalition no longer exists. Whether the Balkan allies could have settled their territorial aspirations amicably if Italy and Austria-Hungary had not made the frontiers of Albania a question that necessitated the intervention of the Powers is problematical. But when the Balkan States were negotiating a treaty with Turkey in the spring of 1913 it was already clear that Bulgaria refused to consider the attribution of Thrace to her an argument for moderating her claims in Macedonia, or for consenting to rectify her frontier with Rumania.

Venizelos, however, keeping his mind on the goal of emancipating unredeemed Greeks from Turkish rule, was willing to go the limit in concessions to Bulgaria and to

compensate Serbia for yielding to Bulgaria by a remarkably generous waiving of some Greek aspirations. As we have seen, the menace of a disruption of the alliance appeared before the end of the first month of the common war against Turkey. Bulgarians, regulars and irregulars, raced to reach Saloniki on the day of the Greek entrance. Crown Prince Boris attempted to share with Crown Prince Constantine the triumphal entry into that city. The *comitadjis* installed themselves in the Saint Sophia of Saloniki, and Bulgarian clergy reconsecrated the ancient church. General Theodoroff established headquarters in the big port of Macedonia independent of the Greek command. This anomalous situation lasted throughout the winter and spring, and was tolerated by Venizelos, who hoped to avoid a break.

Two factors, which one might almost call fatalities, worked against the efforts of Venizelos and Gueshoff to keep the peace. The traditional hostility between Bulgarians and Greeks, never more bitter than during the thirty years following the Treaty of Berlin, had been temporarily allayed only by the necessity of combining forces against the Young Turk peril. After the fall of Janina and Adrianople, the danger that made the coalition possible and maintained it no longer existed. Both nations in arms had tasted military success, and the military leaders were little disposed to listen to the plans of com-

promise suggested by their statesmen. The second factor was the intervention of the Powers in Albania, which deprived Serbia of an outlet to the Adriatic, and made Macedonia the only possible field of territorial gain for Serbia. The quarrel over the division of Macedonia thus became triangular. Neither Greece nor Serbia alone was powerful enough to have refused the demand of Bulgaria to extend her frontiers across the valley of the Vardar. Standing together, Serbia and Greece felt they were in a position to ask Bulgaria to consider expansion in Thrace as compensation for concessions in Macedonia. Greek chauvinists used the argument of Serbian aid against the desire of Venizelos, who looked to the future, to come to a peaceful understanding with Bulgaria.

Later, Venizelos defended himself in the Greek Chamber against the accusation of his enemies that he had been too conciliatory to Bulgaria in the spring of 1913. He revealed the fact that when he asked for advice as to the chances of victory if Greece and Serbia combined to resist the Bulgarian demand, the Greek General Staff answered that they were sixty per cent only in favor of Serbo-Greek coalition. Venizelos had other considerations than that of military risks in wanting to avoid war with Bulgaria. He was worried about the possibility of Austro-Hungarian intervention against Serbia, which was as probable as Rumanian intervention against Bulgaria, and he feared an

Italian occupation of southern Albania, which would involve Epirus. He told me that he believed the preservation of the Balkan Federation was worth the sacrifice of ten thousand square kilometers to Bulgaria. If later it was demonstrated that Bulgaria was deliberately seeking the hegemony of the Balkans, Greece and Serbia would be in a better position to resist the faithless ally, and the discussion with Turkey and Italy over the Ægean Islands would have been settled.

The wise and sound statesmanship of Venizelos and his lofty conception of patriotism are shown by his resistance to the popular clamor in Greece that had assumed serious proportions even before the fall of Janina and Adrianople. Responding to an interpellation in the Chamber on March 15, he said:

"I am aware that there are those who are trying to stir up trouble among the Greek population which without question will remain outside the frontiers of Greater Greece. I, gentlemen, who have been only a few years among you, have come to the conclusion that in three years there has been a tremendous change in the soul of the Greek people. Not every one sees it, but it is so great that it permits, nay, it compels, the responsible head of the Greek Government to tell the truth to the people. None of us can hope to realize all our aspirations. I trust that the patriotism of all the Balkan nations will be so lofty that public opinion will not shrink from such sacrifices as will be inevitable if the partition is to insure

the continuance of the Alliance — even if those who see clearly are called traitors by fervid patriots of their own race."

It was in this spirit that Venizelos went to London to the second peace conference with Turkey in May. He did not disguise his anxiety over the situation nor his desire to arrive at a peaceful division of the spoils. He looked upon the Conference of London as a possibility of settling moot questions with Bulgaria at the same time the terms with Turkey were agreed upon. He knew well that the Balkan questions involved vital interests and policies of the great European Powers. He was fully informed of Italian intrigues in Albania. His agents in Vienna kept sending him alarming letters about an impending Austro-Hungarian mobilization against Russia and Serbia. This made him feel that Rumanian intervention was uncertain. He believed that Greece should content herself with only what was indispensable in order to adjust the differences with Bulgaria amicably. The instinct that led Venizelos to fear the intervention of Austria-Hungary was justified by the revelation in the Italian Chamber several years later that Vienna had approached Rome at this time with the proposal that Italy should permit Austria to attack Serbia without regarding such an attack as disturbing the relations of Italy and Austria as defined by the terms of the Triple Alliance.

Venizelos was attacked many times by his opponents for his opposition to the Second Balkan War. After it had come out all right, they denied to him the honor of its success, "not caring," as Venizelos ruefully put it, "whether I had made the necessary diplomatic and military preparations, so that when it had been made inevitable there should be every probability of the result being as successful as in fact it was."

After his return to power in 1917, Venizelos explained why with the best will in the world he had tried to avoid the war with Bulgaria. He said to the Chamber:

"Attempts have been made to make it appear that I alone, because I was fearful of the result, disapproved of this war, as opposed to the King and the General Staff, so that the conclusion might be drawn that all honor for the success of the war belonged to the King and none to the political chief. I am therefore obliged to declare that no difference ever arose between the Crown and the military authorities on the one hand and the Government on the other concerning our policy toward Bulgaria. And the reason why no difference of opinion arose was because even the military authorities were not by any means without misgivings as to the probable result of the war at that time. You will understand that a responsible Minister had no business to hurry into a war in which the chances of success, even after the signature of the Serbian Alliance, had the narrow margin of only sixty per cent, as the General Staff told me."

Although opposed to the war, Venizelos provided for it

and made possible the contingency of it by inviting to Saloniki the Greek Minister at Belgrade and the Serbian Minister at Athens, after a consultation with whom the terms of a secret alliance between Greece and Serbia were drawn up and signed. All that was known at the time of this alliance was the stipulation that each of the allies would defend by force of arms the other in the possession of the territories actually occupied in May, 1913. It developed afterwards, however, that the two countries had agreed upon definite frontiers with each other, and that they had signed an offensive and defensive alliance for ten years. This treaty was a triumph of the common sense and moderation of Venizelos. For when frontiers were discussed, the Greek military party was disposed to be as intractable toward Serbia as was Bulgaria. The Greek General Staff held out for Monastir. Venizelos had to convince the King and the militarists that something must be given to Serbia. Refusal to relinquish the Greek claim to Monastir would have prevented the conclusion of the alliance, and might have resulted in the loss of Saloniki. Despite the terms of the alliance, the opposition of the Greek General Staff made such an impression on the Serbians that they feared treachery on the part of Greece in the second week of the new war, and made arrangements to protect Monastir to the detriment of a concerted invasion of Bulgaria.

Premier Gueshoff of Bulgaria looked upon the possibility of war with the same misgivings as Venizelos and Pasitch, the Serbian Premier. But he could not persuade the Bulgarian militarist party to agree to a conference proposed by the Greek and Serbian premiers at Saloniki. When Venizelos and Pasitch suggested the arbitration of the Russian Czar, Bulgaria replied that she was willing to arbitrate only in accordance with the terms of the treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria; that is, to ask the mediation of the Czar in the matter of one of the two zones in dispute.

Unfortunately for Premier Gueshoff and Bulgaria, the terms "militarist party" and "Macedonian party" were synonymous. A remarkably large proportion of the officers in the Bulgarian army, especially those higher up, were of Macedonian origin, and the dispute with Greece and Serbia had to do with their homes. This was true also of the inhabitants of Sofia. High-spirited young Bulgarians, born and reared in Macedonia, refused to accept the prospect of living their lives under the Turks, and emigrated in large numbers to Bulgaria during the generation before the war. As they had no capital, and Bulgaria was an agricultural country, they entered the professions, and many of them made their career in the army. In a nation of peasants, at the time of general mobilization reserve officers were recruited from professional

classes. This gave the Macedonians a position of preponderance in all branches of the service, and they looked at the issue with their allies not as a matter for compromise in order to protect the interests of Bulgaria proper, but from a purely Macedonian point of view. In the city of Sofia the merchant class was recruited largely from families that had been driven into exile by Turkish misrule and the persecution of Greek and Serbian *comitadjis*. It will be readily seen how inflamed these powerful elements were. When Serbia and Greece wanted to make a deal with Bulgaria on the basis of compensation in Macedonia for Bulgarian expansion in Thrace, they saw red. They forced the hand of the Bulgarian Government.

The Macedonian party looked upon the idea of the Petrograd conference as the betrayal of Macedonians by the mother country. Unable to maintain his contention that Bulgaria should arbitrate, Gueshoff resigned. His withdrawal ruined Bulgaria, for he was replaced by Daneff, who had proved so unreasonable in the London negotiations, and who was the heart and soul of the Macedonian party.

It was not difficult for the Macedonian party to precipitate hostilities, once Gueshoff, who had worked loyally with Venizelos and Pasitch, was out of the way. The Bulgarian General Staff, notwithstanding the caution that should have imposed itself upon them by the consider-

ation of the exhausting campaign of the winter, felt certain of their ability to defeat the Serbians and Greeks combined. In fact, frontier skirmishes had begun in April. After numerous outbreaks Bulgarian and Greek officers had been compelled to establish a neutral zone in order to prevent a new war from breaking out automatically. During May and June there was frequent fighting. Madness got into the veins of the Bulgarians. With no diplomatic preparation, such as Venizelos knew how to make for Greece, with no assurance that Rumania would remain neutral or that help would come from any outside source, on Sunday night, June 29, without declaration of war or warning, General Savoff ordered a general attack all along the Greek and Serbian lines.

Did the Bulgarians expect that the Greeks and Serbians would be intimidated by this sudden attack, and would agree to continue the project of a conference at Petrograd, with the Bulgarian star in the ascendant? Or did they think that the Greek army was of so little value that they could brush it aside, and enter Saloniki, just as the Greeks had been able to enter in the previous November? Whatever hypothesis we adopt, it demonstrates contempt for their opponents and belief in their own invincibility.

More desperate and much more costly fighting than occurred during the war with Turkey was crowded into the first two weeks of July. The Bulgarians were decisively

defeated in the initial combats and unable to stem anywhere the offensive come-back of their former allies.[1]

On July 10 Rumania declared war against Bulgaria, and crossed the Danube. With their armies on the defensive and hard-pressed by Greeks and Serbians, it was impossible for the Bulgarians to withdraw any men from their western and southwestern fronts to oppose the Rumanian invasion. The Rumanians occupied Varna without fighting, on July 15, and started to march on Sofia. Rumania had entered the war, however, not from a desire to help Greece and Serbia, but for the specific purpose of securing an advantageous rectification of her frontier with Bulgaria in the Dobrudja. To see Bulgaria too greatly humiliated and weakened was no more to the interest of Rumania than to see Bulgaria triumphant.

When Czar Ferdinand realized that if hostilities continued, the Rumanians would occupy Sofia, he begged King Charles to suggest an armistice to the Greeks and Serbians. The Rumanian sovereign, in accord with his ministers, was glad to accept this opening. It was not the intention of the Rumanians to make an irreparable breach between themselves and the Bulgarians. The occupation of Sofia would have been an unnecessary humiliation for the Bulgarians and might have led to complications for

[1] It is impossible, within the limits of this volume, to give a detailed description of the military operations of the Second Balkan War. I refer my readers to my *New Map of Europe*, pp. 321–42.

the Rumanians. One of the purposes of Rumanian intervention, the preservation of the balance of power in the Balkans, would have been defeated if the Bulgarians were too badly worsted by the other two Balkan States. So Charles telegraphed to Constantine, asking for the cessation of hostilities.

Constantine showed the telegram to Venizelos, and said that he was willing to negotiate, but that for military reasons hostilities ought not to cease. Venizelos remonstrated strongly. He pointed out to King Constantine that it was extremely impolitic to refuse the mediations of King Charles when what was wanted above all things was the kindly attitude of Rumania toward Greek interests during peace negotiations. Venizelos, moreover, did not share the King's optimism concerning the invasion of Bulgaria. He thought that it would be a very difficult task to reach Sofia, and that it would entail unnecessary bloodshed and risk, seeing that the Greek victories had already covered more than the territorial claims. Venizelos proposed the following answer:

"Though I know Bulgarian perfidy and am not altogether sure that the request for peace is genuine and means an acknowledgment of defeat, I feel the duty incumbent upon me to accept Your Majesty's intercession, trusting that the Greek interests will find a just advocate in your Person during the negotiations for peace."

The King did not yield at once. He seemed impervious

to the argument that Rumania's help at the peace table would be precious for Greece and to the statesmanlike observation of Venizelos that it must be remembered that Rumania had not entered the war *pour les beaux yeux de la Grèce et de la Serbie*. Venizelos repeated his arguments. At last, seeing the King was obdurate, he said that he would yield if Constantine, as commander-in-chief of the army, took the responsibility of stating that "military reasons made the continuation of hostilities imperative." Constantine did not want to do this. He very soon had to admit, although with reluctance, that the policy of Venizelos was, as the Premier himself put it in narrating later this discussion, "absolutely necessary not only from the political and diplomatic point of view, but also from the purely military point of view."

The truth of the matter is that the Greeks were getting into a hole. Whether they stopped where they were or continued to advance, they ran the risk of having the tables turned upon them, because the Serbians were leaving them in the lurch. The mutual jealousy and suspicion of Balkan races do not permit a loyal military co-operation. After the battle of the Bregalnitza, which ended on July 10, the Serbians began to get nervous over the successes of their Greek allies. They feared that easy victories of Greeks over Bulgarians might necessitate a third war with Greece for Monastir. On July 11, giving

the ostensible reason that such a measure was necessary to protect their rear against the Albanians, the Serbian General Staff had withdrawn from the front a number of the best regiments. They were placed in a position to act quickly if the Greeks attempted to seize Monastir.

The Serbians, masters of all the territory they wanted, were ready for an armistice. Montenegro, whose interest was confined to getting from Serbia a generous portion of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, had no reason for prolonging hostilities. The losses of the belligerents had been as heavy for the victors as for the vanquished, and were being accompanied by atrocities of a heartrending nature. Unless some unquestioned political advantage was to be gained, the prolongation of the fighting was distinctly unwise for Greece. It must be remembered that Rumania had suffered no losses and had incurred no war debts in the struggle with Turkey, in which she had been neutral, and that her belligerency of three weeks in the Second Balkan War had necessitated no fighting. Every additional day of fighting increased the inferiority of Greece and Serbia to Rumania. Greece, too, could not count with certainty upon having settled her score with Turkey.

Venizelos started for Bukarest. He said later to the Greek Chamber:

"When I passed through Hadji-Beïlik on my way to Bukarest, I tried once more to persuade the military

authorities, arguing that I could see no reason for further operations, and that they must not forget the unpleasant position in which I should find myself if, on my arrival at Bukarest, I were unable to accept King Carol's probable advice about the armistice. The answer was once more categorical: that under no circumstances would the military interests of Greece permit the conclusion of an armistice. From Hadji-Beïlik to Bukarest was a journey, I think, of thirty-six hours; and it was only at Bukarest that I succeeded in removing objections of the General Staff and reconciling the views of the military and civilian authorities."

On the afternoon of July 30 the Bulgarian delegates met Premiers Majorsco, Pasitch, and Venizelos at Bukarest. A suspension of arms for three days was agreed upon to begin on August 1 at noon. Fighting was not resumed, for the armistice was prolonged, and peace speedily concluded.

Several French military critics, writing independently, have strikingly confirmed the judgment of Venizelos, who showed more acumen in forecasting the military situation than the Greek General Staff. On the afternoon of the day Venizelos unsuccessfully urged the armistice at Hadji-Beïlik, the Bulgarians began a counter-attack against both wings of the Greek army. On July 29 the Greeks began to plan their retreat. The next day they realized that retreat was no longer possible. The Bulgarians were on both their flanks. It was then that King Constantine telegraphed to Venizelos, consenting to the armistice. Veni-

zelos is a man of realities. He knew all along that Greece alone could not defeat Bulgaria. He realized the advantage of stopping the war at the flood tide of success. He did not want Greece to appear to be beholden either to Serbia or to Rumania for the victory. Had the armistice been concluded on July 27, military critics would not have had the chance to raise the question as to whether in the end Bulgaria could not have pulled herself out of the hole she was in had Rumania remained neutral.

Unlike Turkey in the presence of the Balkan allies, Bulgaria in the presence of her neighbors did not deal with them as a coalition. It was necessary, if there was to be peace, that her delegates should come to an understanding as to the sacrifices she was willing to make with each of her neighbors separately. The important decisions were made in committee meetings. The general assembly of delegates had little else to do than to ratify the concessions wrung from Bulgaria in turn by each of the opponents. The factor in the situation that had made it necessary for Bulgaria to sue for peace saved Bulgaria from the necessity of yielding to all the demands of Serbia and Greece. The Bulgarians were quick to see the possibility of getting diplomatic support from the Rumanians. Rumania had acted as mediator to terminate the war. She was willing to act as mediator to prevent the peace terms from being too inequitable to Bulgaria. Rumania had no

desire to see either Serbia or Greece, greatly enlarged at the expense of Bulgaria, become in the place of Bulgaria a potential Balkan rival. By acceding without discussion to the Rumanian demands, the Bulgarians hoped to, and to a large extent did, win Rumanian diplomatic support in the discussions with Serbia and Greece.

What Bulgaria had to give to each of the victors was decided upon with astonishing rapidity. The Rumanian protocol was presented on August 4, the Serbian on August 6, and the Greek on August 7. The protocol of the Greeks was the only one against which the Bulgarians made a resolute stand. When they signed this protocol they stated that they consented to the inclusion of Kavalla in Greek territory only because they had taken cognizance of the notes which Austria-Hungary and Russia presented to the conference, to the effect that in giving their assent the two Powers would reserve this particular question for future discussion.

Bulgaria fared far worse at Bukarest than if she had agreed to the last proposal of Venizelos and Pasitch to submit to the Czar for arbitration the entire Macedonian question. It was a case of the one who took the sword perishing by the sword. Not only did she lose most of Macedonia, but Turkey, taking advantage of her embarrassment, reoccupied most of Thrace, including Adrianople. The folly of Bulgaria's course is evident when we


HUNGARY
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BELGRADE
SARAJEVO
MOSTAR
NISH
SOFIA
PHILIPPOPOLIS
ADRIANOPLE
CONSTANTINOPLE
SCUTARI
DURAZZO
VALONA
MONASTIR
SALONIKA
SERES
DRAMA
DEDEAGATCH
CAVALLA
Thasos
Samothrace
Imbros
Lemnos
Tenedos
Gallipoli
Sea of Marmora
BRUSA
ÆGEAN SEA
Mitylene
Skyros
Chios
SMYRNA
ASIA MINOR
IONIAN SEA
Corfu
Cephalonia
Zante
Cerigo
ATHENS
CORINTH
PATRAS
PREVESA
LARISSA
VOLO
JANINA
Andros
Tino
Nicaria
Samos
OSCALANOVA
Patmos
Naxos
Kos
Rhodes
Karpathos
CRETE
ITALY
ADRIATIC SEA
BLACK SEA
Strait of Otranto
Danube River
Save R.
Drave
Mouths of the Danube
Bosphorus
Dardanelles
Gulf of Salonika
Gulf of Arta
CONSTANZA
SILISTRIA
RUSTCHUK
VARNA
BURGAS
MIDIA
RIRK KILISSEH
DEMOTIKA
ADDOSTO
ENOS
CALIPOLI
PRIZREND
USKUB
ISHTIP
KOTCHANA
RADOVISH
STRUMNITZA
DEMIRHISSAR
MELNIK
FLORINA
VODENA
NOVI BAZAR
CATTARO
CETTINJE
SPIZZA
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Danube River
TREATY OF BUCHAREST
1913
INCLUDING LATER BULGARIAN CESSIONS
TO TURKEY
0 50 100 150 200 MILES
24 EAST FROM GREENWICH
Wm. J. WILSON

consider that she had a chance to purchase at a lesser price than she finally paid the neutrality of both Turkey and Rumania. Or she could have kept what she had to yield to Turkey and Rumania by compromising her Macedonian claims with Serbia and Greece. As it was, she lost on all sides.

Later events proved that the calamity of the Second Balkan War and the Treaty of Bukarest did not fall upon Bulgaria alone. *La Roumanie*, the organ of the Rumanian statesman Jonescu, put it:

"The Second Balkan War has proved a capital fault, a real error against the interests of us all. It is useless to seek for responsibilities. They were more general than one believes, and every one has paid for them and is paying still. What is certain is that hardly a year after this war, even those who in appearance gained the most by it would have preferred that it had never taken place. They would have to-day more limited territories, perhaps, but they know well that they would be stronger and more free."

Speaking in the House of Commons on November 2, 1915, Premier Asquith described the animosity of the Balkan States as "an unhappy and still unliquidated legacy of the two Balkan wars and especially of the Treaty of Bukarest." The Greek Socialists, in a memorandum to the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference of London in 1918, passed the following judgment upon this great diplomatic blunder:

"We denounced the peace that followed the Second Balkan War — whatever may have been the responsibility of one or the other side in the struggle — as a peace not durable, because it was not the accomplishment of the will of the peoples who participated in it. We protest energetically against every peace imposed at the point of the sword and destined inevitably to excite hatred and a desire for vengeance. Such a peace will have for result only to involve innocent people in a new war."

The veteran English correspondent, J. D. Bourchier, who played an important rôle in the formation of the Balkan Alliance, has never ceased to protest against the territorial arrangements of the Treaty of Bukarest. In his correspondence at the time and later to his newspaper and in magazine articles,[1] Mr. Bourchier has asserted that this treaty was disastrous to the real interests of all the nations concerned. During the World War that followed so closely the Balkan Wars, the truth of the *Times* correspondent's assertions came home to all with peculiar force. The intervention of Bulgaria on the side of the Central Empires caused the prolongation of the war, the internal disruption of Greece, the humiliation and the military occupation of Rumania, and the death of more than a quarter of the inhabitants of Serbia. Mr. Bourchier charges that the process of extermination of the Bulgarian element in Macedonia and Thrace was inaugurated by Serbians and

[1] See the London *Times* files for 1913–17 *passim*, and the *Quarterly Review* for October, 1917.

Greeks in the winter of 1912 while the Bulgarians were still fighting the Turks, and that the negotiations of London were intentionally protracted to increase the exhaustion of the Bulgarian army.

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the Greeks had an old score to settle with the Bulgarians, and that Venizelos as a Greek had in mind himself, and represented a nation that could never forget, the fate that had befallen the Greek element in Bulgarian territories. Although the organic statute of Eastern Rumelia guaranteed to the Greek element parliamentary representation and scholastic and ecclesiastical autonomy, and put the Greek language on an equality with the Bulgarian as an official language, virtually nothing remained after thirty years of the two hundred thousand Greeks of Rumelia and the Black Sea coast. The constitutional privileges of the Greeks were arbitrarily suppressed; convents and hospitals and even private homes were confiscated; and the Greek element had to go into exile or become Bulgarian. As late as 1906 the Bulgarians wiped out in one day the flourishing Greek towns of Anchialos and Stenimachos in a disgraceful pogrom, and demolished every Greek school and charitable institution in Philippopolis. The Greeks maintained that in the division of territories wrested from Turkey they were not calling upon the Bulgarians to make a sacrifice they themselves were unwilling to make. If the

Bulgarian element was preponderant in Macedonia, the Greek element was preponderant in Thrace, and past experience taught them that Hellenism had little to expect from an extension of Bulgarian sovereignty.

Venizelos, who had striven so loyally to avoid the Second Balkan War, was uncompromising in insisting that the Bulgarians should expiate their crime. The inclusion of the Kavalla-Drama region in the Greek claims was represented by British correspondents at Bukarest as being against the advice and judgment of Venizelos. If it was against his judgment, he did not express himself for moderation of Greek demands. Venizelos told me personally that the July fighting had made impossible any such concessions to Bulgaria. He denied the presence in this region of any considerable Bulgarian population, and asserted that if it remained under Bulgarian sovereignty Greece would have to take care of one hundred and fifty thousand additional refugees. He refused to admit the Bulgarian plea that Kavalla was a commercial necessity. He advanced that as an Ægean outlet Porto-Lagos was preferable to Kavalla. The railroad, which traversed less mountainous land, was one third shorter (170 against 260 kilometers), and would lead directly to the center of Bulgaria. Kavalla was an open port, with everything yet to be done to make it available for large shipping, while Porto-Lagos could be protected from the sea at one half

the expense of Kavalla. To the argument of the military authorities Venizelos assented; that is, that the possession of Kavalla was essential for the strategic protection of Saloniki.

Venizelos at Bukarest despaired of the possibility of reconciling Bulgaria by displaying a spirit of conciliation and moderation. He knew also that he could not bring the Greek people to any such point of view. When we criticize statesmen by confronting them at one time with opinions expressed at another time, we fall into the error of failing to appreciate a change of circumstances. The Greek Premier, in common with his fellow-countrymen, was in the mood illustrated by the Greek Punch and Judy show, in which a Bulgarian shepherd was called upon to share with others three sheep acquired in common. "This one," said the Bulgarian, pointing to the first sheep, "falls to me by right; the second you give me for friendship's sake; the third I take from you."[1]

In defense of his Bukarest policy, Venizelos said several years later:

"It was not possible to make any concession on the question of Kavalla; not because I should not have been justified before public opinion, but because I could not be sure that if I sacrificed Kavalla I should be in a position to secure peace from the Balkans. If I had been sure of this, I do not hesitate to say even now that I should have

[1] See Michel André in the Paris *Temps*, December 18, 1914.

made the sacrifice. But I knew, as a matter of fact, that if I gave up Kavalla the effect would be to stimulate Bulgarian voracity, which would only be stronger and which would put the Bulgarians in a more advantageous position for aggression when the time came at which they thought it would be possible to attack us again. If then I insisted, as I did insist, on including Kavalla in Greece, I did so because no sacrifice of Kavalla, under the circumstances that prevailed at Bukarest, could succeed in averting fresh wars and fresh dangers."

From the standpoint of a constructive and durable peace, which was sorely needed by all the Balkan States, the Treaty of Bukarest must be regarded as a failure of statesmanship, and Venizelos cannot be absolved from a share in the responsibility for its failure. His frankness in affirming that he might "have been justified before public opinion" for making the sacrifice of Kavalla increases his responsibility. This blunder, coupled with the lack of precision as to the exact nature of the reciprocal obligations of Serbia and Greece in the secret treaty concluded on the eve of the Second Balkan War, are vulnerable points in an otherwise impeccable diplomatic record.

CHAPTER VIII

VENIZELOS REORGANIZES GREECE INTERNALLY

EVENTS moved too fast to allow Venizelos the five years which he told King George would be necessary for the regeneration of Greece. In less than two years after his accession to the premiership, war broke out with Turkey, followed immediately by the war with Bulgaria. And then, a year after the signing of the Treaty of Bukarest, came the World War. It is the lesson of human experience, however, that the greatest miracles are wrought under pressure, and that those whose hands are fullest accomplish most. Venizelos waited long in Crete for his high destiny. When the day of opportunity arrived, he was ready to lead Greece, and Greece was ready to be led. If he had come to power under ordinary circumstances, and simply as representative of a political party with the majority in the Chamber, he would have had to make haste slowly, and would have found the regeneration of a country financially depleted and rent by internal dissension a superhuman task. But, as the Kingdom of Greece was the hope of Hellenism, and as Venizelos had made himself the embodiment of the aspirations of the Greek race, he was able to strike in his first electoral campaign a note of ap-

peal for support that was irresistible. Hellenism was in danger. In the success of Venizelos at Athens lay the future of the Greek race. The people cried out for a Messiah. The call gave Venizelos confidence and the cause inspired him.

Those who gathered around the new leader put their faith in him implicitly. They were in the frame of mind to do as he told them without examining and discussing his programme, often without understanding the whys and wherefores. Greeks are by nature argumentative and prone to attach great importance to their individual opinions or prejudices. This state of mind made possible the amazing changes of 1911 and 1912. As we look back upon these years, having in mind the character of the Greeks, we realize that the quick succession of external crises played into Venizelos's hands. He remained master of the situation, and was able to accomplish what he did, for the very reason that he did not have five years of quiet to reorganize Greece internally.

The Liberal Party, which won the election of December, 1910, and gave Venizelos a working majority in the Greek Chamber, was born of fanatical devotion to Hellenism and of dissatisfaction with the incompetence and sterility of the political leadership in the Kingdom of Greece. The campaign speeches of Venizelos and his followers demonstrate that the bid for popular favor was founded upon the

crusader spirit. Venizelos declared that the Kingdom of Greece was being ruined, and the cause of Hellas compromised by "favlokratia," as he called the statesmanship of contemporary Greece. It was "the rule of the incompetent." Venizelos, although he was as ready to talk at length (which means hours) as any other Greek, skillfully avoided the long parliamentary and popular discussions which had been the bane of Greek politics by asserting that the people were tired of listening to words and called for acts.

The men who made the first experiment in democracy recognized the fact that times of crisis call for a dictator. The Romans provided for that contingency. Throughout history nations have passed through periods when their destinies had to be committed to one man. The successful dictator is not the despot who imposes himself by force, but the popular hero who inspires the imagination of the masses and wins and keeps their blind devotion. The successful dictator understands mob psychology. Toward the nation he establishes the relationship of a father toward his child by making the people feel that without him they can do nothing. When they arrive at absolute power, many dictators fail because they shut off the current from the dynamo. The people, no longer able to get at their dictators, discard them. When dictators become optimistic, and think they can keep the favor of the people by as-

suring them that all is going well, they undermine their own authority. The child looks to its father for companionship and for protection. As soon as the father ceases to become a companion and a protector, the child turns from him.

Venizelos has made neither of these mistakes. Despite his preoccupations he takes the time to listen to people and to talk to them. A public man belongs to the public. When he became Premier he invited all to come to him with their troubles. He established himself as the accessible court of appeal for remedying injustices and for hearing complaints, in the same inimitable fashion as did Abraham Lincoln when he was carrying the burdens of the Civil War. For the past ten years the antechamber of Venizelos has been open to all who cared to come and wait their turn. As he works without interruption, taking no time for pleasures outside of his career, as he never dwells nor rests upon what he has already accomplished, as he takes little things along with the big, he has been able during the past ten years not only to accomplish the work of many men, but also to keep in close touch with the common people.

A Greek friend tells me: "This is the only way to explain how Venizelos for long years has mesmerized a whole people, aroused it from its languor, inspired and led to victory an army, and has exercised his charm upon the whole world, calling attention to the once despised Greece. The

Greeks, satisfied only with personal contacts, want and require much from their Venizelos."

His illustration to prove this is worth quoting:

"In the antechamber of Venizelos one meets the queerest visitors, from ministers and generals with whom he regulates the affairs of state to the lowliest peasant, whose crops are not promising, to the woman whose rheumatism does not let her sleep — every one demands a personal interview of Venizelos to state his grievances and his desires. Venizelos must know that Demetrios, whose goat has been stolen, is not pleased with the internal administration. After Demetrios, he must receive the old grandmother who has been waiting for two hours to explain to the Premier that the overcoat which was given to her grandson in the army is somewhat worn and that Venizelos must write immediately to the military authorities that they replace it with one worthy of the physique of her strapping boy.

"Once there came a request from an unhappy husband who begged Venizelos to lead his wife back to the right path. 'If you, Mr. President,' wrote the petitioner, 'would only summon my wife and admonish her, I am sure that she would listen to you and that she would change her conduct, and so, thanks to you, I should find my lost happiness again.' How, with all his good-will, does Venizelos find time to occupy himself with the affairs of Greece, the goat of Demetrios, the vegetables of the peasants, the grandson's overcoat, and the unfaithful wife? For he does do so!" [1]

[1] I am indebted to Dr. Antonios P. Savvidis, of Harvard University, for this story.

In my own experience I have had the opportunity of realizing how Venizelos is all things to all men. So I cite this intimate glimpse of a little-known side of the Premier's life without fear of exaggeration. Venizelos does take time for everybody. As he does not work by the clock and has no appointments for golf, he gets as much personal contact with people of all sorts as pressing official duties allow him. He has mounted the rungs of the ladder by tireless energy and by personal magnetism. Those same qualities have kept him where he is. Given the gift of sleep, a good physique, and keen joy in the work one is doing, formal vacations and hours of stereotyped recreation do not necessarily fit into the proper scheme of things for all men. There is such a thing as getting more real fun out of one's work than out of play. Thinking about the goat of Demetrios can be recreation.

From the beginning of his public life in Athens Venizelos never deceived the people with alluring promises. In his speeches I find no promise to which a stiff condition is not attached. He kept impressing upon the people the vital need of their coöperation in every governmental policy. He made them feel their responsibility. He called into being will-power where before there had been inertia. He gave proof of the most wonderful characteristic of leadership, the genius of impressing upon every follower the fact that he was an essential cog in the wheel. If one

failed or slacked, the common good of all would be imperiled. He made the innovation in campaigning of not patting himself or any one else on the back. And he knew how to paint the immediate future in dark colors in order to bring out the dazzling glory of the goal. If one may be allowed to say it in all reverence, Venizelos treated his disciples after the fashion of the Great Master. Hardships and persecutions and danger were to be their lot. He held forth no hope of personal advantage to any one, nor even of immediate success in the triumph of Hellenism. It was a challenge to the Greeks to have faith in themselves as well as in him. The call for service and sacrifice, when rightly put, is the most potent appeal that can be made to humankind.

Under the stimulus of the increasing menace of the Young Turks, who thought to cripple Greece by boycotting her commerce and to intimidate Greece and the other Balkan States, Venizelos was able to resist the pressure of reactionaries and hot-heads and chauvinists, raise and equip a modern army, rehabilitate and increase the navy, re-create the internal administrative system, liberate Greece from financial servitude, and form a military alliance with the Balkan States. As in Crete, old-fashioned politicians distrusted and opposed him, narrow-minded nationalists and self-centered irredentists upbraided him, statesmen of the Powers warned him against the folly of

megalomania, and Court and Church feared that he was gambling with their certainties. Because he hit straight out from the shoulder, and made no attempt to conceal or gloss over the difficulties and dangers, the people believed him and in him. They backed him against sovereign, politicians, and ecclesiastics.

The way in which Venizelos asked for popular support is best illustrated by his own words. When he went before the country in the general election of December, 1910, he said:

"I do not promise that from one day to the next the Government will inaugurate the Golden Age. As the malady is serious, the treatment will be long. What I promise is that the treatment will be radical and effective. The first duty of a politician is to sacrifice his personal interests and those of his party to the general interests of his country. It is also his duty to say always the truth to great and small, without bothering about the displeasure that his loyalty may provoke.

"A leader must give the example of complete submission to the law. If not, how can he impose his point of view upon his followers? That is my fundamental principle. A statesman must look at power not as end, but as a means of assuring what is good for the common weal. He will not hesitate then to resign his office, if his maintenance of the head of the government must be purchased by the sacrifice of his programme.

"To govern is not easy. Only with your support shall we arrive at a restoration which will give birth to happy days. Do not despair. On the ruins of the past, by laying new foundations, shall arise a political edifice which will per-

mit the Hellenic nation to respond to the needs of present-day civilization and to the hopes of those who are working for its regeneration."

From the rebirth of Greece to 1907, her population increased from 600,000 to 2,650,000. By the union of the Ionian Islands and Thessaly with the kingdom, more than half a million were added. The original population tripled in two generations. When the first illiteracy statistics were taken in 1870, there were considerably less than twenty per cent who could read and write, and of these only six per cent were women. When Venizelos came to Athens about thirty-five per cent of the population were literate. There was a compulsory education law for children from six to twelve, but money was lacking to establish schools in country districts, and so the law was not enforced. Two things were necessary: a larger budget for the Ministry of Public Instruction, and normal schools. Higher education had to precede primary education. Along with the creation of two hundred new municipal schools, Venizelos insisted upon making immediately the financial sacrifices required to establish normal schools and to increase the efficiency of the University of Athens. Capodistria University, founded by the Domboli legacy, was annexed to the University of Athens and an ambitious programme of new chairs and new laboratories was inaugurated. All this could not be provided by the State. An appeal was made to the

generosity of rich Greeks, who have always been noted for their willingness to give money for public institutions. Venizelos pointed out that the future of Hellas was inseparably bound up in the efficiency and spirit of the University of Athens. A fourth of its students came from unredeemed Greece. Was not he himself an example of what the University could accomplish toward the realization of national ideals?

I have linked together efficiency and spirit. Many earnest educators had long been striving for the former. There were learned professors on the faculty, imbued with the traditions and scholastic ideals of German universities. But some of them considered education itself and scholastic attainments the ends of university training, and the vision of others was limited to Old Greece or to the worship of the past. Venizelos intended that the University of Athens should become the *foyer* of Hellenism in a very practical sense. So much emphasis had been laid upon the importance and glory of classic Greece in world civilization that those who entertained the hope of reëstablishing the nation by reviving the forms and exterior appearance of ancient Hellas had come into hopeless conflict with realities. They had lost their faith. They had become embittered. Or, if they succeeded in deceiving themselves, they engaged in academic quarrels with those who believed that the dead should bury their dead.

The language question (γλωσσικὸν ζήτημα) was the touchstone. Some were for maintaining and teaching, until it was universally accepted, the pure language (καθαρεύουσα) of public life and the newspapers, while others thought it was ridiculous to strive for nation-wide literacy through any other medium than the popular language (δημοτική) of poetry and ordinary speech.[1]

The Demotikists argued that it was against the history of philological evolution for Greece to be bound by her ancient tongue, and cited the Italian language as an example of logical and virile evolution. Were the great masters of the Renaissance of less worth because they had written in Italian instead of Latin?

The Katharevusists replied that the analogy did not hold. The revival of their ancient tongue in its purity must be to the Greeks the symbol of the unity of the Hellenic race and the repudiation and thrusting into oblivion of the tragic centuries of foreign domination. The Katharevusists asked for Government support in the effort to keep out of the written language what the Demotikists wanted to bring into it, Italian and Turkish and Occidental words and idioms, the memories of bondage and dispersion. They hoped that teaching the pure language of Greece in schools and not allowing the modern patois to be used in newspapers and periodicals and books would lead

[1] Cf. Dr. R. M. Burrows in the *Contemporary Review*, February, 1919.

to a revival throughout Hellas of a common spoken language and the disappearance of dialects. The ideal was a possible one. For the Greek language holds a unique position among European languages. It has maintained itself through thirty centuries so unchanged that only little instruction in grammar is necessary to make the written language of the ancients intelligible to Greeks of the twentieth century. Can this be said for any other European language? I have had the privilege of teaching classical Greek to peasant boys of Asia Minor, and have learned by personal experience that Greeks can read Homer at sight more easily than English or American schoolboys can read Chaucer. Where Anglo-Saxon schoolboys need a dictionary and a teacher for Beowulf, Greek schoolboys read Xenophon at sight.

Venizelos decided for the Katharevusists. By constitutional enactment the Bible in modern dialects is forbidden in Greece, and the Ministry of Public Education adopted a programme to satisfy the demands of the purists. I have heard American missionaries criticize severely the refusal of the Greek Government to tolerate the spread of the Scriptures in the Κοινή. They thought, of course, of the hindrance to their evangelical work and colportage. In common with Demotikists, but for a different reason, they were unable to grasp the significance of the attitude of Venizelos. They did not realize the importance of

the Katharevusist movement to the political conception Venizelos cherished. A common language for all Hellas was the strongest bond to unite the Greek race. Since the revival of the pure language was a practical ideal, it was common sense to attempt it. The student of national movements finds that language is the most powerful factor in awakening and developing the national consciousness of a people that has suffered from alien rule, and especially from servitude to several masters. Would it have been possible for the Poles, for instance, to have found nationhood again, had they not striven to preserve and foster their own language during the century of their eclipse?

But Venizelos knew how to avail himself of the Katharevusist movement only in so far as it could be used for the realization of the aspirations of Hellenism. He had no patience with those who lived in the past, and whose vision of Hellenism was limited to classic Greece. Their academic outlook upon life led to paralysis of the will and to hopeless cynicism. Nor did he give encouragement to the chauvinistic element among the purists who were so completely under the spell of the glory of classic Greece and Byzantium that they thought Greece could regenerate herself without studying and borrowing from Occidental Europe and without seeking aid and counsel from European teachers and advisers. From the moment he be-

came Premier he made war upon pride and self-sufficiency as well as upon apathy. In moderation xenophobia is an essential factor of success for a nationalist movement. But he who uses it must be able to discriminate between self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

Another danger to be guarded against in the regeneration of a small people is the tendency of reformers to insist upon looking to one Great Power to the exclusion of others for aid and guidance. Among the followers of Venizelos were Greeks who had been educated in England or France or Germany. They were Anglophiles or Francophiles or Germanophiles, and when it was a question of imitating and adapting or seeking aid, they demanded that Greece put all her eggs in one basket. Venizelos, on the other hand, believed that Greece should pick and choose. Wholly aside from political and financial considerations, common sense dictated an impartial study of the various European systems of legislation and administration and selecting patterns to be followed and counselors to be employed. Unless the political considerations outweighed the advantages, the determining influences must be success and efficiency and adaptation to the particular need and peculiar genius of the Greek race. Venizelos has never indulged himself in antipathy or hostility toward any Great Power. To lesser men he has left the dubious honor of being pro-English or pro-French or pro-German. He has been con-

tent to be pro-Greek. His sole criterion has been the interest of his own country.

Nor, in the regeneration of Greece, has he represented, as its instrument or the exponent of its ambitions, any class or section of political creed in his own country. Into the ranks of the Liberal Party he welcomed all who wished to follow him, making no promises of individual preferment or of advancing group interests, and exacting only wholehearted devotion to the goal of achieving the unity of Hellas. Thus it is that while he was supported by the Military League, he refused to lend himself to an anti-dynastic movement, and while he was backed by manufacturers and shippers and the wealthiest Greeks, a prominent Socialist could say of his reforms:

"To my mind the reforms of Venizelos mean such a yielding to the anti-plutocratic spirit as will lead to the taxation of the rich for the needy of the State and the relief of the poorer classes. To these reforms Venizelos has pledged himself. And I believe in his promises. Therefore I shall vote for all his measures, which tend to the overthrow of capitalism. The hopes of a million struggling, despised, and wronged working men and women are centered in the present Government." [1]

We can give only a brief summary of the legislative and administrative reforms of 1911, which have made the last ten years a decade of miracles in Greece despite the con-

[1] Cf. Dr. E. J. Dillon, in the *Contemporary Review*, January, 1911.

stant interruptions of wars and internal political conflicts. Of the Ministry of Public Instruction we have already spoken. In the Ministry of Justice the most important of the new laws have provided for the construction of a building and the formation of a system to centralize in Athens the work of the Department; simplifying the procedure of civil tribunals; wills; remedying the abuses of usury; protecting creditors against the bad faith of debtors; condemning to costs false denunciators and false pleaders; reconstructing prisons and enlightened prison administration; raising salaries of magistrates and court officials; and providing for prompt trials with counsel for the accused. In the Ministry of the Interior, a new law for communal administration was passed, and for the first time in the history of Greece an efficient national police force was organized. The Ministry of Public Works received a greatly increased budget for draining swamps and for extending telegraph lines and postal service to the smallest hamlets of the kingdom.

The most important innovation of Venizelos was the creation of the Ministry of National Economy, under a practical business man, to include commerce, industry, and agriculture. Venizelos knew that it would be impossible to bring order out of chaos in finances, to work for the emancipation of Greece from foreign financial control, to plan extensive public works, to build up the army and

navy, and above all to win all classes of the population to the support of his Cabinet, unless the revenues of the country were quickly and greatly increased. The reforms under the Ministry of National Economy were initiated in 1911. They can be considered, however, only in the light of the progressive development during the years that followed. And in judging the work of Venizelos in legislative and administrative reforms, it must be remembered that hardly two years of the new régime had passed before Greek sovereignty was extended over a part of Epirus, most of Macedonia, and additional Ægean islands, including Crete.

Old Greece, with her deep gulfs and peninsulas and islands, depended largely upon transportation by water. The Greeks are born sailors and traders, and it was natural that with the advent of the steamship era they should not only develop a merchant marine for their own needs, but also enter into competition with other nations in the carrying trade. Government encouragement in the development and amelioration of the merchant marine meant more to Greece than simply caring for her own coastal and international communications. Every ship under Greek registry could be made a factor in earning money for Greece outside of Greece and thus help to correct an unfavorable trade balance. A powerful Greek merchant fleet would serve also to further the political interests of Hellenism in

unredeemed Greece. Before 1910 captains and engineers received diplomas by examination before a commission of the Ministry of Marine. Venizelos established a training school for merchant officers at the Piræus, and created a superior council to look after the interests of the merchant marine. From 1910 to 1915 Greek foreign commerce increased from 300,000,000 drachmæ to 500,000,000 drachmæ, and yet more of this commerce was carried on Greek bottoms in 1915 than in 1910. In another place we shall speak of the fearful losses of Greek shipping through the submarine warfare, which have checked the admirable growth of ships under Greek registry. When conditions are again settled, there is no doubt that Greece will become a formidable competitor of the larger nations in the carrying trade, especially in the Mediterranean.

The ease of communication by sea retarded road and railway building in Greece. But when, by reason of the Balkan Wars, the frontiers of Greece were greatly extended landward, the problem of land transportation became acute. The Venizelist Governments have built three hundred kilometers of new railways in the Peloponnesus and the line from Athens to Saloniki, which is over five hundred kilometers. Extensive railway construction is demanded in Macedonia and Thrace, where the roads of the Turkish régime were largely dictated by military necessity. Government ownership of all the railways of Old Greece is now

a matter of only a few years. In 1918 Venizelos secured an appropriation to construct nearly four thousand kilometers of new highways.

The industrial legislation of Greece under Venizelos has made steady progress. There were prejudices to be overcome and conditions different from those of other European countries to be taken into consideration. Hence Venizelos did not attempt to play the rôle of a new broom sweeping clean when he first assumed office. In 1911 the principle of trade-unionism was recognized under specific regulations. In 1912 a National Labor Board was created, with representatives of the Government, the employers, and the unions. A law was passed, stipulating payment for services on the spot where the work was performed, and requiring employers to pay interest on wages overdue. In 1914 Greece adopted an employers' liability act and sickness and old age pensions. Measures that had been tried out for three years were embodied in a definite bill regulating sanitary conditions in factories and vineyards and on farms. In 1915 the question of hours of labor was taken under government control by the law fixing the opening and closing of factories, shops, and bazaars in cities of over fifteen thousand inhabitants. In 1918 various measures for the protection of children and women were embodied in a law prohibiting child labor under twelve, limiting the hours of work of women and older children, excluding

women and children from mine and quarry labor, and requiring employers to give a period of leave with full pay for women bearing children.

The agricultural population of Old Greece is nearly sixty-two per cent, and in the territories added by the Balkan Wars nearly sixty-seven per cent of the total. While Venizelos has always given careful attention to industrial problems in large centers of population, he has realized the prime importance of promoting agriculture and of solving perplexing problems of agrarian legislation and taxes. Outside of Thessaly, where remedial measures had already been taken, large holdings of land did not furnish a serious question for Greece. In many regions public interest demanded the creation of larger holdings rather than the breaking-up of estates. But Venizelos had sufficent faith in the destiny of Greece to look to the future and provide for the contingency of annexation of provinces in which Turkish law and custom made the peasants virtually serfs. He did not desire to have on his hands a difficult agrarian question such as Greece faced after the annexation of Thessaly. So the Constitution of 1911 contained an article providing for the expropriation of lands to install farmers and peasants as proprietors in fee simple. This constitutional change was justified on the ground of public utility, and was a striking forecast of the Rumanian agrarian law of December 14, 1918. Without

this amendment of the constitution, Venizelos could not so easily have extended the Greek principle of agrarian legislation to Macedonia and Epirus in December, 1917.

The measures of Venizelos to promote agriculture in Greece, remarkable in themselves, have been brilliantly successful. One of his first acts, when he became Premier in the autumn of 1910, was to employ French experts for promoting fruit cultivation and draining swamps. The State established fruit-tree nurseries, and sent specialists to show the peasants how to combat diseases of fruit-trees. He also employed French help in the struggle against phylloxera and to show the peasants how to make and preserve wine. He encouraged the cultivation of olives by premiums and State aid. Foreign agricultural engineers and forestry experts were employed. Experiments were made in growing Egyptian and American cotton, and every encouragement was given for improving the quality of tobacco. Venizelos took a personal interest in stimulating the growing of potatoes. The figures of increase in potatoes tell an eloquent story: in 1910, 16,000,000 tons; in 1913, 21,000,000 tons; in 1914, 23,000,000 tons; in 1915, 36,000,000 tons; in 1919, 48,000,000 tons.[1]

[1] For these figures and for most of what is given in this chapter concerning Greek finances, especially the figures, I am indebted to *Le Relèvement Économique de La Grèce* (Paris, 1920), by E. J. Tsouderos, a member of the Greek Chamber, who ably represented his country in economic matters

Venizelos preached love of the land, and sought to check the tide of emigration to America. He made it possible for the humblest peasant to get information that would help him increase his production; he distributed free quinine to fight swamp fever; with his own hand he edited and revised lectures to be sent to teachers in the schools of the provinces; he found time to go to the laboratories at the University of Athens and talk with the research chemists about substitutes such as wood alcohol for benzine, concrete for Austrian wood, lignite for coal, and stafidine (derived from raisins) for sugar. He was as much interested in the discovery that motorine could be made from resin as in a battle won, and he undertook personally to see that the Department of Agriculture popularized the discoveries of chemical science.

Little would have been possible without the enthusiastic and loyal collaboration of able coadjutors, to whose individual work I am unable to give due credit either here or elsewhere; for I am endeavoring to write the story of the life of one man. Those who have worked with Venizelos, however, would be the last to criticize this omission. Their devotion to Venizelos and to the great cause of Hellenism precludes seeking for personal recognition. They realize

at the Peace Conference. I wish also to acknowledge my indebtedness to my good friends, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nicholas Politis and Professor Andreades, of the University of Athens, who have written books and articles on the international aspects of Greek finances.

that from the first Venizelos has stood for Greece and not for himself. So there has been no clash of personalities, no eagerness for winning credit in the eyes of the world. The success of Venizelos in the regeneration of Greece is partly due to the fact that he has led and still leads cabinet ministers, heads of departments, and governors of provinces, as a general leads his army. All are anonymous except the big chief, and his name is synonymous with the cause. The discipline is perfect. Every personal interest is subordinated to winning the battle.

We can understand this if we put ourselves in the place of the friends of Venizelos. Their country was in danger. The cause for success for which they strove was almost a matter of religion with them. Had they been living in normal times in a normal country, they would have been tempted to think more of self and to have looked for the reward of individual recognition of their services. But to save their country they had gladly centered everything around the leader. This self-effacement of men of conspicuous ability is ample refutation of the accusations made by the enemies of Venizelos. If Venizelos were self-seeking and if his policy at any time during the past ten years had been influenced by personal ambition, many of his coadjutors would undoubtedly have forsaken him. The charge that Venizelos fails to star his collaborators can be answered. If he had to star them or did star them, he might

justly be suspected of starring himself. Only an unselfish man calls forth unselfishness in others.

Every follower of Venizelos, who was worthy of the name of follower, shared the vision of the great leader sufficiently to grasp the essential conditions of the success of his mission. Greece could not save Hellenism without proving herself strong enough to fight for Hellenism; that is, for the redemption of the Greeks under Ottoman rule. Venizelos, then, was a peace Premier only in the sense that peace was to be a transitional stage to prepare Greece for war. And the two essentials of war are money and fighting strength. Everything else in the regeneration of Greece under Venizelos has been contributory and secondary to financial and military rehabilitation.

Greece began her independent existence with a heavy debt, the nominal capital of which represented more than twice the amount she had actually received from the friend who loaned her money. Another loan had to be floated in 1833 to set the new kingdom on its feet. From 1833 to 1862 Greece was barely able to pay back short-term loans and to meet the interest on the indebtedness contracted during the War of Independence and in 1833. From 1862 to 1893 the effort to meet interest obligations abroad, together with annual deficits due to the Cretan question and to indispensable public works, led to pyramiding and to an alarming increase of treasury notes. Greece could no

longer meet her interest payments and set aside the amounts promised in the loan agreements to pay off each year a part of the principal. For several years the foreign creditors of Greece urged their Governments to intervene to establish an international control of Greek finances similar to that known as the Ottoman Public Debt in neighboring Turkey. This insistent demand was staved off with difficulty for several years. But the disastrous war of 1897 gave the foreign creditors the opportunity to insist upon the intervention of the Powers. British, French, German, Austrian, and Italian holders of Greek bonds were unanimous in declaring that their Governments should not assent to the payment by Greece of an indemnity to Turkey that would take priority over their bonds. Nor would European financiers lend Greece money to pay the indemnity until the three Protecting Powers, Great Britain, Russia, and France (from whose investors had to come the money desperately needed by Greece), guaranteed the indemnity loan and promised to make Greece submit to Six-Power control of her finances.

It is impossible to go into the details of this control, which was firmly ensconced in Greece when Venizelos came to power. The story is long and involved, and it would be wearisome to give even the main facts of it. Certain revenues of Greece were mortgaged to pay foreign bondholders, and limitations were placed upon the authority

of the Ministry of Finance which meant an encroachment upon the sovereignty of Greece. Her hands were tied in adopting new taxes or increasing old taxes and in fiscal policy generally. The most irritating features of international control, as in other countries where it is exercised, are the knowledge of the taxpayers that unpopular tax levies, such as stamp and salt taxes and monopolies, do not go into the national treasury, and the element of foreign interference in customs duties. Under Venizelos Greece has not yet rid herself of this obnoxious and humiliating limitation of her independence. But three of the six Powers are out of the Commission, and the other three are indebted to Greece. The commission is marked for early disappearance. Venizelos has proposed that the League of Nations take over the interests of foreign landholders in all countries that are afflicted like Greece. In this way impersonal financial administration will be substituted for a system in which diplomacy is tempted sometimes to intervene for particular ends.

Despite the handicap of the International Commission, the record of Greek finances under Venizelos is a glorious achievement.

The factor of exchange has been favorable to the Greeks. Exchange arrived at par in 1910, and stayed around par until the outbreak of the World War. Since 1914 it has become rapidly favorable to Greece. The reasons for this

are the money coming into the country from Greeks abroad, especially from the United States; the gold receipts of the merchant fleets; the revenues of Greeks who have become Greek subjects; the decrease of the public debt held by foreigners and thus of interest payments going abroad; and the lessening of importations since 1914. Before Venizelos demonstrated what he could accomplish for Greece, only one seventh of the national debt was held by Greeks. In 1917 more than two fifths was held by Greeks, and the interest payments on this did not leave the country. Although statistics have not been compiled for 1920, it is believed that considerably more than half of the national debt is now held by Greeks. And all the while the value of Greek Government bonds has been steadily increasing! When I first went to Greece in 1908, one could get three drachmæ for two French francs. Now one can get three francs for two drachmæ. In the general depreciation of European exchanges Greek money has lost less than any other Continental belligerent.

From 1910 to 1913 the revenues of the Greek Government increased by one third. The year 1911 was proof of what the reforms of Venizelos were able to accomplish when there were no extraordinary war expenses to meet. After one year at the helm of the ship of State the pilot could show a surplus of revenue over expenditure of fifty-nine per cent. In ten years, notwithstanding disturbed

conditions, the revenues of Greece have more than doubled and the Government of Venizelos is able to show an average of fifty per cent surplus in the civil administration of the country. Of course, as in all countries, the national debt has increased substantially because of military expenditures. But Greece has assets in more than double her old territory to show for what has been spent.

Faith in the destiny of Greece has been the principal factor in her financial rehabilitation, but, speaking of tangible factors, the Venizelist administration can point to a complete reorganization of methods of collecting and imposing taxes and keeping the books of the Ministry of Finance. It was not easy to get rid of the old system, which was partly a legacy from Turkey and partly the outgrowth of two generations of maladministration. The enlargement of frontiers after the Balkan Wars only complicated the task. In the budget of 1914 there were different systems for Old Greece, the Ionian Islands, Laconia, Crete, and the new provinces. One could count fifty-one kinds of direct taxes, of which fourteen were on agricultural production. Venizelos by a series of laws suppressed eighteen of the direct taxes and lessened others, substituting for them four new taxes: income; unearned increment of improved property; legacies; war profits. A radical series of measures was taken in 1918 to secure uniformity of taxation throughout Greece. But one can well understand how difficult all this

is with the uncertain frontiers, the recency of Turkish and Bulgarian domination and foreign military occupation, the complications of the Ottoman Public Debt, and the claims of the victors in the World War for indemnities to be levied on all territories formerly belonging to Turkey and Bulgaria.

All these reforms have had as their principal object the military efficiency of Greece. Fortunately Venizelos did not need to drive this lesson home. At every stage of his career the Greek nation has been threatened in its commercial prosperity and in its very existence by rumors of wars and wars. Venizelos came upon the stage in Greece at a time when the possession of superior force was becoming the supreme argument in international relations. A weak nation had to swallow everything. A nation capable of defending itself could secure respect for its territorial integrity and its commercial interests, and hope to realize its national aspirations.

When Venizelos came to Athens Turkey had an army massed on the Thessalian frontier, and was attempting to secure from the Greek Government a blanket surrender of present and future interests in Crete. The young Turks were persecuting the Greeks in Thrace, Asia Minor, and the unfortunate islands still under their domination. The Greek flag was being boycotted in Ottoman ports, and Greek merchants could do no business in Ottoman cities.

After her defeat in the Balkan Wars Turkey renewed with more ferocity than ever her oppression of Greek Ottoman subjects. During the World War, when Greece under Constantine tried to keep neutral, the Entente Powers seized Saloniki as a base of operations and the Central Powers and Bulgaria invaded Greek territory. After the Peace Conference the Allied Premiers wished to evade giving Greece any great extension of frontiers, and were only blocked in this purpose by the fact that Greece had a large army mobilized, which wanted to fight and knew how to fight.

Venizelos did not have much time to build up the Greek army and navy before the war with Turkey broke out, and after his conflict with King Constantine during the World War he had to re-create both the army and the navy. But all along he was equal to the task and accomplished it for the simple reason that military strength was the *sine qua non* of saving Greece and realizing the national aspirations. Venizelos never allowed himself to be fooled and to count on getting what Greece wanted by any other means than having a strong army as the trump card to play when a trick had to be taken.

It seemed a superhuman task to build up an army and a navy in the atmosphere of Athens of the summer of 1910, when both branches of the service were still suffering from the revolution of the previous year. Discipline had gone to

smash. The Military League had obliged the Diadoque (Crown Prince) and other sons of the King to resign their commands and quit the army. King George had to swallow this affront, and not only grant an amnesty to the rebels, but submit to their conditions. Venizelos was regarded as the instrument in the League, which was avowedly anti-dynastic. But he was able to resist the pressure brought to bear upon him by those who had called him to Greece. He reëstablished harmony in the General Staff and among regular army officers by recalling the Princes and gradually restoring the Crown Prince to favor with the people and the rank and file of the army. He took the responsibility of every measure necessary to restore discipline. He found the money for new equipment, artillery, and munitions. He asked the aid of France, and entrusted to a French Military Mission under General Eydoux the difficult task of whipping the army into shape. He did not fear to risk disfavor by siding with the foreigners when it was necessary to do so. He made use of that wonderful personal magnetism which he displayed a second time at Saloniki in 1917 to put obedience and a fighting spirit into the Greek army.

Venizelos begged the British Admiralty to send a naval mission (although Great Britain was doing the same for Turkey) to rehabilitate the Greek navy. By the gift of a patriot Greece received in 1910 the cruiser Averoff, which

gave her the supremacy of the Ægean in the first Balkan War. And in 1914, when Turkey ordered two dreadnoughts in England, Venizelos promptly purchased the only ships in sight in the whole world, the Idaho and the Mississippi, from the United States (rebaptized Kilkis and Lemnos), and a little Chinese cruiser, which was renamed Helle.

Asked in May, 1914, why he was paying so much attention to military and naval preparation, when Greece was the glorious victor in two wars and incontestable master of her destiny, Venizelos smiled. The questioner pressed him. He demanded pointedly, "Do you expect another war?"

"Certainly not!" answered Venizelos. "But that is the very reason why I want to be ready."

CHAPTER IX

VENIZELOS OFFERS TO JOIN THE ENTENTE AGAINST GERMANY

DESPITE the larger boundaries won by Greece at Bukarest over those Venizelos would have gladly agreed on at London, there is no doubt that the Greek Premier when he returned to Athens felt like the Rumanian Take Jonescu, who said: "Even those who in appearance gained most by the Second Balkan War would have preferred that it had never taken place. They would have to-day less territory, perhaps, but they know well that they would be stronger and more free."

After the treaty had been signed, the anti-Venizelists tried to make capital of the Premier's moderation at Bukarest by charging him with sacrificing Greek interests to make possible a new *rapprochement* with Bulgaria. When Stratos was virtually dismissed from his position in the Cabinet by Venizelos in November, 1913, he accused Venizelos of still playing up to Bulgaria. The Premier frankly admitted that until the actual hostilities were begun he had done all he could to preserve the alliance. More than this, he had the courage to put himself on record as supporting the movement originated by the English

Balkan committee to appease race hatred. Interviewed afterwards by journalists, he said that he was anxious for Greece to live at peace with Bulgaria, that he believed that the Balkan Confederation was not an exploded dream, and that some day it could be realized on a large scale, including not only Bulgaria, but also Turkey.

This attitude was dictated by sound statesmanship. A hostile and revengeful Bulgaria, suspected of being under Austrian influence, was not a comfortable neighbor; for Venizelos had to face the stubbornness of Turkey in concluding the peace whose details had not been fully settled at London. The retaking of Adrianople, following the collapse of Bulgaria, made the Turks bold. The treaty with Turkey, concluded at Athens in October, 1913, left open the title of Greece to the Ægean Islands captured during the war. Turkey, invoking the subterfuge of the necessity of the consent of the Powers, refused to acknowledge the transfer of sovereignty to Greece. Hardly was the peace signed than the Turkish Minister at Athens, Ghalib Kemal, began to threaten molestation of Greeks in Turkey and a renewal of the boycott of Greek commerce. When we remember that the goal for which Venizelos was striving was the redemption of Hellas and not simply the aggrandizement of the Kingdom of Greece and that his principal backing was the merchant class of Ottoman Greek origin and affiliations, we understand why Veni-

zelos subordinated the Macedonian frontier to what he believed was the greater good of the Hellenic race.

As long as Greece was superior on the sea, she did not have to fear Turkish aggression. But Turkey ordered two dreadnoughts in England and submarines and destroyers in France. Venizelos countered by looking around for immediate additions to the Greek navy. He entered into negotiations to buy the Idaho and the Mississippi from the United States to preserve Greece's sea mastery.

Obstructionist tactics in diplomatic negotiations and naval rivalry were inevitable; and they could be fought by other means than war. Venizelos sat tight on the lid for many months after the Treaty of Bukarest. To restrain the chauvinism of his compatriots, flushed by victory in two wars, was the hardest job he ever tackled. But (as he confessed to the Greek Chamber four years later) his bellicose language to Turkey, which could be indulged in as long as the Turkish dreadnoughts were on the ways in England, was simply a bluff. "I believed it was to our national interest to have a long period of peace as much as it depended upon us. I hoped that the Anatolian question could have been postponed for a whole generation, so that Greece might have solved it by herself."

The anti-Greek movement became well defined early in 1914. Following the old custom of retreating with the crescent before the cross, large numbers of Macedonian

Turks left the liberated regions. These *mouhadjairs* (refugees) trekked with all their belongings to the coast regions of Asia Minor. The Ottoman authorities encouraged them to install themselves in Greek communities, expelling the Christians. The extension of this movement will be followed in a later chapter.[1] It had already assumed proportions alarming enough in the early summer of 1914 to convince Venizelos that drastic action would be necessary before long to save from extinction the Ottoman Greeks of the Ægean littoral.

Venizelos, however, determined to leave no stone unturned to avoid a new conflict with Turkey. He accepted with alacrity the suggestion of a direct conference with Turkish representatives at Brussels, and was on his way to the Belgian capital when the World War broke out. Venizelos has never been the man to hesitate. He saw in the war the *Deus ex machina* for Greece. Thoroughly posted as to the relations between Germany and Turkey, he grasped the unique opportunity for Greece to settle her quarrel with Turkey by allying herself with the Entente. He hastened back to Athens with his mind made up. He knew that Turkey was going to intervene on the opposite side. He felt that Bulgarian neutrality could be bought by territorial cessions, a price well worth while if there were compensation in sight at the expense of Turkey. Greece

[1] See chapter XIV.

could not afford to let Austria-Hungary crush Turkey. If Greece got in ahead of Italy, there would be no question of Northern Epirus at the Peace Conference, and Venizelos could ask boldly for the Dodecanese and Cyprus. Representing Greece, an ally from the beginning of the struggle, he could forestall a secret understanding among the Entente Powers for the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire. If an understanding had to be made, Greece could be in on it and prevent the attribution of her unredeemed lands to others than herself.

At Munich, where Venizelos received the news of the Austrian ultimatum and of the outbreak of war between Austria and Serbia, a telegram came to him from Mr. Pasitch inquiring the attitude of Greece in the event of hostilities. Venizelos answered that as far as the war with Austria was concerned, the Greek Government needed more information before an answer could be given, but in regard to a possible attack of Bulgaria against Serbia, Greece would intervene to help Serbia.

It was impossible for Venizelos to promise more than that. He had first to ascertain what degree of protection and aid the big allies of Serbia were able and willing to give Greece. Venizelos realized that the Treaty of Bukarest was in danger, and that an understanding between Bulgaria and Turkey, independent of participation in the European war, might be possible. What if Bulgaria and Turkey

should take advantage of the European war to fall upon Greece? Might they not do this without allying themselves with Germany? In that case, unless Greece had become an ally of the Entente Powers, she would be left to face a superior coalition on land and sea: on land, because the ally upon whom she had counted in such a contingency, Serbia, was already involved to the limit of her forces in defending her northern and western frontiers from Austria-Hungary; on sea, because collusion between Turkey and the Central Powers might give Turkey the supremacy of the Ægean, despite the additions to the Greek navy. No European statesman worried more about the Goeben and Breslau than did Venizelos.

On the morning of August 2 a Cabinet Council was held under the presidency of the King at the Palace. It was announced to the press that there was agreement "on all points as to the attitude of Greece in the Austro-Serbian conflict, which attitude would be one of absolute neutrality as long as Bulgaria and Turkey remained neutral."[1] The enemies of Venizelos later made capital of this announcement to attempt to prove that Venizelos was not in favor of immediate intervention. But they neglect the implication of the last words of the official bulletin. "As long as Bulgaria and Turkey remained neutral" was a phrase indicating that the attitude of "absolute neutrality" was

[1] *See* Athens *Athenai*, July 23 (O. S.), 1914.

contingent upon the conflict not spreading to the Balkans.

Venizelos believed that Turkey would enter the war. He suffered from no illusions on this score. As early as August 6 his information from Constantinople told him how the wind was blowing on the Bosphorus. The Goeben and Breslau took refuge in the Golden Horn, and on August 9 Turkey announced that she had purchased these two ships.

Venizelos went immediately to the King, after conferring with his Cabinet, and convinced Constantine of the advisability of declaring that Greece was not merely in the consciousness of her indebtedness to the Guaranteeing Powers, but, "from a clear conception of her vital interest as a nation, understood that her place was at the side of the Powers of the Entente." But owing to the dangers in Bulgaria, Greece was unable to reinforce the Serbians, much less send an expeditionary force to France, and yet Greece "thought it her duty to declare to the Powers of the Entente that, if Turkey went to war against them, Greece would place all her military and naval forces at the disposal of the Entente for the war against Turkey, always presupposing that Greece be guaranteed against the Bulgarian danger."

This declaration was not immediately made to the Entente Powers. Having the authorization, Venizelos was

content to wait until the confused international diplomatic situation became clearer. However, the initial victories of the Germans were so rapid and complete that Venizelos felt it would be wiser to make the overture to the Entente Powers without further delay. He chose the moment when the Germans had reached Compiègne. In case the Germans lost the Battle of the Marne, he did not want it to be said that Greece was siding with the winner.

The Greek Premier was afterwards bitterly reproached for having bound Greece to the Entente in this way at a time when God only knew who was going to win. All the more so because he did not try to bargain with the Entente Powers as to the recompense Greece should receive in case she took part with them in the war against Turkey. This move has often been cited by the enemies of Venizelos to prove that he let his friendship for the Entente, especially for Great Britain, obscure his judgment, and was willing to involve Greece in war against the interests of Greece. If it was not blind admiration for the Entente and unreasoning confidence in the outcome of the war, said his enemies, it was his obsession to rebuild the Byzantine Empire on the ruins of Turkey. Did he not throw prudence to the winds? After each disaster to Entente arms, did he not persist in maintaining that Greece ought to have intervened?

In his remarkable speech of August 26, 1917, Venizelos

defended himself with spirit and wit against this accusation. Although I am anticipating events, it is advantageous to present the defense at this place. Said Venizelos:

"Imagine the prestige and authority which Greece would have acquired if she had succeeded through her own efforts in tremendously influencing the history of the world by shortening by a whole year the history of the war. Yet after the withdrawal from the Dardanelles, our opponents said they had saved Greece — because without Greek help the expedition had proved a failure.

"You will notice, gentlemen, that remarkable good faith of our opponents who judge our policy not on a consideration of the effects which it would have produced if it had been honestly applied, but on a consideration of the consequences which arose precisely because it was not applied. And they say: 'You see that the expedition was a failure.' Of course it was a failure, because the immediate and stunning coöperation of Greece was the one factor which could have secured its success.

"Our 'saviors' of to-day are exactly the same as the 'saviors' we should have had in 1912, if, when I proposed that we take part in the war which the two other Balkan States had decided upon, King George, who was opposed to that war, had resembled even distantly his son Constantine, and had wanted like him to follow his own policy, saying: 'I don't want to fight; I cannot coöperate with Serbia and Bulgaria in a war against Turkey, if you have n't even cleared up for me the question of what we are each to take.'

"Only suppose King George had been like King Con-

stantine! Is it possible to doubt that his policy would have been praised for its prudence, and that I should have been accused with apparent justice of being visionary and bellicose, and every one would have said: 'Of course the poor King was right — we had n't even settled what we were to have!'

"And now imagine what the consequences might have been if we had taken no part in the war against Turkey. By the inactivity of the Greek fleet, Turkey would have been enabled to transport her army from Asia Minor to European Turkey, and probably to overcome Serbia and Bulgaria. And then who could have counted the 'saviors' of the moment who would have been saying: 'We have the good old King to thank; you see, we're well out of it! You see, that man Venizelos is mad as a hatter, wanting to take part in the war, to be the finish of us, although it was quite obvious that Turkey would win' — for such, I may say, was the opinion of all the military authorities at the time, and the Russian military *attaché* in Constantinople informed us that Turkey would put 900,000 men in the field. I have made this supposition in order to show how utterly unsound is the argument of our opponents. They want, I repeat, to judge our policy, which was never carried out, and its result, by the misfortunes which supervened for the very reason that it was not carried out, and that they themselves would not allow it to be carried out."

There was little that the opponents of Venizelos could answer to this line of reasoning. Had he not believed in the truth of "nothing venture, nothing gain," the two Balkan Wars would never have been fought. And there was as much reason for risking something in 1914 and 1915 as in

1912. The firm faith of Venizelos in the final victory of the Entente, so often proclaimed during the war, has been justified by the results. But it would be unfair to Venizelos to allow the defense of his interventionist policy to rest solely upon the argument Venizelos advanced above. For the statesmanlike vision of the Greek Premier embraced and held fast to factors in the situation to which many friends of Greece as well as enemies of Venizelos remained blind. The victory of the Entente was not certain. It never was certain until the United States had demonstrated its ability to transport a large army to France. Faith is a valuable asset for a statesman. No man ever accomplished great things who was unwilling to take a gamble. At every stage in his career the successful man is called on to bet upon uncertainties.

Venizelos could plead justification for the stand he took without hesitation at the very beginning of the war on the twofold ground of the impossibility of Greece aiding, even negatively, in the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the impossibility of Greece taking sides against England and France.

If Greece remained neutral when Turkey entered the war, Greece would be *particeps criminis* in forging the chains that still bound half the Greek race in servitude to Islam. And the events of the past few years had proved that the Young Turk servitude spelled extermination.

If Greece entered the war — which was the alternative to neutrality — it must be on the side of the Entente Powers, irrespective of the relative chances of victory of the two groups of belligerents. Even were the Entente to lose the war or carry it on only to a draw, the obligation of redeemed Greece to unredeemed Greece and the superior political and economic interests of Greece dictated allying herself with the Entente Powers. This sound foreign policy was well expressed by Venizelos at Saloniki, on November 25, 1916, when the Provisional Government declared war against Germany and Bulgaria. In this speech that announced his definite break with King Constantine and the Athens Government, after more than two years of conflict of words and pleading, Venizelos said:

"We wish to emphasize in a tangible and complete manner our absolute conviction that Greece can never progress, nor even exist, as a free and independent state except by continued maintenance of the closest contact with those Powers that rule the Mediterranean."

The critics of Venizelos, at home and abroad, have never had in mind either the interests of Hellas, taken as a whole, or the fact of the dependence of Greece upon Great Britain and France. The conception of the obligation of redeemed Greece to unredeemed Greece has been distorted to megalomania and imperialism, and the wise decision of Venizelos to throw in the lot of Greece with

"those Powers that rule the Mediterranean" has been interpreted as blind championship of the cause of one group of belligerents against the other. The geographical position of Greece, her island possessions, her Anatolian aspirations, her dependence upon sea-borne commerce, were peremptory reasons for offering immediately to join the Entente Alliance.

Although he had received the authorization of the Crown to offer the participation of Greece in case Turkey joined the Central Empires, Venizelos discovered within a week that the King had changed his mind. As a result of the offer made by Venizelos to the Entente, the British admiralty instructed Admiral Kerr to come to an understanding with the Greek General Staff in order to study the possibility of attacking and working out plans for occupying the peninsula of Gallipoli. King Constantine feigned surprise at the *démarche*. He said to Admiral Kerr: "Why all this? I have no intention of making war against Turkey. You know that Venizelos has spoken to me about this, and he feels very strongly about it. I agreed with him to this extent: if Turkey declares war against us, and you want to help us, I shall accept your help."

Admiral Kerr, dumbfounded, was obliged to ask the King if he would allow him to communicate these remarks to the British Government as his answer.

"I authorize you," the King replied, "to communicate

them as my answer to your Government, but please remember that you must call and see the Premier for him to confirm your telegram, for this reply must not be sent without his approval."

Venizelos refused to allow any such response to be made to the British Government. On September 7, 1914, after he had received the message of Admiral Kerr, Venizelos turned from scanning the dubious bulletins of the Battle of the Marne to addressing a communication to his sovereign that was destined to be the first letter in a long series. He went straight to the heart of the matter:

"After the declarations conveyed by me in accordance with Your Majesty's authorization to the representatives of the Triple Entente and the telegrams exchanged between the King of England and Your Majesty, I think it impossible that the answer given to-day by Your Majesty to Admiral Kerr could be that Greece refuses to fight against Turkey so long as Turkey is not the first aggressor.

"As I had the honor to tell Your Majesty, it is, of course, impossible for us to proceed to an offensive war against Turkey unless we are assured of the coöperation, or at least of the absolute neutrality, of Bulgaria.

"But to declare that under no circumstances, not even if this condition were fulfilled, should we be disposed to declare war on Turkey before Turkey attacks us, is clearly opposed to the well-understood interests of the nation. Let us not deceive ourselves. Turkey has long been waging an undeclared war against us.

"If we refuse, on principle and quite unconditionally,

to join in a war against Turkey, we do not thereby escape such a war, but only postpone it. And we do not even postpone it for very long. It is obvious that Turkey will want to settle her accounts with us before she demobilizes.

"When we have before us the prospect of prosecuting the war against Turkey with the help of powerful and numerous allies, are we to throw away such an opportunity in order to find ourselves some day compelled to fight the same war without allies and without friends?

"It is absolutely clear which course is preferable. But what I think confuses the issues and in the mind of Your Majesty and Mr. Streit produces a feeling of opposition to the course I recommend, is simply the desire not to offend Germany by undertaking a war against Turkey in coöperation with the Powers which are fighting her."

Venizelos did not know until later that his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Streit, had sent secretly, at the request of the King, a telegram from the King to his brother-in-law, Kaiser Wilhelm, stating plainly that under no circumstances would the King make war against the Emperor's allies unless they attacked him. But he shrewdly guessed the reason for the King's treatment of Admiral Kerr. This was the beginning of the long struggle of the King and his friends to keep Greece neutral for the sake of helping Germany.

At this time Venizelos was unable to control the communications between Athens and Berlin. He may have suspected, but could not prove, the disloyalty of his

Minister of Foreign Affairs and the treachery of the King. But he protested none the less against the pro-Germanism of his sovereign. He went on to say in his letter:

"Why should we have so much regard for the Power whose aim is to strengthen by every possible means the two principal enemies of Hellenism — Turkey and Bulgaria? And why should we show ourselves indifferent toward the very Powers who revived the Greek States, who have defended Greece in every emergency, and who are to-day again prepared, if Turkey falls upon us, to stand by our side?"

The letter ended by offering his resignation.

King Constantine did not dare to accept the resignation. It would have been impossible for him to have come out openly in favor of Germany then or at any later period. Venizelos had a powerful weapon with public opinion to use against Germany, and King Constantine knew it. Had not Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg told Venizelos at Corfu in April that Greece in negotiations with Turkey could not count on German support? Constantine refused to accept the resignation. The telegram to the British Government was not sent, and Admiral Kerr was put into communication with the General Staff in order to study the proposed enterprise. Minister of Foreign Affairs Streit was caught later in the act of suggesting to the King both verbally and by written memoranda a policy favorable to Germany and diametrically opposed to that of

the Cabinet. The King did not dare to oppose his dismissal.

A month later Turkey entered the war, as the Premier predicted. The attitude that Venizelos had taken, however, was nullified for the moment and his programme could not be carried through because the Triple Entente refused the coöperation of Greece. This blunder was afterwards explained by a member of the Asquith Cabinet on the ground of "a sincere desire to limit the area of the conflict, a profound reluctance to involve another state in the perils of this struggle, and the hope, the vain hope as it has proved, of achieving at a later stage unity of action among the Balkan peoples."[1]

The last of these reasons is true. The Entente Powers felt that it was unnecessary to play up to Greece, because their control of the sea put Greece at their mercy. Greece could not afford to be hostile to the Entente. Until the development of submarine warfare on an unanticipated scale, the Entente did not need to fear, and did not fear, the possibility of Greece aiding the Central Empires. It was quite another matter with Bulgaria. To keep Bulgaria neutral was more important than to have Greece as an ally. Bulgaria strictly neutral meant the isolation of Turkey. Therefore the Entente persisted in cherishing

[1] Compare speech of Winston Churchill at the Mansion House dinner, June 27, 1918.

what Winston Churchill confessed afterwards to be the "vain hope" of getting all the Balkan States on their side. So Entente diplomacy acknowledged and encouraged cautiously the friendship of Venizelos and at the same time took advantage of that friendship to play up to Bulgaria and offer bribes to Bulgaria at the expense of Serbia and Greece alike.

The principal reason, however, for the refusal to accept the offer of Venizelos to ally Greece with the Entente Winston Churchill was unwilling to admit. In the autumn of 1914, and again in the early spring of 1915, Entente diplomacy was working for a far bigger stake than the intervention of Greece. London and Paris and Petrograd were concentrating their diplomatic activity at Rome. If Italy could be induced to join the Entente, it was believed that the war would end in 1915. The statesmen who controlled Italy demanded of France and Great Britain and Russia, as the price of Italian intervention, the sacrifice of Greek aspirations, present and future. Almost everything that Italy demanded was directly opposed to the interests of Hellenism. The secret treaty, concluded in April, 1915, between Baron Sonnino and the Entente Powers, contained provisions awarding to Italy not only a sphere of influence on the Adriatic littoral and in the hinterland of the Balkan peninsula, but also on the Ægean littoral and in the hinterland of Asia Minor. One of the

articles of this infamous treaty acknowledged the "right" of Italy to keep the Dodecanese, a group of Greek islands that includes Rhodes.

It is readily seen that Venizelos could not explain at the time, nor has he been able since to explain, this unfortunate side of the difficulties under which Greece labored in the early years of the World War. When one reads the speeches of Venizelos, the interviews with Venizelos, and the memoranda written by Venizelos since 1914, one must take into account the obligatory silence of the Greek Premier on vital international diplomatic negotiations which throw much light upon the reasons for the failure of the policy of Venizelos and the change of heart of Greek statesmen and public opinion in 1915 and 1916. Advocating alliance with the Entente, Venizelos could not criticize or denounce the questionable diplomacy of Entente statesmen, which was undoubtedly inimical to the interests of Greece. What Venizelos hoped — and the hope has since been largely justified — was that after her entry into the conflict, Greece would be in a position to stand up for her rights and thwart the fulfillment of diplomatic agreements that were contrary to her interests. The relations of the Entente with Bulgaria and Italy, in fact, prompted him to redouble his efforts to secure for Greece standing as an ally in the councils of the coalition against Germany.

Venizelos did not yield to discouragement or disgust, he did not pout or sulk, he did not threaten or beseech. When he realized that Russia was blackmailing France and Great Britain on the eventual distribution of Turkish spoils, and that France and England were using the Ottoman inheritance as bait to tempt Italy, he did what any next of kin would have done. He intimated to the British Foreign Office that Greece was the most interested heir, and that it would be wise to give Greece an idea of what would fall to her in case Turkey died. He expected no definite answer. But to his delight, Sir Edward Grey made tangible promises about Asia Minor.

A glorious vista of the realization of sacred hopes was before the eyes of Venizelos when he read the British note. It is not megalomania nor imperialism for a Greek to contemplate the freeing from foreign yoke of one of the oldest and most vital parts of Hellas. It was incumbent upon Venizelos as a pious duty to make every effort and every sacrifice to realize this hope of centuries. The promise of concessions in Asia Minor had conditions attached to it. But Venizelos, at no time during the World War, as has been charged by his enemies, was ready to involve his country in an enterprise against Turkey without providing for contingencies. On this occasion, as on later occasions, he pointed out to the Entente what must be assured to Greece, for her own security, before Greece could inter-

vene in the war. Venizelos later explained his policy after the receipt of the concessions offered by Sir Edward Grey. There were alternatives:

"The endeavor to secure the coöperation of Rumania; the endeavor, failing that, to secure the coöperation of Bulgaria; and that being impossible without concessions, you find that the man responsible for the policy of the State is led, unwillingly indeed, to face the necessity of sacrificing a portion of Macedonian territory in order to obtain compensations which were so tremendously finer than the sacrifices imposed."

In January, 1915, Venizelos addressed two memoranda to King Constantine, giving his views as to the essential conditions of Greek coöperation with the Entente Powers to save Serbia and to destroy the Ottoman Empire.

The memorandum of January 11, inspired by the communication of Sir Edward Grey, declared that

"Greece finds herself once more confronted with one of the most critical events of her national history. Until to-day our policy has consisted in the conserving of our neutrality, at least in so far as our engagement toward Serbia has not demanded our leaving it. But now we are called upon to take part in the war — no longer merely to discharge a moral duty, but in exchange for compensations which, when realized, will constitute a great and powerful Greece such as even the most optimistic could not have imagined a few years ago. To succeed in obtaining these great compensations, we shall undoubtedly have to confront great dangers. But after having studied the question

deeply and at length, I have arrived at the conclusion that we ought to face these dangers. We should confront them principally because even if we do not take part in the war, and if we endeavor to maintain our neutrality until the end of the war, we shall still be exposed to great risks."

What these risks would be Venizelos set forth clearly: an Austro-German threat against Saloniki if Serbia were crushed, or the occupation of Serbian Macedonia by Bulgaria.

The essential conditions of Greek intervention against Turkey Venizelos believed to be the coöperation of Rumania and Bulgaria. He recognized that Bulgaria would have to be compensated by both Serbian and Greek territorial sacrifices in Macedonia. Greece had hitherto opposed Serbian concessions to Bulgaria. The menace to Serbia was now so great that Greece should withdraw her opposition in order to enable Serbia thus to save herself. Moreover, if the Serbian concessions were not sufficient to attract Bulgaria to intervene against the Central Empires and Turkey by the side of her former allies, or at least to induce Bulgaria to maintain a benevolent neutrality, Venizelos would "not hesitate — painful as the act would be — to advise the sacrifice of Kavalla to save Hellenism in Turkey and to assure the creation of a really great Greece, comprising nearly all the countries where Hellenism had exercised her power during her long history through the centuries."

In order to overcome the objection of abandoning Greek populations to Bulgaria, Venizelos proposed an exchange of properties and inhabitants under the supervision of an international commission, by which "an ethnological segregation could definitely be accomplished and the idea of a Balkan confederation realized."

The supreme justification for these sacrifices Venizelos believed to be the fact that the crushing of Serbia and the victory of the Central Powers in the European struggle would prove "a fatal blow to the independence of all little nations, without taking into consideration the immediate loss we should bear in the forfeiture of the islands. And, finally, for this reason also: that if the war should not end by definite victory of one side or the other, but by a return to the order existing before the war, the extermination of Hellenism in Turkey would come swiftly and inevitably."

Following the first memorandum, Venizelos sounded Rumania. The Rumanian Government intimated that military coöperation with Greece and Serbia could not be envisaged unless Bulgaria also participated. This answer led Venizelos to submit a second memorandum on January 17, in which he pointed out that Bulgaria held the key to the situation, and that it was now clear that sufficiently important concessions should be made to Bulgaria to induce her to enter into "a pan-Balkan alliance for a common participation in the war." Venizelos again insisted upon

the necessity of ceding Kavalla, although it would be "a very painful sacrifice, and my whole being suffers profoundly in advising it." But he pointed out that it would mean a sacrifice of only 30,000 inhabitants and an area of 2000 square kilometers against a gain of 800,000 inhabitants and an area of 120,000 square kilometers.

Once more Venizelos advanced the consideration uppermost in his mind. Of the saving of Hellenism, he said:

"Sire, under these circumstances I firmly believe that all hesitation should be put aside. It is doubtful — it is improbable that such an occasion as this which presents itself to us to-day will be offered again to Hellenism to render so complete our national restoration. If we do not participate in the war, whatever may be its issue, Hellas in Asia Minor will be definitely lost to us. Because if, on the one hand, the powers of the Triple Entente gain the victory without us, they will share among themselves or with Italy both Asia Minor and the remainder of Turkey. If, on the other hand, Germany and Turkey are victorious, not only will the 200,000 Greeks already driven from Asia Minor have no longer the hope of returning to their homes, but the number of those who will be driven out later may take on alarming proportions. In any case the triumph of Germanism will assure for itself the absorption of the whole of Asia Minor.

"Under these conditions, how can we let pass this opportunity furnished us by divine Providence to realize our most audacious national ideals? The opportunity is offered us for the creation of a Greece absorbing nearly all the territory where Hellenism has predominated during its

long and historic existence. This Greece, with stretches of the most fertile land, will assure to us the mastery of the Ægean Sea."

Constantine remained obdurate. He declared: "Venizelos is a visionary. He lacks practical sense." The General Staff agreed with the King.

From this moment the issue between King Constantine and his Premier was clear. For two years events played into the hands of the King. The visionary did not lose his vision. He won out in the end, as he had done in Crete and at the time of the first Balkan War. But, as always has been the case with great men pursuing great ideals, the path was *per aspera ad astra.*

CHAPTER X

CONSTANTINE TRIES TO KEEP GREECE NEUTRAL

NOT the general question alone of the future of Hellenism, but particular and pressing problems, the title to the Ægean Islands, and the Greeks expelled from Thrace and Asia Minor, prompted Venizelos to persuade King Constantine and the General Staff to coöperate with the Entente Powers against Turkey in the early months of the European war. We remember that Venizelos had reached Munich on his way to Brussels to confer with the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs when Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia interrupted the journey of the Premier and necessitated the postponement of the conference. At the time Turkey abandoned her neutrality to join the Central Empires, Venizelos told an Italian journalist that relations with Turkey had been strained for some months. There were two unsettled questions, the status of the Ægean Islands and the disposition of refugees of both countries.[1]

Greek and Turkish delegates went to Bukarest for a conference. Because it was a question of mutual interests, agreement was reached (to a certain extent) regarding the

[1] See Milan *Corriere della Sera*, October 29, 1914.

refugees. There were over 50,000 Turkish refugees in Macedonia, and the Turks had expelled 200,000 Greeks from Thrace and Asia Minor, part of whom were crowded on islands and others were in a state of extreme destitution at the Piræus and in the outskirts of Athens. A mixed commission was created for the exchange of refugees and to provide, wherever this was possible, for the return to their lands of those who wished to go back.

Greece considered the ownership of the Ægean Islands settled, not only by the Treaties of London and Athens, but also by the unanimous decision of the European Powers. Venizelos was ready to give guarantees of property rights and religious freedom to Moslems if Turkey would recognize their occupation and administration by Greece under the same conditions as the other provinces of the Hellenic Kingdom. Turkey proposed to defer the definite settlement of the title of the Islands because of the European war and her internal condition. Venizelos was far from satisfied. He felt that Turkey would act, when occasion offered, as she had acted for so long in the case of Crete. Was not the way out of the difficulty to join forces with the Entente Powers and solve the problem by war, as the Cretan problem had been solved? This seemed, moreover, the only way to settle the refugee problem and to put a stop to the horrible persecutions of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire. Venizelos recommended war as a neces-

sary step to preserve from destruction Hellenism in the Ottoman Empire.

Neither the King nor the General Staff, both under German influence, sympathized with the pan-Hellenic vision of the Premier. They recognized no obligations to the Greeks outside of Greece. They repudiated the obligation to aid Serbia. They had no sense of gratitude to Great Britain for having declared, even before Turkey participated in the war, that the Turkish fleet, which had become formidable because of the acquisition of the Goeben and Breslau, would not be allowed to leave the Dardanelles to attack Greece. They showed no interest in the tentative offer of Cyprus and the promise of a share in the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire that included Smyrna.

The January memoranda of Venizelos lost in force when it developed that Bulgaria had floated a loan of 500,000,000 francs in Berlin. Venizelos had to agree that Bulgaria constituted a serious danger for a Greek army going to the aid of Serbia. With no military aid from the Entente to offset the Bulgarian menace it would be impossible to fulfill the condition attached to the Grey offer; i.e., that the Greek army advance as far as the Danube to the assistance of Serbia.

At this moment came the news of the French and British naval attack to force the Dardanelles. This appeared to Venizelos a new opportunity to put the Entente under

obligation to Greece and secure the territorial concessions in Asia Minor without exposing the Greek army to a menace on the flank. Venizelos had to admit that the General Staff was right in insisting upon this. The Premier went immediately to the King, and proposed that a landing force, to coöperate with the Entente fleets, be provided for Gallipoli by Greece. If one army corps were mobilized and sent to the Dardanelles, Greece would get into the war against Turkey without risking a Macedonian expedition. Venizelos thought that success in forcing the Straits would certainly keep Bulgaria neutral, if it did not induce her to join the Entente. He knew that Entente agents were spending large sums of money at Sofia to bribe Bulgarian politicians. And he had no faith in Bulgarian loyalty to Germany simply because of a loan floated at Berlin!

The General Staff opposed this scheme also. This time the objections were not based upon military grounds, but inspired by political reasons. They said that Venizelos had no business to involve Greece in Asia Minor; that new territories could not be won and administered without drawing upon the vitality of the Greek nation; that any addition to Greece outside of the Balkans would be controlled by Great Britain because of mastery of the sea, and that Greek expansion in Asia Minor would make her the neighbor of Russians advancing along the southern

shore of the Black Sea as far as Constantinople, of Italians, of Turks, and of French. How could Greece defend herself with such frontiers?

Venizelos prepared a third memorandum, took it to the King, and insisted upon discussing it *tête-à-tête*. Neither King nor Premier has been willing since to disclose the text — or even the general contents — of this memorandum. But one can well believe that it contained a frank refutation of the political objection of the General Staff to intervention in Asia Minor and as frank a statement of what Greece might eventually hope to obtain once she gained a good foothold in the region of Smyrna. I have no doubt that Venizelos marshaled before his sovereign the reasons for believing that the Entente Powers could not maintain harmony and act together in the Near East once the war was won. Greece would not need to fear becoming embroiled in Asia Minor with any one of the Great Powers, because she could take advantage of their distrust of each other, not only to protect her own portion of the Sultan's inheritance, but also to expand at the expense of all the Powers until the unity of Hellas was achieved. Thus Venizelos took Constantine on the mountain-top and showed him how the prophecy concerning the reign of the namesake of the founder and of the last sovereign of the Byzantine Empire might be fulfilled. The rôle was Constantine XII's, if he were willing to play it.

Speaking later of this interview, Venizelos said:

"The King read the memorandum, and was visibly disturbed. For I must admit, to do him justice, that he very rarely failed to be fully convinced whenever I was in his presence. Such was the earnestness with which I spoke, so strong were the arguments that were set forth in the memorandum, that the King, who quite evidently, as is clearly proved by subsequent events, had from the very beginning promised the Emperor of Germany that he would never be found in the Entente camp unless one of the Balkan States directly attacked him — the King said to me with great emotion, I remember the very words: 'Very well, then, in God's name.' That is to say, he consented."

But when Venizelos came out of the audience chamber into the anteroom, he found waiting for him Colonel Metaxas, Chief of the General Staff, who handed him an envelope and said: "Mr. President, this is my resignation. I cannot remain Chief of Staff if a policy of which I do not personally approve is decided upon."

Venizelos was taken aback. He did not worry over losing the services of Metaxas. But he saw that political opinions were affecting military judgment. German propaganda was getting in its good work. On the street newsboys were crying: "Colonel Metaxas has resigned!" Venizelos knew then that the Chief of the General Staff had carried insubordination to the point of announcing his resignation to the press before he had presented it to

the Premier. Such a breach of discipline would inevitably have its effect upon Bulgaria. It was a revelation of divided counsels in Greece over the question of intervention, all the more serious because a high officer of the army had dared to mix into politics and raise publicly a political issue with the head of the Government.

There was no time to be lost. Venizelos sent a letter to the King, asking that he be allowed to summon a council of former Premiers under the Presidency of the King in order to hear their views on the issue squarely raised by the resignation, in this strange fashion, of the Chief of Staff.

In the Crown Council Rallis and Dragoumis sustained Venizelos, and agreed that it would be dangerous for the King and Cabinet to allow their policy of intervention to be questioned by Metaxas. But Theotokis insisted that the former Chief of Staff be called before them to give his views. At a second Crown Council, on March 5, Venizelos modified his original proposal, and asked for a division instead of an army corps. He argued that if only one Greek division took part in the Dardanelles expedition, it would be sufficient to establish the principle of intervention and to remove the objection that Greece was weakening her army in the face of Bulgaria. Then the next move would be up to the Entente. They could either secure the definite guarantee of Bulgarian neutrality, or promise them-

selves to give Greece effective aid should Bulgaria attack Greece. All the former Premiers expressed the opinion that the King was bound to accept the modified proposal of his Government. Theotokis admitted that his own opinion, which was for maintaining neutrality, was not shared by the Greek people, and warned Constantine that the Crown must not count upon his support in event of the rejection of the advice of the Government. The Crown Council then unanimously adopted the plan of sending the Greek fleet and one division to coöperate with the Anglo-French fleet.

In the first attack on the Dardanelles, February 19, 1915, the British and French fleets bombarded and reduced the forts at the Ægean Sea and of the Strait. A week of mine-sweeping followed, and another week was lost on account of unfavorable weather. The bombardment of the forts in the narrows was begun on March 5, the very day the Crown Council recommended Greek participation. But after having announced that the strait would be forced, the British and French contented themselves with further bombardment, and retired for another period of mine-sweeping.

Was it this second delay that influenced the King to change his mind? He has never told us. But whatever was the cause of his decision to reject the unanimous recommendation of his Premier and ex-Premiers, on the

morning of March 6 King Constantine announced that Greece would not participate in the Dardanelles campaign. Venizelos presented his resignation. It was accepted, and the King called upon Gounaris to form a Cabinet to carry out the policy of maintaining strict neutrality. There was much excitement throughout Greece, but before the country could be thoroughly aroused on the issue of intervention, King Constantine was saved by the failure of the Allied attempt to force the passage of the Dardanelles. On March 18 the French battleship Bouvet and the British battleships Irresistible and Ocean struck mines and sank. Simultaneously with the announcement of this disaster, the Athens newspapers published dispatches from London and Paris disclosing the anxiety of Great Britain and France over German submarine activity in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.

The battleships lost in the Dardanelles attempt had evidently struck mines that had drifted down the current. This demonstrated the futility of the long and costly mine-sweeping that preceded the effort of the fleets. Constantine and his friends were thus able to make capital out of the Entente naval reverse. If the King had not interposed his veto, Greek ships and their crews might have been needlessly sacrificed. Every unit in the Greek fleet was precious. The Entente Powers might be able to afford to throw away their ships in this fashion, but not

Greece! Here was an opportunity to contrast the judgment of the King with that of Venizelos. In order to prove his willingness to join the Entente in an "enterprise that had a reasonable chance of success," to quote the King's words, Constantine told the foreign correspondents at Athens that he had sent two staff officers to Malta to point out the folly of a naval attack on the Dardanelles, and also of combined naval and military operations unless undertaken on a large scale.

The apologists of the policy of King Constantine regarding the Dardanelles, and of his subsequent attitude towards the question of intervention on the side of the Entente Powers, make three points: (1) that King Constantine and the General Staff were always willing to intervene, provided the Entente Powers agreed to conditions essential to the success of military operations and to the safety and honor of Greece; (2) that subsequent events proved that the King was right and Venizelos wrong; and (3) that Great Britain and France were all along betraying and sacrificing the interests of Greece — "selling out Greece," to use a frank term — in their negotiations with Russia, Italy, and Bulgaria. Volumes have been written *pro* and *contra* on the Dardanelles opportunity and the obligation of Greece under the treaty with Serbia.[1] A biographer of Venizelos is unable to discuss in

[1] Cf. the defense of the King in *Constantine I and the Greek People*, by

detail these controversies. Telling the story of an eventful life demands a sense of proportion. The Serbian treaty issue may be regarded as one of interpretation. But the Dardanelles issue, which provoked the first resignation of Venizelos in March, 1915, is one of political judgment, and the points raised on behalf of Constantine — to the discredit of Venizelos — cannot be ignored and passed over in silence.

In regard to the third of the points made by the friends of the ex-King, its truth must be admitted. We know definitely that Russia, when the question of intervention was first raised, refused to allow the participation of Greek troops in the capture of Constantinople; we have before our eyes the text of the shameless secret treaty with Italy of April, 1915, in which the Italians are given what Sir Edward Grey intimated to Venizelos would fall to Greece; and the Entente negotiations at Sofia were indefensible on the ground of common decency as well as of common sense. But these revelations do not detract from the reputation of Venizelos. On the contrary, they give added force to his contention that Greece could not afford to stay out of the war, and they enhance our admiration

Paxton Hibben, and the exposition of the Venizelist policy in *Ainsi Parla Venizelos*, by Léon Maccas. The former, by the correspondent of the Associated Press at Athens, gives the King's attitude as explained by himself, and the latter contains valuable references to diplomatic correspondence and the Venizelist newspapers.

of his forbearance, his unfaltering courage, and his political genius. For the disgraceful diplomacy of the Entente Powers kept putting difficulties in the way of Venizelos and gave arguments to the King and his other enemies. On more than one occasion it made the continued insistence upon the necessity of Greece fighting to aid those who were wounding her pride and sacrificing her interests a political risk few statesmen have dared to incur.

The first and second points, if admitted, would make Venizelos appear, at this great crisis in his country's history, a disappointed and self-seeking politician and a pure gambler.

We have seen how King Constantine changed his mind in August, 1914, and consented to retract what he said to Admiral Kerr and to confer with the Entente military and naval authorities only when Venizelos threatened to resign. His naval *pourparlers* at Malta were negative. When Venizelos insisted upon taking the opportunity offered by the Dardanelles, Constantine at first consented, then took the matter before a Crown Council, which recommended adopting the proposal of Venizelos, and the next day changed his mind again. This time he accepted the resignation of Venizelos, and chose a reactionary Cabinet with Gounaris as Premier. The necessity of a new general election was admitted, but the date of the election was postponed until June 13. In the meantime the King knew

that he would have a free hand. He waited for a month (during which the Dardanelles were fortified), and then authorized Foreign Minister Zographos to put the following conditions as the *sine qua non* of Greek intervention:

1. Guarantee of territorial integrity of Greece, continental and insular, including Northern Epirus.
2. Extent and nature of Greece's military contribution to be fixed by special convention.
3. Exact statement of territorial compensations and other concessions.

On their face these conditions seem reasonable. The Constantinists have since contended that they meant simply a guarantee against Bulgaria, a precaution against the intention of the Entente to use Greek troops in Egypt or on the Danube instead of against Turkey, and a determination to have the same clear understanding with the Entente that Baron Sonnino insisted upon for Italy. Venizelos, on the other hand, would have rushed in without conditions, and have involved Greece single-handed in a war with Bulgaria, at the same time finding himself jockeyed out of expected advantages from intervention by Russia and Italy. The Constantinists declare that the King of Greece was warned by the Russian Court that there was nothing for Greece in the Dardanelles expedition and that Greek troops would never be allowed to enter

Constantinople. This seems to be substantiated by the admission of Winston Churchill,[1] who said:

"When the collapse of Turkish resistance appeared to be imminent, the second chance of Greek intervention was thrown away, rendered unavailing through the delays introduced by the Russian autocracy, who at this critical moment, when hours counted, were occupying themselves in disputing whether Greek troops should or should not be allowed to participate in the triumphal entry into Constantinople."

The Constantinist argument, however, takes no account of chronology, which is all-important in arriving at the merits of the Dardanelles intervention question. Two days after the resignation of Venizelos, the Greek Government knew by a telegram from Romanes, Minister at Paris, that France had obtained Russia's consent to the unconditional participation of Greece. As for Italy and her claims, we must remember that the secret treaty was not signed until April 25. Had King Constantine been sincere in his desire to intervene, he could have taken up the question again on March 10, when Greek coöperation would have been precious. He knew well enough that every day aided the German engineers to make the Dardanelles impregnable. And yet, five weeks later, Zographos presented conditions that were indefinite and debatable, and that postponed the moment of intervention until kalends truly Greek!

[1] At the Mansion House dinner, June 27, 1918.

Even if we did not have the correspondence between King Constantine and the Kaiser to confirm our suspicions, the often entered into and never consummated negotiations between Constantine's General Staff and the Entente Powers give the impression of bad faith on the part of the Greek King. I once had an artist friend in Paris who, after unpaid debts had accumulated, announced suddenly his intention of going home. One of his creditors, with evident embarrassment, mentioned a sum due him. The debtor answered instantly, "I don't mind your asking about the money. Don't feel embarrassed. Just ask me for it whenever you feel like it." Constantine was the artist — frank and friendly. He always wanted the Entente Powers to feel that they could negotiate with his General Staff about intervention whenever they had the impulse. Each time he listened and gave advice to Allied diplomats and military missions, and then summoned the correspondent of the Associated Press to mourn over the stupidity of the Entente. Why did they not let Greece help them? It looked so easy! And all the while the Greek General Staff's military conditions were impossible of fulfillment, and the Greek Foreign Office's conditions would have disrupted the Entente Alliance. In the spring of 1915, and during the long, weary period after Venizelos's second resignation, good faith was lacking. Venizelos cannot be blamed for what happened when he

was out of office. Nor can it be asserted that he would have been unsuccessful in solving the problem of intervention, had the King allowed him to remain Premier. For he was successful later, when conditions were even more serious than in 1915: and he was successful both in the military and diplomatic phases of intervention without having demanded of or secured from the Entente Powers acceptance of conditions similar to those of the Zographos note.

The second point of the Constantinists, that subsequent events proved that the King was right and Venizelos wrong in the matter of the Dardanelles, has also been argued without taking into consideration chronology. What happened from May to December, 1915, on Gallipoli Peninsula is no proof at all that a joint sea and land attack, made possible by Greek coöperation, would have failed at the moment Venizelos urged it; that is, in the first week of March. The Greek Premier has never defended more cogently than he defended *post factum* his Dardanelles intervention policy of February, 1915.[1] Com-

[1] See the text of the speeches delivered in the Greek Chamber from August 24 to 26, 1917, in the English translation, *The Vindication of Greek National Policy: 1912–1917* (London, 1918). Paxton Hibben's *Constantine I and the Greek People* (New York, 1920) was written in 1917, and withheld from publication because of American intervention in the war. In justice to himself, however, Mr. Hibben should have added an appendix, before his book was given to the public, setting forth the facts revealed in the Greek Chamber in August, 1917. His volume bears the statement that it was published in June, 1917, but contains in Appendix 5

menting, more than two years later in the Greek Chamber, upon the official British parliamentary report on the Dardanelles Expedition, Venizelos said:

"Whoever studies the conclusions of this report will discover that if the deposed King had followed the policy which it was his duty to follow, because it was indicated, not simply by the Government representing the majority of the country, but by the other party leaders as well; if the King had followed this course and Colonel Metaxas had not become a tool of German policy by resigning and engendering those momentary hesitations; if we had made use of one army corps, or even after all of a single division, the seizure of Gallipoli would have been a military exploit of no great difficulty. Five days after the decree of mobilization the army corps I asked for would have been mobilized, and in another nine days, with the abundance of material which we and our Allies had at our disposal, we should have found ourselves with our army corps, or even with our one division, in occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsula, which was unguarded, ungarrisoned, and unfortified."

Venizelos argued that "the task which 100,000 or 200,000 men were not equal to later on, when the place had been fortified under the guidance of German military science, would have been child's play for the Greek army in those early days, when I discerned the state of affairs and advised the attack." In proof of this assertion he read to

(pp. 575–77) quotations from the *Corriere della Sera* of November 7 and 11, 1917, several months after Venizelos made his famous speech at Athens.

the Chamber a series of dispatches from the Greek Ministers at Constantinople and Sofia and the Greek Consul at Philippopolis to demonstrate his knowledge at the time of the demoralization of the Turkish Government and of the fact that there were only 6000 Turkish troops at the Dardanelles. "Imagine," he cried, "the prestige and authority Greece would have acquired if she had succeeded by her own efforts in tremendously influencing the history of the world by shortening even by one whole year this war."

After his resignation Venizelos went for a short vacation to Spetsæ and then to Egypt. It was his first vacation after five continuous years in office. When he returned, the police refused to allow him to land at the Piræus, where a demonstration had been arranged in his honor, and he disembarked at Phaleron. A few days later, when the national holiday was celebrated, he was forbidden to leave his house. No opportunity was given him to take part in the campaigning for the approaching election. On the other hand, the Government and the Court did everything in their power to influence and intimidate the voters. The Liberal Party candidates presented themselves on June 13 without having had the opportunity, either in the press or on the platform, to explain and defend their policy and to plead for the endorsement of their great leader. In Old Greece the King's party did not dare to abuse their

opportunity too greatly. But in New Greece the Government gave the Venizelists no chance whatever. Even the bitterest enemies of Venizelos had to admit that Admiral Goudas, given a free hand by the Government to "arrange" the elections in Macedonia where a clean sweep for the Liberal Party was anticipated, went too far. Only four Liberal deputies were returned out of seventy-three normally Venizelist circumscriptions of Macedonia.

For all the abuse of power and open intimidation and refusal to allow Venizelos to campaign, Old Greece gave Venizelos 123 out of 184 seats. The islands voted solidly for him. So, despite the "counting out" of the Liberal Party in Macedonia, the election of June 13 was a triumph for Venizelos. Of 310 seats the Liberal Party won 184, a clear majority of 58 over the other parties combined.

Since Venizelos had published in full, keeping nothing back, the memoranda of January, 1915, and since he had resigned the premiership in March as a protest against the King's policy of non-intervention, it was surprising to hear Constantine stating, almost immediately after his signal defeat at the polls, "The people elected Venizelos, not his policy." It was a tremendous, if unwilling, tribute to the popularity of Venizelos: but the contention was ridiculous. Venizelos was popular because of what he had accomplished for Greece. The electorate supported him against

the King and Court and Church and General Staff because they trusted their great Premier, and wanted him back in office to lead the nation forward along the path that seemed best to him. The man and his policy could not be divorced.

The Gounaris Cabinet, repudiated by the electorate, hid behind the pretext of the King's illness to attempt to remain in office. For more than two months Gounaris refused to resign.[1] The King was in seclusion. The Government declared that in the critical state of the King's health it would be impossible to have a change of Cabinet. The Liberal Party leaders answered that the Constitution provided for this emergency, and that if the King were incapable of performing his functions, a regency should be set up. In the meantime the German propaganda made every effort to use the Russian setback in Poland and the unsuccess of the Gallipoli campaign to influence Greek public opinion. As was learned later, on July 30 King Constantine and Premier Gounaris informed Germany that Greece would remain neutral in case Bulgaria attacked Serbia. Early in August Warsaw fell, and Baron Schenck,

[1] Hibben, *op. cit.*, p. 39, dismisses this period of seventy days, so important in the history of the struggle between Constantine and Venizelos, in one brief sentence, as follows: "Following the elections, Prime Minister Gounaris resigned, and King Constantine summoned Venizelos to the premiership." He also fails to mention the conditions under which Venizelos told the King he would accept office, and to which Constantine consented.

head of the German propaganda at Athens, filled the Government newspapers with prophecies of the triumphant end of the war before winter set in.

When the King recovered, however, the verdict of public opinion could no longer be ignored. On August 23 King Constantine decided that he must make the best of a bad business, and invited Venizelos, as majority leader in the new Chamber, to form a Cabinet. Venizelos consented, if the King would agree that "we must come back to our original policy and abide by the principles laid down at the beginning of the war, chief of which was never to allow Bulgaria to crush Serbia." The King gave his approval to this policy, and Venizelos immediately went before the Chamber to state that he had accepted the premiership after having come to an agreement with the King that Greece should not suffer any Bulgarian aggression against Serbia. This warning was not out of a clear sky. It was known to the public that Bulgaria had signed a railway accord with Turkey on July 15, which paved the way for her intervention in the war on the side of the Central Powers.

The opponents of Venizelos charge that if his return to power had been regarded by him as an endorsement of his war policy, Venizelos would have immediately ranged Greece on the side of the Entente Powers. They point to the fact that he announced the policy of returning to the

neutrality adopted at the beginning of the war because he was astute enough politician to realize that the country was now against intervention, whatever may have been the feeling in the late winter when he resigned. Venizelos did not attempt at any time to conceal his abandonment of the Dardanelles policy. This did not mean, however, a confession that he had been wrong in March. On the contrary, he made clear then, and has repeated several times since, that the psychological moment had passed. There was no longer any question of the Dardanelles. That was a matter of opportunity. But the contingency of Serbia being attacked by Bulgaria was a matter both of treaty obligation and of the vital interests of Greece. A blanket intervention of Greece on the side of the Entente had been advocated by Venizelos only at the commencement of the war. Since then some of the considerations that moved him in August, 1914, notably the desire to forestall Italy's claims in Asia Minor, no longer held good.

As was often to happen during the next two years, Entente diplomacy destroyed Greek confidence in the good faith of France and Great Britain more rapidly than Venizelos could build it up. Whenever the King needed an argument for continuing neutrality, a military disaster or a diplomatic *faux pas* was furnished by the Entente. Two weeks before Venizelos returned to power, Great Britain, France, and Russia notified the Greek Government that

they had promised Bulgaria Kavalla and its hinterland, to be enlarged, the note ran, in proportion to Greek territorial expansion in Asia Minor. On the same day, August 3, Serbia was informed that the Entente intended to cede to Bulgaria the southern part of Macedonia, which would have brought Bulgaria as a wedge across the Vardar between Serbia and Greece. What would have happened had Bulgaria accepted the proposition and remained neutral, God alone knows. Granted that the Entente Powers sincerely believed this arrangement to be for the best interests of Serbia and Greece, it was none the less a direct affront to Greece and an assumption of the right to dispose of Greek territory without the consent of Greece. Such ill-considered moves as this played into the hands of Germany. Instead of winning both Bulgaria and Greece, the Entente won neither. More than this, Entente diplomats, up to the middle of September, refused to believe that Bulgaria would join the Central Powers, and made no preparations for this contingency, or even for giving effective aid to Serbia, although they had received full information of the Austro-German concentration on the Serbian frontier.

Entente stupidity and double-dealing and undue optimism, however, do not affect the merits of the respective policies of the Greek King and his Premier. They are cited here only to explain why the King was not prevented

by public opinion from following an anti-constitutional and anti-national policy, and the great obstacles Venizelos had to contend with. After Venizelos assumed once more the premiership, the Serbian Minister communicated to him a telegram from Premier Pasitch, asking the Greek Government's opinion of the view prevailing in Serbian military circles that Serbia should take advantage of Bulgaria's unpreparedness and invade Bulgaria before she had time to mobilize. When Venizelos referred this question to the King, Constantine told Venizelos that he had better advise the Serbians not to attack Bulgaria, because the Serbo-Greek alliance was defensive, and if the Serbians should be first to attack it would be a question whether Greece would be obliged to go to the aid of Serbia. When he later realized that the King had been carrying on negotiations with Germany behind his back at this very moment, Venizelos said:

"How can you describe the conduct of giving such an opinion and at the same time informing the common enemy that he was at liberty to fall upon our Ally — the Ally whom we kept in ignorance of our intentions when she might at least have succeeded in saving herself by the desperate means of an anticipatory attack upon Bulgaria?"

So little did Venizelos dream of the treachery of the King, who had just accepted his return to office on the basis of defending Serbia against Bulgarian aggression,

that he dispatched a warning to Germany, which ended as follows:

"We believe that the German Government has no interest in provoking a general Balkan outbreak, and will continue to desire the preservation of Greek neutrality. We may accordingly hope that in all circumstances, and even in the event of the organization of a Balkan campaign, she will not fail to exercise all her influence in order to restrain Bulgaria from attacking Serbia, and will thus insure the preservation of peace on our frontiers."

Although the feeling had grown upon him that Bulgaria was definitely in the enemy camp, Venizelos, on September 14, agreed with Premier Pasitch of Serbia to make territorial concessions to Bulgaria through the Entente as the price of keeping Bulgaria neutral. The two Premiers knew that the situation was desperate and that the Entente could not be counted upon for generous military aid. The submarine warfare was looming up as a deadly and uncertain factor in estimating the reliability of transport of troops by sea, and Venizelos had been watching with extreme care the slowness in provisioning and the indecision in increasing the Dardanelles Expedition. The attitude of Italy was equivocal. Rumania gave no sign of abandoning neutrality. The first duty of the statesman was to avoid a test of arms under these circumstances.

But a week later the Greek Minister at Sofia telegraphed that Bulgaria had decided upon the partial mobilization of

her army. Constantine agreed to respond by calling to the colors two Greek army corps. The next morning at half-past nine came a second telegram from Sofia, announcing the general mobilization of Bulgaria. Venizelos telephoned immediately to Tatoï Palace, stating that he desired to present for the King's signature a decree ordering the general mobilization of the Greek army. He was not received until five in the afternoon.

When Venizelos at last succeeded in seeing the King, and asked point-blank for the mobilization order, Constantine for the first time spoke frankly. He said: "You know, I don't want to help Serbia, because Germany will win, and I don't want to be beaten." This sentence summed up the attitude of the King from the beginning of the war until his blind and stubborn faith in the invincibility of Germany cost him his throne. Germany will win! To this illusion King Constantine sacrificed the honor and prestige of Greece, the interests and security of Greece, the aspirations of Hellas, and his own future.

In vain Venizelos tried to convince his sovereign. He pointed out that an immediate response by Greece to the Bulgarian invasion of Serbia had a reasonable chance of success, and that even if it did not succeed, the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians together could not use their numbers against Serbia and Greece because of lack of railways and the mountainous character of Macedonia. He

showed that there was no analogy between the case of Belgium and its possible repetition in Greece. When he saw that these arguments were without effect, Venizelos said:

"Your Majesty, having failed to persuade you, I am sorry, but it is my duty, as representing at the present moment the sovereignty of the people, to tell you that this time you have no right to differ with me. By the election of June 13 the people have approved my policy and given me their confidence: and the electorate knew that the foundation of my policy was that we should not allow Bulgaria to crush Serbia and expand overmuch so as to crush us to-morrow. If you are determined to set aside the Constitution, you must say so clearly, abrogating the Constitution and assuming full responsibility by a royal decree."

But he added that the moment was too grave to provoke any internal discussion in Greece over the Constitution, so he would resign and leave the responsibility to the King. This threat brought the reluctant consent of the King. Constantine was unwilling to have Venizelos quit his post because of disagreement over mobilization. It would be highly impolitic to have the news of the Bulgarian mobilization coupled in the minds of the people with the resignation of Venizelos on the ground that the King had refused to respond to the challenge of Bulgaria. Venizelos left the palace, uncertain as to the King's next move, but with the order of general mobilization signed.

Equally important, in view of subsequent events, was the King's consent, granted in the same interview, to ask Great Britain and France to send 150,000 troops to the Balkans, to take the place of that number stipulated in the military convention accompanying the Serbo-Greek Treaty as Serbia's quota against Bulgaria. Venizelos had been careful to go over this ground fully with the King, so that there would be no misunderstanding. He brought up the matter of the Serbian quota, because the General Staff had been opposing the contingency of intervention on the ground that Serbia would be unable to fulfill her part of the compact, and therefore Greece was released from the obligation of intervening. The only reservation Constantine made was that the British and French should send home troops and not colonials.

Venizelos returned post-haste to his office, and telephoned the Ministers of the Entente to come to see him on urgent business. When they arrived, he informed them that Greece had decided to mobilize, and that the decree would be published that evening; but for his future guidance he must know if the Powers would be disposed to furnish the 150,000 men which, according to the Serbo-Greek Treaty, Serbia was obliged to contribute to the war with Bulgaria. The Ministers promised to communicate immediately with their Governments. Hardly had the Ministers left when a message arrived from the palace

countermanding the *démarche*. Venizelos answered that it had already been made, and that even if it had not, he would still have sounded the Powers on this matter, "because as responsible Minister it is necessary for me to know, in order to concert my plans, whether the Powers are disposed to furnish this assistance."

On September 25 came the answer that the Powers would make good Serbia's quota against Bulgaria, and that the number stipulated would be composed entirely of home troops. When the answer was transmitted to him, the King directed Venizelos to inform the Ministers that "so long as Bulgaria does not attack Serbia and does not thereby create the situation that obliges us to abandon our neutrality, these forces must not be dispatched: for their arrival on Greek soil would constitute a breach of our neutrality, it being still possible that Bulgaria will not attack Serbia." The Ministers telegraphed this message to their Governments. The next day came the answer that the troops had already started. Venizelos told the Ministers that he would have to protest, "but after making our protest, we shall afford you all possible facilities for disembarkation and quartering."

When the Chamber met, on September 29, Venizelos explained that the Bulgarian mobilization could not be regarded in any other light than as a grave menace, and for that reason Greece had mobilized in turn. In asking for

the ratification of the decree and a war loan of 150,000,000 drachmæ, Venizelos said:

"After the recent election, having again been called to power, I considered, in view of the great changes that had taken place meanwhile in the international situation, that we should return to our original policy of neutrality: but this normal situation was suddenly disturbed by the general mobilization in Bulgaria, to which measure Greece could make but one reply.

"I earnestly want peace, but the Greek nation must oppose any attempt of any one Balkan State to acquire for itself a preponderant position which would put an end to the political and moral independence of the others."

Venizelos went on to explain that the Bulgarian Premier had assured him of the peaceable intentions of Bulgaria, whose mobilization was only "to enable Bulgaria to maintain a policy of armed neutrality." To this Venizelos had replied that so long as such was the significance of the Bulgarian mobilization, the Greek mobilization must not be considered as having any other object than the same armed neutrality.

The appeal of Venizelos was adroit. He had emphasized, not rendering help to Serbia or to the Entente, but the fundamental principle of Greece's Balkan policy, the maintenance of the balance of power in the Balkans. On the question of opposing "any attempt of any one Balkan State to acquire for itself a preponderant position which

would put an end to the political and moral independence of the others," there was no division of opinion. When he asked for approval of the mobilization decree and a war loan on the ground of maintaining the balance of power in the Balkans, the Chamber was with Venizelos. In the midst of great enthusiasm, former Premier Gounaris declared that his group extended unreserved support to the Government's policy. Venizelos was acclaimed in the streets. The feeling against Bulgaria was strong enough to carry the nation into war. Had the Entente Powers been able and willing to do what Venizelos had indicated in his *démarche* to their Ministers at Athens the week before, the King and his followers would never have been able to get the better of Venizelos, and to keep Greece neutral. But Great Britain and France failed to take advantage of the opportunity offered them by Venizelos. And then they blamed him and his nation for what was their own fault.

At the beginning of October the Austro-Germans launched their long-heralded attack upon Serbia. Bulgaria was completing her mobilization and massing troops on the Serbian frontier. The Greek mobilization was progressing rapidly. British and French troops were on their way to Saloniki from Marseilles and were embarking on transports at Moudros. How could King Constantine continue to maintain that Bulgaria must be given the benefit of the doubt? The situation was intolerable for

Venizelos. Yet he obeyed the King, and protested formally on October 2 against the proposed landing at Saloniki. On October 4 Russia gave Bulgaria twenty-four hours to expel German and Austro-Hungarian officers and break openly "with the enemies of the Slav cause."

This news and that of the arrival of the first French and British ships at Saloniki reached Athens when the Chamber was in session. Without exception the elder statesmen — former Premiers — cried out against this move of the Allies to involve Greece in war, without furnishing adequate military aid. Venizelos answered:

"Some time has passed since the Entente Powers have made requests of Greece. To-day they ask nothing but this — to offer Serbia, Greece's ally, succor in the event of circumstances which would require Greece herself, under her alliance, to give Serbia help. Great nations may with impunity regard treaties as scraps of paper. For smaller countries such a policy would be suicidal."

The Chamber was in an uproar. Above it all Venizelos cried:

"We have a treaty with Serbia. If we are honest, we shall leave nothing undone to assure its fulfillment in letter and spirit. Only if we are rogues may we find excuses to avoid our obligations."

Venizelos admitted that he had asked Great Britain and France for 150,000 men on September 22, and had agreed to allow the landing at Saloniki under formal protest on

October 2. He was simply trying to make the best of a bad business after he had been let in by the French and British. Only after the Anglo-French force had started for Saloniki was Venizelos informed that it comprised 13,000 men. This was not at all the understanding. It was beyond the ability of Venizelos to convince Greece of the wisdom — of the possibility even — of entering the war with this very slight military aid. He got a vote of confidence, but by a narrow margin: 142 voted for the Government, 102 against, and 13 abstained.

The next morning the King summoned Venizelos to the palace. Russia had declared war on Bulgaria. The Anglo-French expedition, under command of General Sarrail and Sir Bryan Mahon, was at Saloniki. Constantine told Venizelos that he intended to inform the world that the Anglo-French landing would be a case of *force majeure*, comparable to Germany's invasion of Belgium. When Venizelos made a final plea for the solution of the problem of neutrality by abandoning neutrality, which was Greece's duty and which Greece would have to do in the end, the King answered that the General Staff advised unanimously against "this madness." He reminded Venizelos that the negotiations with the Entente had been on the basis of furnishing Serbia's quota according to the definite terms of the military convention. Thirteen thousand men was a drop in the bucket, declared the King, which made

the proposed landing a trick to involve Greece without risking anything or assuming any obligations. There was nothing for Venizelos to do but resign. The resignation was promptly accepted. Former Premier Zaïmis agreed to head a new Cabinet. Venizelos was only a few hours out of office when the French and British began to land at Saloniki.

The violation of Greek neutrality did not pass without protest in the British Parliament, and Lord Lansdowne explained for the Government that it was "at the instance of Venizelos that we undertook to provide forces to enable Greece to fulfill her treaty obligations to Serbia." A similar defense was made in the French Chamber of Deputies, where bitter opposition to the expedition developed, on the ground not of morality, but of military wisdom. But all the explanations of Lansdowne and others contained even less than half the truth. To make it appear that the Greeks had changed their minds and that Venizelos, after having taken the initiative, was unable to hold his country to its side of the bargain, the French and British press denatured the truth. Venizelos was put in a bad hole. He was unable to defend himself. His lips were sealed and have remained sealed. As on numerous other occasions, before and since, the great Cretan has had to refrain from speaking out and to wait for history to vindicate him and his country as well.

Lord Lansdowne sacrificed the reputation of Venizelos, the character of the Greeks, and his own truthfulness, when he told Parliament that it was "at the instance of Venizelos that we undertook to provide forces to enable Greece to fulfill her treaty obligations to Serbia." Venizelos had simply sounded the Entente Powers to find out whether, in case Bulgaria attacked Serbia, they would be disposed to furnish Serbia's quota — 150,000 troops — in order to make the Serbo-Greek Treaty operative. This was quite a different matter from undertaking "to provide forces to enable Greece to fulfill her treaty obligations to Serbia." The *démarche* — a purely tentative one, as Venizelos had clearly explained to the Entente Ministers — was acted upon immediately and used as an excuse for disembarking a woefully inadequate force at Saloniki — less than one tenth the number of troops asked for by Venizelos, and asked for, not on behalf of Greece, but on behalf of Serbia, to enable Serbia to fulfill her treaty obligations! Honesty demanded a frank answer to the *démarche* of Venizelos. The Entente Powers were disloyal to their friend Venizelos when they interpreted this *démarche* as an invitation to send 13,000 troops to Saloniki. For obvious reasons Venizelos has never been able to point this out. Entente statesmen and the Ministers of the Powers at Athens conspired to put Venizelos in an impossible situation, knowing that he could not defend himself, and trust-

ing that he would somehow extricate himself and lead Greece into the war in time to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. They overshot the mark. What could Venizelos respond when the King and the General Staff pointed out the discrepancy between 150,000 and 13,000? The attempt to save Serbia was doomed to failure before it began.[1]

Venizelos still had a majority in the Chamber. But it was dwindling. The failure of the Entente Powers to furnish the Serbian equivalent for joint action against Bulgaria, or to promise that the 150,000 men stipulated in the treaty would be forthcoming immediately, made him too weak to force an issue with his successor. On October 10 Premier Zaïmis informed the Chamber that the policy of the Government would be armed neutrality, conditioned on events as they occurred. Zaïmis believed that the people were behind his Cabinet. He may have been wrong at the moment, but there is no doubt that public opinion in Greece changed sensibly with the sweeping victories of the Bulgarians and Central Powers, and the revelation of the impotence of the Entente to help Serbia and to make progress at Gallipoli.

[1] The ridiculous insufficiency of the Saloniki Expedition, from a military point of view, was exposed from the very beginning by British and French critics, whose opinion was the same as that of King Constantine and the Greek General Staff. Most pronounced of the critics was Georges Clemenceau, editor of the Paris daily, *L'Homme Enchaîné*, who afterwards became Premier of France.

Venizelos, while not provoking a test of votes, maintained his policy, and from the Opposition benches continued to call for a departure from neutrality. But he shifted his ground, and emphasized the ulterior interest of Greece to go to the aid of Serbia. His speech of October 10 is one of the noblest of his career. Answering Zaïmis, he said:

"Even if there existed no treaty with Serbia, our interest would oblige us to enter the war, because another State wishes to aggrandize itself at our expense. . . . We ought not to allow Bulgaria to crush Serbia in order that she may then attack us with all her forces. The national soul says it is to the interest of Greece that Bulgaria be defeated. For if Bulgaria should triumph, Hellenism would be completely vanquished."

He denied that Germany had still a chance to win the war. With their greater resources, "as time goes on, reason points to the conclusion that Great Britain and her Allies must win." Neutrality was an immense service to Germany, and if the new Cabinet persisted in maintaining neutrality and thereby helped Germany to win the war, they should anticipate their belief in Germany's victory by securing a promise from Germany of territorial aggrandizement after ascertaining what territory had been promised to Bulgaria. They should also secure a guarantee of integrity for ten years at least after the war.

Venizelos ended with a warning:

"Take care, gentlemen, take care of that Greater Greece which I have handed over to you. Take care that you do not hand over to your successors a smaller Greece. Gentlemen, I have finished. I feel that I have done my duty."

On October 12, in reply to an official communication from Serbia, contending that the entry of Bulgaria into the war made a *casus fœderis*, and asking if the Greek army was ready to enter into action against Bulgaria, Greece formally refused to acknowledge that the treaty obligation existed. The note argued that the alliance of 1911 was limited to preserving the equilibrium among the Balkan States, and that its purely Balkan character made it inapplicable in case of a general European conflagration. The situation that arose was not covered, because the treaty contemplated only "isolated attacks by Bulgaria against either Greece or Serbia." This answer was followed by an exhaustive communication from Premier Zaïmis to Great Britain, presenting an interpretation of the Greco-Serbian Treaty unfavorable to intervention.

The controversy over the obligation of Greece to Serbia after Bulgarian intervention became a *cause célèbre*, and was hotly debated in the European press as well as throughout Greece. As the treaty had never been published, however, the discussion was mostly surmise. Nearly two years later, when Venizelos came back to Athens from Saloniki, and this question arose once more

in the Greek Chamber, a number of the deputies declared that in 1915 they had known nothing about this treaty obligation, and, not having the text under their eyes, were unable to form an independent opinion. Venizelos said one thing: Zaïmis said another. Both were men whose honesty and sincerity were unquestioned. King Constantine and most of the elder statesmen of Greece denied that the treaty provided that if either State was attacked by Bulgaria, the other State would hasten to its assistance. Prince Nicholas in a letter to Lord Burnham declared that he had taken part in the negotiations of the treaty, and that it certainly contained no such blanket provision. Venizelos answered in the press that the obligation did exist and that Prince Nicholas had had nothing to do with framing the treaty.

In justice to the Greek people, the fact of this uncertainty and confusion should be emphasized. The Greeks had a right to resent the imputation of the Entente Powers, both in official communications and in their newspapers, that the Greek nation had failed to observe the treaty. Venizelos could speak his mind. He knew what was in the treaty. But the Entente press did not know, and the assumption on the part of uninformed statesmen and publicists that the Greeks were acting dishonorably was unwarranted.

King Constantine cannot be accused at this critical

moment of willfully misinterpreting the treaty. If he did misinterpret it, the responsibility rests upon counselors among whom are numbered some of the most reputable men in Greece. But he is guilty of a lack of straightforwardness, which can be explained only by sympathy with Germany and belief in Germany's invincibility, when he failed to inform the Serbian Government before Bulgaria had declared war that Greece would refuse to consider Bulgarian intervention a *casus fœderis*. And his action can be called by no other name than complicity, since it has been established that Constantine assured the Central Empires and Bulgaria that Greece was not bound to go to the aid of Serbia and would remain neutral so long as her own frontiers were respected.

But was the attitude of King Constantine more dishonest than that of the Entente Powers? It was well known in Greece, and was a cause of deep resentment, that the Entente Powers had been negotiating with Bulgaria on the basis of violating the Greco-Serbian Treaty. If one article of the treaty provided for intervention by one of the contracting parties when the other was attacked by Bulgaria, another article stipulated that neither party should cede territory to Bulgaria without the consent of the other. And yet Entente pressure was being brought upon Serbia to consent secretly to territorial cessions in favor of Bulgaria. In addition, the Entente Ministers at

Sofia offered Bulgaria a portion of Greek Macedonia as the price of Bulgarian neutrality, and at the same time told Serbia that she could have compensation at the expense of Greece for what Serbia was asked to cede to Bulgaria. The equivocal diplomacy of the Entente for months before the Saloniki landing made it very difficult for Venizelos, and diminished his influence even with followers who had the deepest affection for him.

If the Allies had been militarily successful, their political knavery might have been forgiven. But the military failure of their Balkan policy was as signal as the diplomatic failure. Despite the undignified and tortuous negotiations at Sofia, which took no account of Greek interests or Greek sentiment, Bulgaria rejected the offers of the Entente. The last-minute effort to go to the aid of Serbia with ridiculously inadequate forces ended in the hasty retreat of the inter-Allied expeditionary corps to the Saloniki base. For what was due to their own impotence, the Entente tried to blame Greece. Venizelos was charged with having overestimated his ability to bring Greece into the war. Constantine was charged with plotting against the Entente.

French and British public opinion did not take into consideration factors in the situation that worked against Venizelos and for Constantine and that justified the Greeks in changing their attitude towards the Entente. When

the May elections were held, the military prospects of the Allies were bright. Their propaganda had confidently proclaimed the *débâcle* of Germany on the western front in the second summer, the success of Italy against Austria, of Russia against Germany and Austria, of the Gallipoli expedition against the Turks. These hopes were blasted one after the other. The Germans held the French and British and the Austrians held the Italians. Russia, in a vast and disastrous retreat from Poland, had been put virtually out of the running. Gallipoli was an ignominious failure. Neither by pressure on other fronts nor by direct aid from Saloniki had the Entente been able to prevent the crushing of Serbia. The Sofia negotiations demonstrated that the Entente had been willing to sacrifice Greece to win Bulgaria.

Admiration for Venizelos ought not to lead us into the error of glorifying the statesman at the expense of his people. It is a reflection upon the character of the Greek nation to draw a picture of the events of 1915 and 1916 as if this were a period of conflict between the King and Venizelos during which the Greeks were victims of German corruption and guilty of moral turpitude. Any such easy generalization would make the leadership of Venizelos from 1910 to 1915 and since 1917 inexplicable. The Greeks were not cowards, dismayed at the thought of a new war. They were not shirkers, unwilling to fulfill their obliga-

tions. They had no thought of playing one side off against the other until they could be sure that they were casting in their lot with the victors. These insinuations, made by many who have written to praise Venizelos, are unfounded. Venizelos needs and wants no glory at the price of besmirching his fellow-countrymen. Even during the most trying period of the Saloniki Provisional Government, when the treachery of the Court cabal seemed evident, Venizelos had no fear of the Greeks stabbing the Allies in the back. Did he not oppose the plan of the Allies to go into Thessaly and offer to go himself? He knew how Greek would meet Greek. His confidence in his fellow-countrymen never wavered. If it had wavered, would he have triumphed in the end? Did any man ever make a silk purse out of a sow's ear?

The truth of the matter is that the Greeks were confused. They were puzzled. They were irritated. They were misinformed. The Entente statesmen failed to come out definitely for Venizelos and against Constantine. They did not trust Venizelos's estimate of his own people. They did not assure to Greece the military backing that would have compelled Constantine to show his hand. Strong opposition to the Saloniki expedition developed in London and Paris. The Allies paraded their military impotence and their lack of harmony and coördination before the eyes of the Greeks. When the inside history of

the Saloniki story is published, we shall realize how the actions of the Allies themselves kept furnishing fresh arguments against the interventionist policy of Venizelos.

A smaller man, a lesser patriot, than Venizelos would have directed those who kept soliciting his influence, and yet worked against that influence, to the regions ruled over by an ancient god of his race. But the reasons for joining the Entente remained as strong as ever. The greatest of modern Hellenes thought only of Hellas and the interests of Hellas. Venizelos knew that the victory of Germany would mean the hegemony of Bulgaria in the Balkans and the stamping-out of Hellenism in Thrace, Constantinople, and Asia Minor. This was no hypothesis. The Turks were already at work. Venizelos did not need to draw upon his imagination to picture the holocaust of massacre and expulsion that swept over Asia Minor in the summer and autumn of 1915. He was a Cretan, brought up under the shadow of the crescent. If Greeks of the kingdom did not share the keen sense of the danger to Hellenism from a German victory with Ottoman Greeks who remained steadfast in their loyalty to Venizelos through the dark days, they were more to be pitied than blamed. Venizelos was willing to wait until the shadow lifted.

In an official communication to the Athens evening newspapers on October 21, the Zaïmis Cabinet stated the

opinion of the Greek Government in regard to the treaty obligation of Greece toward Serbia. The note said that the interpretation of the alliance with Serbia was not in the province of the Entente Powers, because Greece was an independent nation disposing of her fate in full sovereignty. The Austro-German attack released Greece from the obligation of armed intervention, since the treaty was conceived only as a document to provide against a renewed attempt of Bulgaria to win the hegemony of the Balkans. Even if it were argued that the treaty became operative after the intervention of Bulgaria, it must be remembered that Greek aid to Serbia against Bulgaria was contingent upon Serbia putting 150,000 men immediately in the field against Bulgaria. The Entente Powers had failed to furnish an equivalent contingent. The General Staff thought that unless there were 400,000 men for the Balkan joint expedition, Greece would be ruined without saving Serbia. Greece would aid Serbia best by allowing the Allies to pass through her territory, maintaining all the while her own mobilization.

This communication admitted, what had already become public in the House of Commons debate of October 14, that Greece had been offered Cyprus by Great Britain on condition that she enter the war, and had declined the offer. Premier Zaïmis said that Greece thanked Great Britain, but could not consider abandoning her

neutrality, which, however, was of the most benevolent character towards the Entente.

Venizelos kept his majority under control, and allowed the Zaïmis Cabinet to transact normal business. It was his desire that the Chamber finish its business and adjourn. Constitutionally, then, new selections would not have to be held until the summer of 1916. This would give Greece time to judge the merits of the controversy between the King and Venizelos by the results of the nine or ten months of unchecked Crown authority. A crisis arose, however, on November 4, when the Minister of War, General Giannakitsas, insulted deputies of various parties in a discussion over extra pay due army officers during the period of mobilization. The deputies insisted that Giannakitsas apologize. Zaïmis, who considered this an excellent opportunity to get out of a position that was becoming irksome, without seeming to desert the premiership, took the part of the Minister of War and asked for a vote of confidence. Venizelos on behalf of the Liberal Party offered to support the Zaïmis Cabinet if Giannakitsas alone resigned, or simply to withdraw from participation during the remaining fortnight of the session and allow the bills still before the Chamber thus to be passed prior to automatic adjournment after business was completed. But Zaïmis refused.

The debate that ensued lasted all night. A Government

deputy asked Venizelos whether he thought the King wished the country's destruction. Venizelos met the issue squarely. He deplored dragging the King's name into a purely political discussion, and denied that his opposition to the King meant imputing unpatriotic motives to Constantine, who was "a distinguished general, but not equally experienced in things political." Then in three brief sentences he set forth his disagreement with the King:

"Our state is a democracy presided over by the King, and the whole responsibility in the Government rests with the Cabinet, which depends upon the majority of the elected representatives of the people. In a constitutional government, the Crown has no share in responsibilities. If foolish political leaders admit that in this Chamber there can be such a thing as a Crown policy, they are unworthy to represent a free and sovereign people."

Premier Zaïmis was refused the confidence of the Chamber by 33 voices. The vote stood: for the Government, 114; against, 147; abstaining, 3. Venizelos protested against dissolving the Chamber and ordering a new general election. He said that the Liberal Party would consider dissolution and a new election illegal, and warned the advisers of the King that his followers would back up this opinion by refusing to participate in the election.

King Constantine decided that the time had come to break openly with Venizelos and the Liberal Party, which

had been returned by so definite a majority in the last general election. As a first step to show his contempt of the Chamber, he sent for the discarded Minister of War and made him his aide-de-camp. The next day he dissolved the Chamber, and asked Stephanos Skouloudis to form a Cabinet. This was the beginning of a series of appointments to the premiership without taking into account the political standing of the appointee before the Chamber and the country. From November 6, 1915, until his forced abdication, Constantine I ruled Greece unconstitutionally. For the will of the people he substituted divine guidance.

On November 9 the new Premier informed France of Greece's "neutrality with the character of sincerest benevolence towards the Entente Powers." But acts soon belied words. The mad enterprise of flying to the aid of Serbia too late and with insufficient forces was meeting with disaster. Foreseeing the necessity of falling back on Saloniki, on November 12 the British, French, and Russian Ministers demanded that Greece define the attitude she would observe in event of the Allied forces seeking refuge in Greek territory if there should be a reverse in Serbian Macedonia. They insisted that no distinction be made between the Anglo-French army and the Serbian army. Skouloudis answered that Greece would be compelled to disarm the Serbians because of the obligation of neutrality.

and hinted that the British and French really ought to be disarmed also, but that their eventual retreat into Greek Macedonia would be again a case of *force majeure* for Greece, as the original landing had been.

On November 21 Venizelos issued a proclamation asking his followers to refrain from voting in the general election, on the ground that the dissolution of the Chamber had been illegal and the deputies elected on June 13 still constituted the lawful legislative assembly of Greece. The returns of the election, held on December 19, showed that the majority of the Greek electorate had obeyed Venizelos. In June 750,000 votes had been cast. In December the polls recorded a scant 200,000. The Liberal Party never regarded the new Chamber as constitutional, and Venizelos and his friends took no part in its proceedings during the long months that followed before the open rupture.

A disaster more complete even than had been anticipated met the Allies in Serbia. The little country was completely overrun. The Entente forces retreated to Macedonia and entrenched themselves in the Saloniki base. Driven across Albania to the sea, the Serbians would have been annihilated had not France and Great Britain, violating once more Greek neutrality, transported the remnants of the Serbian army to Corfu.

After recuperation at Corfu, the problem arose of send-

ing the rehabilitated Serbian army, which numbered about 120,000, to Saloniki. It seemed impossible to find the vessels necessary for the long sea voyage around Greece. Transport by sea in submarine-infested waters was also a risky operation. The Entente informed Greece that the Serbians would have to go to Saloniki by way of Patras and Attica. The German Minister at Athens promptly warned Greece that this would be considered a breach of neutrality. Premier Skouloudis protested. The Entente answered that Greece must not only consent to the transfer of Serbian troops by land, but would be required to furnish troop trains and a right-of-way on the railroad. The Entente justified overriding the protest of Skouloudis on the ground that: (1) the Skouloudis Cabinet did not have official standing on the basis of the Greek Constitution, and did not represent the will of the Greek nation; (2) the Treaty which created the Kingdom of Greece provided for the intervention by the guaranteeing Powers when, in their judgment, it became necessary; and (3) the failure to keep the treaty pledge to Serbia made it morally incumbent upon Greece to do all in her power to repair the consequent damage to Serbian interests.

This was the thesis now adopted in all the relations of the Entente with Greece. The article, creating the Kingdom of Greece, in the Treaty of Adrianople, September 14, 1829, was due to the agreement reached between Russia,

winner in the war with Turkey, and the two Occidental Powers that had intervened to prevent Greece from being crushed by her Ottoman masters. By the Convention of London, May 7, 1832, the independent Kingdom of Greece was put under the protection of Great Britain, France, and Russia, who were made guarantors of her Constitution. Down to the forced abdication of Constantine and the reconvening of the Chamber of June 13, 1915, under the presidency of the dismissed Premier, in the summer of 1917, the Entente Powers based every act in their relations with Greece upon their privileged position as guarantors of the Constitution, which King Constantine's Government was violating.

Few Greeks went the length of defending all the arbitrary measures of the Entente Powers. There were some that were indefensible on any ground whatever. Even where ardent Venizelists realized the necessity for them, they were none the less resented. King Constantine may have been at fault: and he was surrounded by incompetents, sycophants, and downright rascals. But down in the bottom of his heart every Greek believed that the Entente diplomacy went too far, and that at Saloniki General Sarrail was unduly nervous and abused the hospitality and ignored the sovereign rights of Greece. Constant pinpricks prevented the return of Venizelos to power through a revulsion of public opinion.

Greek irritation over the high-handed abuses of sea power by the Entente did much to maintain sympathy for the neutralist policy of King Constantine. There seemed to be no limit to the arrogance and stupidity of British naval officers in the Mediterranean. Although illegal, many blockade measures could be justified by *Notwendigkeit*, and tolerated by neutrals friendly to the Entente. But frequently the abuses of sea power were unreasonable and unnecessary. Americans who had experience with the working-out of Orders-in-Council, which were contrary to international law, remember how difficult it was for the most enthusiastic supporters of the Entente to brook the many insolent acts of illegality committed by the British fleet in the Atlantic before our entry into the war. There was much truth in the charges, made by Prince Nicholas in a letter to a London newspaper,[1] of lack of tact in handling Greek commerce and of unjust accusations against Greece.

Prince Nicholas pointed out that although, since the beginning of the Dardanelles campaign, the Germans had been able to aid Turkey through Bulgaria, no coercive measures of importance had been taken against Bulgaria. But Greek merchantmen were subjected to such a rigorous control that the liberty of the seas in the Ægean had become an empty phrase. There was prolonged detention

[1] See London *Daily Telegraph*, April 7, 1916.

at Moudros or Malta. The same vessel was subjected to more than one visit. Days were lost at Gibraltar and again at Malta. Objects were confiscated without apparent justification, and Great Britain applied to Greek ships measures against which she had protested to the point of threatening Russia with war ten years earlier. Prince Nicholas cited the instance of the detention at Moudros, after taking it hours out of its course, of a ship transporting General Moschopoulos, commanding officer of the Saloniki army corps, with all his staff. Maritime communications were so paralyzed that Greece was repeatedly on the verge of starvation, "although no facts justifying such measures have ever been established." If the accusation against the Greeks of maintaining bases for German submarines were well founded, why had none claimed the British Legation's prize of two thousand pounds? Surely there were plenty of poor Greek sailors and fishermen who would have detected such bases had they existed. Near Nauplia marines had landed from Allied ships, with no warning to local authorities, and destroyed the petroleum *dépôt* of the Government, placed there for the agricultural station of Tiryns. Had they stopped to inquire or even had they examined the contents of the tanks, they would have discovered that the liquid inside was denatured and could be used only for the destruction of locusts.

The letter of Prince Nicholas was not German propaganda, and I have found that its facts are correct. A dozen Greeks, all of them sympathizers with the Entente, have told me that Entente interference with their business and correspondence and movements was so unnecessarily stupid that they did not blame their fellow-countrymen for being unwilling to enter the war on the side of nations who were showing themselves unfriendly and unjust to Greece, and whose actions exemplified the detestable Prussianism they were inviting the Greeks to aid them in destroying. This point needs to be emphasized. Little things have big results. They may not have known it, but French and British officials, especially naval officers, who acted like typical Prussians, abusing their power, were unconscious agents of the German propaganda in Greece. They are responsible for the size of the cemeteries in Saloniki.

Many Greeks felt also that Entente naval power was being used in the Mediterranean for the furtherance of sordid commercial interests, even at critical moments. Information of a purely commercial nature that came to the British and French authorities through the control of mails and telegraphs was communicated to rivals of Greek firms in the same lines, and ships were detained to allow French and British goods to get to certain markets ahead of Greek goods in order to take the top prices. Greeks, ardent friends of Venizelos, have told me these things. They also

charged that certain Allied officers were open to bribes, and would give no permits until their palms were well greased.

In investigating causes of irritation against the Entente at the time, I discovered that Entente control of the sea was also being used to influence internal politics in Greece. The British Legation's official commercial bureau granted no permits to anti-Ententists or to those who sincerely believed Greece should remain neutral. Merchants had to come out flat-footed for the Allies or be deprived of facilities at sea, irrespective of international law and the Hague Conventions. The British Legation was supreme, as Greece depended upon imports. Even within the circle of professed Entente sympathizers, it was claimed by many (although I have no proof of this) that the authorities at the British Legation considered only Venizelists as friends of the Entente. Those applying for permits had to be vouched for by the Liberal Party organization. Since many who were disposed to accept the reasoning of Venizelos and to support Greek intervention did not want to adhere to the Liberal Party for reasons independent of foreign policy, this fact may explain the undoubtedly large backing King Constantine received for his abstention policy from influential Greeks who were in no sense pro-German.

Throughout this bitter struggle Venizelos refused to

countenance a republican movement. He wanted no civil war in Greece. He stated that he was no more anti-dynastic than at the time of the conflict with Prince George in Crete or when he first came to Athens in 1910. Overthrowing the monarchy might have been the easiest remedy for the intolerable position in which Venizelos found himself. But he was averse to the idea of a republic, because he believed that a constitutional monarchy was the best form of government for Greece during the period of the unification of the Hellenic race. Two other reasons made Venizelos feel that it was necessary to persist to the end, even risking failure, in the effort to win over the King to his point of view. To ask the people to choose between him and Constantine, making it a question of personalities, was exceedingly distasteful to Venizelos. For it would mean the republic, despite his opposition to that form of government in the period of evolution. And then Venizelos had no illusions about the attitude of the Greek people towards their sovereign. If it was true that many Greeks were pro-Entente without being pro-Venizelos, it was equally true that among those who supported the policies of Venizelos were ardent admirers of the sovereign. This was well explained in retrospect by Minister Gennadius, at the Mansion House reception in London several years later. On June 27, 1918, Gennadius said:

"Let me tell you frankly that ex-King Constantine was

originally beloved of his people. He was the first Greek Prince born to us — as promised and hoped and prayed for by fifteen generations of Greeks. He was given a name that brought back memories of glory. No event was more touching than the christening, among representatives from Greek lands and communities the world over, of this Greek-born Orthodox Prince. Great things were expected of him; and none denies that he gallantly led our men to victory during the two Balkan Wars."

A revolution at this stage, although urged by friends in whose loyalty and judgment he had confidence, did not appeal to the man whose heart was filled with apprehension for the Greater Greece he had created. He knew that public opinion was confused, and that the main issue was not as clear to others as to himself. He was too shrewd to underestimate the popularity of the King and the unpopularity of the Entente. A revolution would mean civil war, and probably New Greece against Old Greece. With the army mobilized, such an idea was abhorrent. Venizelos pointed out, to those who dared to upbraid him for keeping in the background when Greece was going to ruin, that as long as Bulgaria did not invade Greece the risk of a revolution would be greater than the gain. If the mobilized army split and started a civil war, would not this embolden Bulgaria and tempt her even more than the very suspect neutrality of Constantine? And had the Venizelists the right to assume that Constantine would carry his love of Ger-

many or fear of her prowess or faith in her military star far enough to refuse to fight even if Bulgaria invaded Macedonia? If Venizelos made a mistake, it was in refusing to believe in the infamy of his sovereign until the proofs were too clear to deny.

In May, 1916, the Skouloudis Government yielded to German pressure and shamelessly ordered the surrender of Fort Roupel, an important frontier post, to the Bulgarians without firing a shot. This raised a tremendous furore in Greece. In the Chamber, on June 6, Premier Skouloudis denied connivance, but the Entente Powers demanded his dismissal and the formation of a business government. Zaïmis again consented to become Premier on the promise that a plan was to be worked out for the intervention of Greece on the side of the Entente, should Bulgaria, who was threatening to drive the Allies out of Saloniki, invade Greek territory. But the Entente demands included also partial demobilization, control of the police, and new elections. Was an opportunity coming again to Venizelos to save his country without openly rebelling against the King?

The surrender of Fort Roupel had made him restive. That was a matter of honor. But he looked in another direction and saw a threat to Greece that few of his compatriots realized. The Italians had landed at Valona, and were extending their occupation into the interior through

Northern Epirus, compelling the Greek army to give up the precious territory for whose incorporation in Greece Venizelos had worked since he first became Premier. No part of Græcia Irredenta was dearer to him than Epirus. The Entente had allowed the Greeks to occupy this country in 1915. But now, after Fort Roupel, what was there to say to the Italian argument that the Greek army was no longer to be trusted with the possession of important strategic frontiers, whose fortresses might at any moment go the way of Roupel?

Venizelos planned to contest the elections. But the invasion of Macedonia by the Bulgarians destroyed the hope of a peaceful return to power through the ballot. There remained now the last-minute conversion of the King to a national policy — or revolution.

CHAPTER XI

VENIZELOS GOES TO SALONIKI

THE Bulgarian invasion of Macedonia violated a promise King Constantine had openly declared was made by Bulgaria and the Central Empires jointly when the former entered the war. It aroused the Greek people. On August 26, 1916, the Bulgarians occupied Drama and Seres, and took possession of the heights around Kavalla. Against the natural instincts of the Greek race, the General Staff ordered the army to withdraw, abandoning what had been won in the Balkan Wars. This was a serious blow to the prestige of King Constantine. Coupled with the shameful sequel of the invasion, — the surrender of Kavalla by Colonel Hadjopoulos and the internment of a considerable portion of the garrison in Germany, the seizure of Greek war material by the Bulgarians, the oppression of Greeks in occupied territory, — King Constantine would have been forced to join the Entente had elementary skill been used in handling the Greek people. But the French and British continued to make blunder after blunder, offending needlessly the susceptibilities of the Greeks. They saved King Constantine over and over again from the consequences of his pro-German policy by arousing the re-

sentment of the Greeks. The French and British played their cards badly. This made much more difficult than it needed to have been the task of Venizelos, and engendered internal strife in Greece, the evil effects of which have not been eradicated in the hour of victory.

On the day following the occupation of Drama and Seres and the investment of Kavalla came the news of the intervention of Rumania. This event precipitated the crisis that had long been brewing between Venizelists and Constantinists. It happened on the anniversary of the Revolution of 1909, which the Liberal Party had prepared to celebrate by a mass meeting in front of the house of Venizelos. Forty thousand gathered in the streets to listen to the speech Venizelos delivered, as was his custom, from a balcony. The great Cretan had prepared beforehand a resolution to be adopted by the meeting and to be presented to the King. This he read. It was carried by acclamation. It was the last public warning to King Constantine. Said Venizelos:

"You are the prey of advisers of a purely military outlook and of oligarchical ideas, who have persuaded you that Germany must be victorious, and who, trading upon your admiration of the Germans whose victory you believe in and have desired, hope by Germany's victory to be able to set aside the liberal Constitution of Greece and to concentrate in the Royal hands the power of absolutism. As a result of these warped ideas, instead of an extension

of the territory of Greece to Asia Minor, Thrace, and Cyprus, we see to-day Macedonia invaded by the Bulgarians, military supplies worth hundreds of thousands of drachmæ surrendered to the invaders, and northern Epirus in danger of being permanently lost.

"We, the people, by this demonstration declare that we disapprove the course recently followed, and insist upon the dismissal from the *entourage* of the King of his present sinister advisers. The interjection of the King's name into the electoral contest constitutes an internal revolution against the Liberal Party. The national unity has been destroyed by thrusting the Royal prestige into politics."

It was the common belief that the intervention of Rumania had taken away the last pretext of the pro-German General Staff to object to Greek intervention on military grounds. Venizelos bluntly told Premier Zaïmis that the resolution of the mass meeting was a definite warning, and that he could no longer remain a passive spectator to the dishonor of his country and to the betrayal of the interests of Greece. He authorized Zaïmis to inform the King that if the policy of neutrality was persisted in even under the new situation created by Rumanian intervention, Venizelos would not hesitate to divide the country by asking to follow him the provinces which were ready to make the sacrifices necessary to combat the pro-German policy of the King.

During the first few weeks of Rumania's belligerency, King Constantine played for time. He did offer to enter

the war on the side of the Entente upon conditions that were not unreasonable. But the final decision was always postponed. His hand was not forced by public opinion and the agitation of the Venizelists simply because the Entente Powers persisted in offending Greek pride. A squadron of warships appeared at the Piræus on September 1, and a series of intimidating measures began which reacted against the Venizelists. Then came the rapid and unexpected collapse of Rumania to help the King and the General Staff, belief in whose military sagacity had been shaken by the events of August.

Venizelos waited for a month before taking the irrevocable step of dividing Greece. But the King, while assuring every one that he intended to bring Greece into the war, did not make good his promises. Premier Zaïmis resigned, unwilling to assume the responsibility of the dilatory tactics of the King, and equally unwilling to stand for the underhand and lawless methods employed by the British and French Legations to force the King into the war.

One cannot defend Anglo-French intrigues at Athens, and it is an open question how much the Venizelists were mixed up in them and were employing questionable methods to coerce the King and the Cabinet. But it may have been a case of fighting fire with fire. At any rate, the King could have ended it all by asking Venizelos to head a War Cabinet. This would have been the proof of his sincerity

and of the assertion, so frequently made to exculpate him, that he had at heart the best interests of his country. Propaganda literature abounds concerning this period, and both sides bring out facts to the discredit of the other side. The impartial student, however, concludes that if the King was really a patriot, he was a mistaken one. He may have wanted to keep his country out of the war from patriotic motives. He believed that Germany was going to win. Venizelos believed the Entente was going to win. In the final analysis this was the issue.

Venizelos was not as eager to embark upon a revolutionary venture as in earlier days. He was not as young as he had been, and he had lost the mentality of a revolutionary. In the old days in Crete it was easy for the young lawyer to pack his gun and take to the mountains. Age and experience had not yet developed in him the habit of weighing the consequences. Venizelos later confessed that in 1916, when he debated with himself whether he should make good his threat to the King through Zaïmis of dividing Greece, he dwelt more than he had in earlier years upon the danger of revolutions degenerating into anarchy, and that he was not sure of the extent of the poisonous effect of the German propaganda in Greece.

The instinct of the former Premier of Greece was to remain within the law. A man who had been in the position of Venizelos since 1910 could not easily convince himself

that it was his duty to break down the prescribed condition of things in order to create a new condition, even if by that means he might succeed in saving his country from ruin. Was the situation retrievable? What Venizelos, for the sake of international comity, has never admitted, I am sure he felt, that the stupidity and the ignorance of conditions of Entente statesmen, and the antipathy of French and British officials to the Greeks, might nullify whatever effort he made, did he dispose himself to take the great risk of openly defying the King. Moreover, Venizelos did not trust Italy, and he could not be sure that Italian hostility would not prove his undoing.

But one day a leading shipowner of Athens, his intimate friend Embeirikos, reported to him a conversation with his barber. The barber had said: "Mr. Embeirikos, you know I am a tremendous Venizelist, but we plain men are saying that, besides the King, Venizelos has a great responsibility."

When Embeirikos asked where lay the responsibility of Venizelos, who was protesting and shouting and wearing himself out, the barber replied: "But Venizelos tells us that we are heading for disaster. Well, then, if we are heading for disaster, why should n't we prevent all this?"

"And why don't you look about you," said Embeirikos, "and prevent it?"

"How can we?" answered the barber. "As long as

Venizelos is alive and well, we can't do such a thing. Because every one thinks that when Venizelos, who sees things better than we do, sits quiet, it means that nothing can be done. But if it was n't for Venizelos, the rest of us, the people, might be tempted to try to see if we could save the country from disaster."

The opinion of a simple barber made Venizelos ashamed of his hesitation and started him to thinking. He decided that what the barber said was right, and that his desire to keep within the law might be due to purely selfish motives. Up to now he had succeeded in every task to which he had put his hand. Had success atrophied him? Was he so jealous of his laurels that fear to risk them led him now to betray the cause of Hellenism?

Venizelos went with his problem to Admiral Koundouriotis. He explained his doubts and the conflict of motives, and put the question of openly breaking with the King to the Admiral. What was his duty in the matter? Koundouriotis not only urged Venizelos to revolt, but said that he would share in the enterprise. As a member of the last two Cabinets, the Admiral spoke with authority and knowledge when he affirmed positively to Venizelos that Greece was being betrayed and that the guiding policy of the King was friendship for and assistance to Germany, regardless of the interests of his country.

On September 26, 1916, Venizelos and Koundouriotis

left Athens. The next day they landed in Crete and proclaimed a revolution. From Crete they went to Saloniki, where they set up a Provisional Government. Crete, the Ægean Islands, and Macedonia broke with Athens, and rallied to the revolution. It was New Greece against Old Greece. The regions freed from the Turks in the Balkan wars cast in their lot with the man who had been their liberator. Personal attachment to Venizelos was not the sole motive that prompted New Greece to follow him. The revolutionary movement was popular because it was directed against Bulgaria and Turkey, the recent oppressors, who were feared as certain to become the masters again should Germany be victorious. Did not the sole hope for the security of New Greece rest in the triumph of the Entente? To follow Venizelos was to obey the instinct of self-preservation.

Venizelos had no intention of entering upon a civil war. He counted upon the eventual overthrow of King Constantine and an awakening of national spirit in Old Greece that would lead to the fusion of the Saloniki and Athens Governments. His proclamation stated that the Provisional Government had no anti-dynastic tendency, and that he and all his followers were willing to support the Crown the moment King Constantine abandoned his unconstitutional anti-national policy. To prevent the possibility of a conflict between Greeks, Venizelos agreed to the

creation of a neutral zone, to be occupied by Allied troops, between New Greece and Old Greece.

The correspondent of the Associated Press at Athens, who had come under the spell of King Constantine, gives a curious picture of this period in a book which is an apology for the Royalist policy. Writes Mr. Paxton Hibben:

"The departure of Venizelos changed nothing in King Constantine's purpose to join the Allies; but it altered materially the attitude of the Allies toward Greece. They had never really wished to work with the King of the Hellenes, because Constantine I was devoted heart and soul to the interests of his own country, not to the interests of the Entente. Venizelos, on the other hand, was literally their man, wholly amenable to the desires of Great Britain and France." [1]

This judgment of Venizelos shows how ignorant Mr. Hibben is of the history of the man upon whom he passes judgment. If Venizelos in 1916 was influenced by the motives imputed to him by Mr. Hibben (who simply voices the accusations of the political enemies of Venizelos), he was acting in a manner that denied his whole past life. The judgment of history upon Venizelos and Constantine will take into account the background, the aspirations, the work for Greece of the two men before 1916 and since 1916. Mr. Hibben unfortunately attempts to interpret the revolutionary movement, as well as the war policy of Venizelos

[1] See *Constantine I and the Greek People*, by Paxton Hibben, p. 347.

in 1914 and 1915, without appreciating what Hellenism means. In common with many writers on Greece, he has mistaken for the Greek "fatherland" the little Kingdom of Greece, created by the Powers after the War of Independence, and has not understood that the spirit of Hellas and the conception of Hellas represented, from the very beginning of the birth of nationalism in Europe, something far different and far more comprehensive than the confines of the small kingdom within which only one fourth of the Greek race lived when Venizelos appeared on the scene at Athens.

According to Mr. Hibben's own dispatches to the Associated Press, Venizelos said to him on September 20, when asked if he planned to go to Saloniki and thus split Greece, that this depended upon whether the King heard the voice of the people. To the American correspondent the former Premier very frankly expressed his fear that the Serbians might after the war retain a part of Greek Macedonia. He suspected, too, the intention on the part of the Allies to retain Saloniki permanently. This was hardly the proper opinion for "the man of the Allies" to express for publication in newspapers! In fact, Venizelos counted little upon the aid of the Allies and trusted less their diplomatic *combinazione*. If he had said all that was on his mind to Mr. Hibben, he would have spoken of his great anxiety over the intrigues of the Italians in Albania, who

were planning to take advantage of the anomalous situation in Greece to install themselves in Northern Epirus.

During the winter at Saloniki Venizelos created an army of sixty thousand men, fully equipped, officered, and trained. In April the Provisional Government had three divisions on war footing, and was ready to join the Allies on the Macedonian front. The improvisation of this army is the greatest achievement of the career of Venizelos. He had nothing to start with, and received little financial support or moral encouragement from the Powers he was risking everything to aid. The Saloniki army was the result of his enthusiasm, of his faith in the high destiny of Greece, of his organizing ability, and above all of his drawing power as a master of men. The King of Greece had betrayed the cause of Hellenism. The Kingdom of Greece had for the moment proved an uncertain and even unworthy foundation upon which to build Greater Greece. As in the autumn of 1910, the hopes of Hellas rested in a single man. He was the foundation. He was the authority. He was the embodiment of the cause.

It was at the call of Venizelos and to put their lives in the hands of Venizelos that volunteers flocked to Saloniki and that the flower of the officers of the Greek army burned the bridges behind them and came to offer Venizelos their swords. It was for Venizelos that Greeks who lived outside the radius of the authority of King Constan-

tine's Government emptied their coffers to provide the Saloniki Government with funds. It was for Venizelos that the Greek shipowners, eluding both the German submarines and the unreasonable requisitions and hindrances of the Entente authorities, brought clothing and munitions and food to Saloniki.

The history of the World War affords no other example comparable to this of faith in one man. Venizelos was a rebel against constituted authority. He was neither properly recognized nor adequately supported by the Powers on whose side he was attempting to array the Greeks. And the victory of these Powers was by no means certain. They had failed to break through the German lines after four months of costly effort on the Somme, and were immobilized on every other front. In the Balkans especially the Entente star was growing dimmer and dimmer. Serbia was conquered and occupied. Shortly after Venizelos arrived at Saloniki the intervention of Rumania proved to be a calamity, and the Constantinists could point to the fate of the Balkan country that dared to ally itself with the enemies of invincible Germany. Right under the very eyes of the Greeks at Saloniki the military impotence of the Entente Powers had been demonstrated for more than a year. Misfortunes were accumulating for those of whose victory Venizelos was sure. In addition to this there was little love lost between the Greeks and the men of the Al-

lied armies. Venizelos had to appeal to his followers with the sole argument of confidence in his judgment and to hold them with the sole magnet of his personality.

While the volunteer army was growing Venizelos constantly visited the soldiers in their camps. Instead of passing the troops in review, with pomp and circumstance, he had a habit of asking the soldiers to form a circle around him, and his visit took the character of a family gathering. He had time to speak to the soldiers individually, asking about their homes and families, and if they had any complaints to make. The gathering ended in a speech, of course (they would not have been Greeks if there had been no speech), but it began with questions such as: "Where do you come from?" "Your father and mother are living?" "How many children have you?" "Do you like the shoes you are wearing?" "Is your food good?" "Have you warm clothing and blankets?"

In the midst of dark days and discouragement the Provisional Government gradually established a civilian administration in what was left of Macedonia and in the Islands, and built up the new army company by company, regiment by regiment, brigade by brigade, until the three divisions of Seres, Crete, and the Islands were ready for service at the end of March, 1917. When General Sarrail, generalissimo of the Entente armies in Macedonia, received an invitation from Venizelos to review the new

Greek army, the Frenchman, who felt he had every reason to distrust the Greeks, exclaimed, "It is a juggler's trick!"

Venizelos, who on his side had received scant encouragement from General Sarrail, answered that seeing the army from a reviewing stand was not all. He took General Sarrail on an inspection trip to the Greek camps. Everything was in perfect order, hospital corps, transportation corps, quartermaster corps. The Greeks were ready to go to the front with ambulance service, lines of communication, and an independent commissary functioning from the base.

Venizelos disclaimed any merit for himself in this stupendous undertaking other than having had faith in the justice of the Allied cause and in the final triumph of the Entente arms. In talking to me at the time and since of the months of miracles at Saloniki, he was modest about his organizing ability, about the magnetism of his personality, about the long nights at his desk that followed long days talking to people. He brushed all this aside with a wave of the hand. But he did boast of his optimism, and he told me that he knew from personal experience that faith could remove mountains.

The old adage of God helping those who help themselves was never absent from the mind of Venizelos. It had been the secret of his constructive thinking and acting in Crete and in Old Greece. It was no new thing for him to be disappointed over the apathy and lack of enthusiasm

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VENIZELOS REVIEWS HIS ARMY AT SALONIKI, APRIL, 1917

and blindness of vision of the statesmen of the Powers. That was an old story. Others might wait for support, or at least promises of it, before getting to work. Venizelos is like every other man who makes a success of life. In each task to which he put his hand, he was accustomed to go straight ahead until what he was actually accomplishing attracted the attention of those whose coöperation he needed.

There was not a ghost of a chance of success for his Saloniki venture unless he could raise by his own efforts an army of Greeks subject to his orders. Had he gone to Rome and Paris and London to convince Entente statesmen of the necessity of recognizing the Saloniki Government as the lawful government of Greece, he would have lost out with the Greeks as well as with the Allies. He was incapable of committing this error. Instead of lobbying and scolding and pleading, he busied himself with making the Provisional Government efficient and building up his army. When he was undisputed master of New Greece and an army of sixty thousand men, the Allies themselves decided that the time had come to expel Constantine.

From the rupture between Venizelos and Constantine to the abdication of the King, Old Greece passed through eight months of tragedy and humiliation. The King on one side, and the French and British on the other, kept

exchanging mutual assurances of good will and good faith. King Constantine declared that he was ready to intervene in the war. But he did not. The French and British Ministers at Athens declared their friendliness for the Greeks, and their desire to work out a *modus vivendi* by which Greece would be able to pass from neutrality to belligerency. But their distrust of King Constantine and his advisers was so strong that they were led from one measure to another, from one ultimatum to another, until it was realized that only by the abdication of the King and the return of Venizelos to Athens could the situation be cleared up.

General Sarrail, unnerved by the Bulgarian offensive of the summer of 1916, which he believed was with the connivance of Athens, impressed upon Paris and London that the offensive he was planning for the spring of 1917 risked failure through the possibility of the Royalist Greek army falling upon his rear. He charged the Athens Government with being party to a widespread system of espionage and aid to submarines. There is no doubt that he was sincere in his belief that every move in his camp was reported to Athens and thence immediately communicated to the Germans. As the submarine menace was very serious, the collapse of Rumania a heavy and unexpected blow to Entente hopes, and the attitude of Russia uncertain before as well as after the Petrograd revolution, it can readily

be imagined how upset the French and British Governments were over the alarming reports that came from Athens and Saloniki. For reasons that have never been fully explained, but which were probably due to considerations affecting Italy and Russia, Great Britain and France could not make up their minds to take sides openly with Venizelos and put an end to the intolerable situation at Athens. They contented themselves with half-measures. In every step they went too far because they did not go far enough.

It is impossible to go into the long and involved story of the successive Allied ultimatums and encroachments upon the sovereignty and neutrality of Greece. The texts of the ultimatums, the answers of the Athens Government, the incidents provoked by the acts of the Allies, would make a book in themselves. Shortly after the Provisional Government was established at Saloniki, the Allies demanded of the Athens Government the surrender of a quantity of munitions, the use of certain railways, the expulsion of pro-German agents, and limitations of the movements of the Greek army in Old Greece. When the Athens Government refused these, Admiral Dartige du Fournet, who had already offended Greek pride by seizing the Greek navy, foolishly attempted to enforce the Allied demands by landing a force of three thousand men and marching on Athens.

The Royalists resisted. Several hundred Allied marines were shot down in the streets of Athens, and the French Admiral had to withdraw. The Allied forces would have been annihilated had not King Constantine, under the threat of a bombardment by the Allied fleet, ordered them to be escorted back to the port. This outbreak, for which the Admiral was fully as responsible as the King, was accompanied by the assassination of partisans of Venizelos and followed by the wholesale persecution and imprisonment of Venizelists in Old Greece. The French especially were inflamed by what they called the massacre of their troops, and these events of December 1 and 2, 1916, led to a blockade of Greece and to another ultimatum, demanding the withdrawal of all Greek troops from Thessaly. King Constantine was informed that his army must be demobilized or retire to the Peloponnesus, where it would be virtually under surveillance.

On December 31, 1916, Great Britain and France, with the consent of Russia, addressed a note to the Greek Government demanding the immediate liberation of Venizelists arrested, the indemnification of victims who, after inquiry, were recognized as having suffered damage unjustly as a result of the events of December 1 and 2, and full reparation for the massacres. The Greek Government accepted. A commission was formed with full power to determine its own procedure and to summon witnesses,

and it was agreed that the decisions of the commission would be accepted without appeal as binding upon the Greek Government. As with other promises, King Constantine never fulfilled this one. The commission was named by the French and British, but was unable to start its hearing. Not until the deposition of King Constantine and the return of Venizelos to Athens was the commission in a position to begin its sittings. It had jurisdiction over claims of Greeks as well as foreigners. But reparation due foreign officials and the military and naval forces so roughly handled at Athens on December 1 and 2 was not included. Their claims were to be presented through diplomatic channels.[1]

[1] The report of the Mixed Commission of Indemnities, presented to Minister of Foreign Affairs Politis on December 27, 1918, was published by the Greek Government. It states that from September, 1917, to December, 1918, the Commission held 437 meetings and made 6018 decisions. Thousands of exaggerated and unscrupulous claims, which would have entailed the payment of over 100,000,000 drachmæ, were thrown out. All statements were checked by inquiries made on the spot by experts. The total indemnities amounted to nearly 7,000,000 drachmæ. Of the claims allowed, 35 were for murders; 922 for imprisonments; 418 for severe ill treatment; 503 for pillage; 66 for damage to real estate; 31 for suspensions of newspapers, mostly followed by the destruction of printing-presses; and 900 for expulsions or flights caused by the menaces of reservists.

The report gives details of shocking outrages, and shows "the deplorable internal condition to which the German influence had brought Greece . . . neither the property nor the liberty, nor even the lives of the citizens were respected." In some places the reservist committees acted like Soviets. Greece would have been ruined and broken up "had not the Greek people, more fortunate than the Empire of the Czars, found a saviour in the person of Venizelos. The Government established by him at Saloniki represented not only the national aspirations of Greece, but also

After the events of December 1 and 2 the character of the revolution changed. The assassination and imprisonment of the leaders of the Liberal Party and many of the rank and file of Venizelists, who had not gone to Saloniki, made Venizelos and his friends feel that King Constantine had become simply a party leader. Up to this time they had been prepared to tolerate the continuation of the King upon the throne and to postpone the settlement of internal questions in Greece until after the war. When he was fully informed of the misfortunes of his followers in Old Greece, Venizelos privately notified the Allied Governments that "every bond between us and King Constantine has been severed, and it is impossible for us any longer to recognize him as King of the Hellenes, now that he has fallen from the leadership of the State to the leadership of a party, and has joined the other authorities in rising in disorder to crush and annihilate the opposing party."

Venizelos now found the hierarchy arrayed against him once more at a critical moment of his career. We remember that the Archbishop of Crete, siding with Prince George against the aspirations of the Cretan people, had excommunicated Venizelos. This mediæval folly weakened the Archbishop's prestige. In modern times, when ignorance and superstition have largely disappeared, an ecclesiastical

the truly constitutional régime and the principles of order and justice upon which all civilized society reposes."

organization has no authority and influence unless its decrees and acts are in accordance with what public opinion believes to be right.

The Holy Synod of Greece formally appealed to the ecclesiastical authorities in Allied countries against the encouragement given by the Allies to "a small political group which takes advantage of a foreign military occupation to terrorize the State, and which, not hesitating before recruitment by force, has imprisoned and expelled priests and prelates who have remained faithful to their duty." If a list of the molested priests and prelates had been appended, it would have revealed that there were more prelates than priests. The high dignitaries of the Orthodox Church, dependent upon the Court for advancement and already enjoying a favored position, were hostile to the revolution. The considerations that aroused Venizelos to action after he had heard the barber's criticism of his course did not arise in the minds of bishops and archbishops. The Metropolitan of Crete, the Archbishops of Agathangelos, Drama, and Cosani, and the Bishops of Grevena, Photios, Syra, and Paronaxia tried to restrain the people from joining Venizelos. Naturally they were arrested and put out of harm's way. There was no other course open to Venizelos. But if, as the Holy Synod charged, Venizelos was leader of "a small political group" and was attempting to "terrorize the State" and did not

hesitate "before recruitment by force," how can we explain the flocking of volunteers to Saloniki and the growth of the wonderful army that made the Allies realize that Venizelos really could once more regenerate his country?

Deputy Agamemnon Schlieman, former Greek Minister to the United States, who, like his colleague Streit, had the sympathies of his origin, told an American correspondent: "The choice is between Greece as Greece, with our sovereign, our flag, and the Greek national spirit, or merely individual Greeks, representing no really national purpose, fighting under Venizelos at so much a day." [1]

Schlieman has a distorted idea of what constitutes "Greek national spirit." The clergy probably felt as Schlieman did, although they had not the excuse of being, like Constantine and Schlieman, Greeks of very recent vintage. They had confused the interests of the Crown with the interests of Greece. Devotion to Greece meant to them devotion to a sovereign. As they had no visions of Hellas, it was natural that men like Schlieman should think of Venizelos as "representing no really national purpose."

When we consider what happened to Greece between 1911 and 1916 and what has happened to Greece since 1917, it is pathetic to think of the venerable Archbishop of Athens mounting a cairn of stones in the center of a vast

[1] See Hibben, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

multitude, and pronouncing the anathema of the Church of Greece upon "the traitor, Venizelos," and all his followers. On that Christmas Day of 1916 it was reported that sixty thousand Athenians came to the excommunication ceremony, each bringing a stone to cast according to the ancient custom. They were the ignorant and the unthinking. When Venizelos returned six months later they went out to throw flowers in his path. Were they different from the masses in any country? The blockade had caused them to throw the stones. The thought that Venizelos was bringing food prompted them to strew the flowers.

Off in Saloniki Venizelos took his Christmas communion at the hands of the priests who paid no attention to the anathema. Most priests did not. They lived too near the people, and in Macedonia they knew that God could not really be angry with the man who had liberated them from the yoke of the infidel and through whose efforts and by reason of whose faith the church in which the mass was celebrated had been repurified after Mohammedan desecration.

Venizelos did not worry about the fulminations of the hierarchy and the seeming disapproval of his old Athenian admirers. For it would be in the future as it had been in the past — *per aspera ad astra.* Few might stay with him in the rough places, but when he reached the stars again, all the world would be his friend.

When the persecutions of the Venizelists in Old Greece had become unbearable, Venizelos felt that he was in honor bound to go to their assistance. Admiral Koundouriotes and Politis (who had left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Athens to join the Saloniki Government in October, on the eve of the persecutions) agreed with Venizelos that it would not be precipitating civil war, but fulfilling a moral obligation, to intervene against the martyrdom of persecution of the Liberal Party in Old Greece. The Provisional Government had another motive in desiring to put an end as soon as possible to the lack of national unity. Part of Macedonia was occupied by the Bulgarians. The inhabitants of the Islands were not all available for military service, as many were indispensable for the navy and merchant marine. The Saloniki army could grow to proportions important enough to make Greece a vital factor in the approaching Macedonian offensive only if Old Greece could be wrested from the authority of the King and opened up as a field of recruitment. Had not the time come to make a test of arms with King Constantine?

Venizelos therefore asked the Powers to suspend, if possible, the neutral zone and to allow the Provisional Government to come to a trial of strength with the State organization in Old Greece, so as to bring the division of the country to an end and to restore the national unity

in time to enable Greece to be a military factor in the victory of the Entente Powers. As an alternative Venizelos demanded the right to occupy Thessaly in order not to leave the crops of Thessaly to the Athens Government.

The Powers refused both requests. They moved themselves, however, into Thessaly, and they began to realize that they could not leave Venizelos indefinitely in an anomalous position at Saloniki. What he had been able to accomplish with the volunteers opened to them the tempting prospective of a Greek army four or five times as large and imbued with the same splendid fighting spirit, if only Venizelos had a free hand.

In June France and Great Britain decided to invoke their obligation as "protecting Powers," who had promised to guarantee a constitutional form of government for Greece at the time the Kingdom was created, to demand the abdication of King Constantine. Jonnart, formerly Governor-General of Algeria, was sent to Greece with full powers. On June 11 Jonnart, acting in the name of France and Great Britain, notified King Constantine that his persistent violations of the Greek Constitution made it necessary for the protecting Powers to demand his immediate abdication and departure from Greece and the designation of a successor to the throne. It was intimated that the Crown Prince was unacceptable to the protecting Powers. To back up the demand French troops were landed at

Corinth. Constantine yielded to force. He abdicated in favor of his second son Alexander. On the following day, with his wife and eldest son, Constantine left Greece on a French steamer, *en route* to visit his brother-in-law.

CHAPTER XII

GREECE IN THE WORLD WAR

THE struggle between Venizelos and King Constantine, the decision to become once more a revolutionary, the excommunication by the Archbishop of Athens seconded by the Alcibiadean anathema of the Athenians, the forced abdication of the King, the return of Venizelos to Athens after weary months of building up an army at Saloniki, his success in healing dissension and reëstablishing economic prosperity in a country suffering from the blockade and the crippling of its shipping — all while the outcome of the war was uncertain — is one of the most fascinating chapters of the World War. What Venizelos accomplished may not have been a decisive factor in the war, but it has enabled Venizelos to become the final authority in shaping the peace terms of the Near East. It was the experience in Crete over again, on a larger scale, with a grander setting. And Venizelos was the same man, playing for the same stake.

Venizelos was not consulted in regard to the abdication of Constantine. The move was made wholly upon the responsibility of the British and French Governments. But High Commissioner Jonnart knew that Venizelos believed

that this step was the only possible means of saving Greece from civil war of a nature that might jeopardize the hopes of an Allied offensive from Saloniki. There seemed no other way out of the dilemma. The forced abdication was the lesser of two evils. Venizelos could not enter into any agreement beforehand with Jonnart. This would have involved him in difficulties later with an important element in Greece that sympathized with him and at the same time was loath to accept the necessity of the armed intervention of the Entente Powers. It would have been dangerous for Venizelos to lay himself open to the accusation of being returned to power by Allied bayonets. Many Venizelists resented the blockade. The Greeks are a proud people. Belief in the wisdom of the policy of Venizelos did not destroy their fanatical devotion to their sovereign and their memory of his leadership in the wars against Turkey and Bulgaria.

It had been intimated to Jonnart that the success of his drastic move and the coöperation of Venizelos depended upon the willingness of Constantine's second son, Alexander, to succeed to the throne. Constantine might have embarrassed Jonnart and made delicate and difficult the return of Venizelos had he refused to allow Alexander to succeed him. There is no doubt but that the son would have followed the father into exile.

Constantine, however, agreed to leave Alexander on

the throne. Perhaps he felt that this was the only way to keep a hold on Greece, and that the future would be less compromised for himself and his dynasty by abdicating in favor of Alexander and yielding gracefully to *force majeure* than by playing what might have proved a trump card. But in justice to the deposed monarch it may also be advanced that Constantine put the interest of his country above his personal ambition. The Allies were in control of the situation. Nothing good could be hoped for Greece by resistance to their will. By withdrawing as he did, he helped Venizelos and the Allies. But at the same time he would be able afterwards to claim that he had sacrificed himself in order to give his people food and in order to prevent the country from falling into chaos.

Because he realized how precious an advantage at this critical moment was the maintenance of the dynasty, Jonnart tolerated the proclamation of the new King, who spoke with affection of his father and whose statement that he was obeying his father's injunction was scarcely more than a veiled insult to the Allies and their triumphant High Commissioner.

Premier Zaïmis remained in office after the abdication of Constantine at the request of King Alexander, who wrote to Zaïmis that he was "the faithful guardian of the Constitution," and made it clear that he was willing to comply with all the demands of the Entente. Venizelos

immediately declared that he had no quarrel with the new Government, and that the Provisional Government at Saloniki went out of existence automatically. He assumed that the change of sovereign indicated the intention of returning to an observance of the Constitution. Since the Provisional Government had been created simply as a protest against the violation of the Constitution, it had no longer a *raison d'être*. Venizelos returned to Athens on June 21 and entered into negotiations with Zaïmis.

Jonnart insisted upon the convocation of the Chamber elected on May 31, 1915, in which Venizelos had a majority. He based his demand upon the grounds invoked for the abdication of Constantine. The Powers that stood as guarantors of Greece were bound to see that the Constitution was observed. Since the dissolution of the May Chamber had been illegal, its legislative functions and mandates still held good. Zaïmis refused to accept this interpretation, and resigned.

On June 27 King Alexander asked Venizelos to form a Cabinet. He accepted the premiership, reserved to himself the portfolio of war, and appointed his tried friend Politis Minister of Foreign Affairs. Two days later Greece formally entered the war. The King signed a decree convoking the Venizelist Chamber of 1915. In token of their confidence in the new Government, the Allies gradually withdrew their administrative control of Government

services, retaining only the censorship of the telegraph and cable in coöperation with the Greek Government.

Venizelos was asked to make only one promise, to bring to justice those responsible for the December, 1916, assault upon the Allies, and to indemnify the Allied victims, the Greek Government acting in conjunction with an Allied commission. This was as much a measure of protection for Venizelos as a satisfaction to the French. Venizelos knew that his success depended upon getting the upper hand of his enemies, whose number and organization he did not underestimate. But he wanted to do it without incurring the charge of seeking personal vengeance. The work of the commission, the direction of which he was assured would be in his hands, was a splendid cover.

By returning to Athens Venizelos risked assassination. Even if he were able to guard against that, he had the implacable hostility of the Royalists to contend with. But his position at Saloniki was no longer tenable. He thought that it was better to be in the midst of things and win back the people by personal contact than to allow the Royalists to form new plots and to keep the minds of the people unsettled. It was too much to hope, also, that the Entente, at this late date, would cease their military and political blunders. He could protect himself from his friends only by appearing in Athens without delay, accepting the premiership at the risk of seeming to be backed

by foreigners, and using his personal influence with the French and British and with the Chamber. He felt that there was no time to be lost in mounting guard over Alexander, who was not to be trusted.

On the face of things a new general election seemed preferable to reconvoking the old Venizelist Chamber, which might be construed as a confession of weakness and lack of popular support. But Venizelos had no illusions concerning the mischief-making power of his enemies. Even if the Constantinists were cowed and did not contest the election, he knew the Greek people well enough to realize that the swing of the pendulum would raise the dynastic question. This Venizelos wanted to avoid at all costs.

During the month of July Venizelos worked tirelessly to repair the misfortunes of the past two years. His first objectives were to gain administrative control of all of Greece, merging the Saloniki administration into that of Athens without provoking armed resistance, and to amalgamate and harmonize his Saloniki volunteers with the regular army. Alternately, he had to act as intimidator and conciliator, applying unhesitatingly to each region and individual the policy that he thought would work out best. A miracle was performed in four weeks simply because Venizelos knew when to threaten and when to cajole.

But on the whole his experience was that of Napoleon upon his return from Elba. It is curious to read the ac-

counts of British correspondents of the reception accorded the Saloniki troops in Thessaly and of the *volteface* of the Athenian population. They expressed contempt for a people so mercurial and lauded Venizelos as a wizard. The Premier had to remonstrate with them, and point out that their eulogies of him were left-handed compliments. He resented them deeply. Not only did the ill-disguised contempt of the correspondents toward the Greeks show how little they understood the inwardness of the conflict from 1915 to 1917, but the success of Venizelos was being compromised by the lack of tact of his foreign friends. Venizelos is an intense and ardent admirer of his own race, and when the time comes when he can open his mouth and speak out what he thinks of Entente diplomacy, many of his judgments will be found to be not far different from those of Constantine.

Venizelos justified the constitutionality of his position, and at the same time anticipated conspiracies against him, by assuming that everything that had happened at Athens since the beginning of 1916 was illegal. He "purified" the courts, and then haled before them Premiers and Cabinet Ministers, and those of the Constantinists, big and small fry alike, for whom he thought the method of intimidation was the best treatment. This process was applied to the army and navy as well as to the civil administration. It was high-handed, and in many cases unjust. But no dic-

tator ever wore kid gloves, and in time of war governments are compelled to invoke the principle of *salus populi suprema lex*. The difference between stupidity and genius in depotism is in the ability to comprehend the philosophy of form and in knowing how far to go in the use of force.

Venizelos had Greece well in hand, and had won back his popularity with the people, when he allowed his old Chamber to reassemble in August. He was ready then to do what would have been dangerous a month before, to present his Cabinet to the Chamber, make the traditional Greek *apologia pro sua vita*, and ask for a vote of confidence. He chose his ground, the contention that the policy of Constantine had not avoided for Greece the sufferings of war, but on the other hand had led Greece into greater sacrifices than if the Venizelist policy of 1915 had been followed, with humiliation and dishonor to boot.

Venizelos spoke for eight hours on August 26, 1917, answering every interruption during his speech. He reviewed the history of Greece from the time of his arrival in 1910 to the abdication of King Constantine under sixty-three separate heads, explaining and defending his foreign policy and reading into the record confidential correspondence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When he finished at two o'clock in the morning, a number of prominent deputies, who had been identified with the Opposition, and an Independent and a Socialist, made short declara-

tions, signifying their intention, after hearing the Premier's speech, of supporting the Government. The motion of confidence was put. Not a single deputy registered his vote against it.

Even a summary of the speech would be impossible in the limits of this book. I have used the information it gives in earlier chapters. But it is important to quote Venizelos briefly to indicate the potency of his appeal through his skillful use of the failure of Germany and Bulgaria to live up to the promises made to Constantine:

"The followers of the German policy in Greece sought to persuade the people that their disagreement with the policy of the Liberal Party consisted in this: the Liberals tried to apply a radical policy and to realize the national aspiration, but such a policy involved dangers. They, on the other hand, claimed that they were seeking to apply a conservative policy, by which, for the time being, the realization of the national aspirations was abandoned, but what was in our possession was safe and war was avoided.

"This is not true. By their policy nothing was conserved. We neither saved what we possessed in Eastern Macedonia and Northern Epirus, nor did we maintain the balance of power in the Balkans, which was overthrown at our expense by our hereditary rival. Nor did we avoid the horrors of war.

"The adherents of the former King's policy knew that by allowing the French troops to land in Saloniki and not at the same time hastening to the aid of the Serbians, they would bring the theater of war within our Macedonian territory. They did not even try to prevent such a calamity,

because it would do harm to the German interests. If our policy had been followed, enemies would never have invaded our territory, even if we had not beaten the Bulgarians; and we should now possess Eastern Macedonia, Northern Epirus, and Cyprus, which the British offered us. But even if we supposed that the Central Empires would win — an impossibility — Greece would come to the Peace Conference with her national soil intact, even enlarged by Cyprus, and assisted by five or six Great Powers.

"The policy of our opponents cannot claim the right to be called conservative, because it was simply a policy of abandoning and betraying every political interest and every national ideal.

"It might have been called a conservative policy if, for all its betrayal of alliance with Serbia, it had taken care, while observing a very benevolent neutrality toward Serbia, to secure the inviolability of the national territory, checking of the undue expansion of Bulgaria, preservation of Hellenism in Asia Minor, Thrace, and Macedonia, immunity of our mercantile fleet, and guarantee of our integrity for a period of ten years after the war. And nobody, gentlemen, can maintain that all this was not attainable, for Greece at the beginning had a general mobilization on her hands, which might at least have been made use of for attaining it. For my part, even if such a policy as this had been pursued, I should have been one of its most bitter opponents, because I should have been stirred by the idea that Greece had dishonored herself by disowning her obligations, and because it would have created for Greece a position of subservience in every way to Bulgaria. But I should, at all events, have recognized that it was a conservative policy I had to deal with.

"But this so-called conservative policy, what did it conserve, and what did it not betray? The ten months' mobilization, the Bulgarian invasion of Eastern Macedonia, the laying waste of Greek Macedonia, the imprisonment of an army corps — are all these not equivalent to an unsuccessful war? The annihilation of Hellenism in Asia Minor, in Thrace, and Eastern Macedonia, are they not equivalent in themselves to another unsuccessful war? The suppression of every noble sentiment, the instilling of fear and cowardice, the insinuation of the idea that not only any further expansion of the realm was dangerous and unnecessary, but that even the expansion that had resulted from the Balkan Wars was injurious, and that the loss of it might be viewed without concern — are not all these again equivalent to another unsuccessful war? Was it then a conservative and peaceful policy that was pursued by the 'Saviours,' when they brought upon us the disasters of three unsuccessful wars, and left a final war still hanging over us, the war to be waged against a Greater Bulgaria, the war in which Greece was to have been crushed once for all?"

Having stated the failure of his opponents in this striking way, Venizelos asked, "Can our policy — the Liberal policy — still be applied under the conditions in which it was originally conceived?" His answer was the peroration of the greatest speech of his career. After charging that the Greece of 1917 did not even "distantly resemble" the Greece of 1915, and that the men who pursued a German policy "can boast of the truly alarming success that has attended their efforts," he cried:

"I see our ally Serbia overthrown, even though her overthrow was only temporary, and will be followed, as I feel assured, by the restoration of her full national unity. I see Bulgaria overwhelmingly aggrandized, and ready to fall upon us to-morrow to crush and subjugate us. I see the régime of internal corruption risen from the dead with a fresh impetus and a fresh vigor. I see the economic wreck. I see the Royal army almost in a state of dissolution.

"Nevertheless, with all these disadvantageous conditions, my optimism does not desert me. A nation which for no less than three thousand years has passed through great trials without disappearing, a nation which only yesterday recorded the victories of 1912 and 1913, a nation which, although betrayed by its rulers, succeeded in finding within itself sufficient moral strength to create a new state, to raise a new army, and write, as I have often said, some of the brightest pages of our military history, I am unshakably convinced that such a nation still conceals within itself enough vitality, even in this last moment, to achieve its own salvation.

"Gentlemen, the nation is aware that I have never promised it anything which was not attainable. The nation knows that I have never fallen short in the promises I have made.

"In taking part in this World War, we shall not only regain the national territories we have lost, we shall not only reëstablish our honor as a nation, we shall not only effectively defend our national interests at the Peace Conference and secure our national future, but we shall also be a worthy member of the family of free nations which that Conference will organize, and we shall hand down to our children such a Greece as generations past have

dreamed of, whom we must show ourselves not unworthy to succeed, such a Greece as we ourselves foreshadowed in our recent victories of 1912 and 1913."

Venizelos found and took advantage of his enemies' most vulnerable point to drive home the attack against them and to justify his own drastic step of breaking with and defying the Constantinist Government. The Ministers of Germany and Bulgaria at Athens had promised Premier Skouloudis that "the individual liberty, property rights, and established religious conditions will be respected"; and that "the German and Bulgarian troops will act in a manner absolutely friendly toward the population of the country." This letter was written on May 22, 1916. Four days later the Central Empires and Bulgaria invaded Greek territory. There were massacres, pillage, requisitions, usurpation of authority, interference with churches and schools, confiscation of public revenues, persecutions, deportations. The martyrdom of Greek Macedonia was at its height when Venizelos spoke. It had been the hardest adverse factor Constantine had had to contend with in appealing for popular support of his policy. It worked now in favor of Venizelos. He was shrewd enough to see how strong a card it was. The Greeks hated the Bulgarians and were bitter over the persecutions. The aggrandizement of Bulgaria had long caused them to doubt the wisdom of Constantine and his advisers.

The other appeal in the peroration of Venizelos was equally forceful. When had he led them on with false promises? When had he failed to keep the promises he made? No man could say him nay. The record of five years, from 1911 to 1915, was written into the history of Greece. What a contrast with the record of 1915 to 1917!

On two other points Venizelos felt that defense of his policy was wise. In explaining why he did not advise King Alexander to order a new election, he said:

"I wish nobody to think, even for a minute, that if I lacked the deep conviction of our power, due to a mandate from the Greek people, I could find myself in Athens through the aid of foreigners, however great protectors and guarantors they might be. The revolution has triumphed and our rivals are forced to recognize us. They accept us as a Cabinet, they tolerate us, if you please, but they tell us, 'Why don't you govern without any Chamber?' And they wonder why, since the Government of the scum of politics has been getting along without a Chamber, we do not govern similarly. I should refuse to govern a country without the support of the representatives of the people.

"Then they say, 'Why have you called the Chamber of May 31?' None denies the danger, if not the impossibility, of holding a new election now. This being the case, the convocation of the Chamber of May 31 was logical. The Liberal Party has never, not even for one moment, recognized the legality of the royal *coup d'état* dissolving that party. We did not participate in the elections of December 6, and later, thinking the participation in the second

elections forced upon us, we declared clearly to our electors that we did not intend by participating to assume the obligation to sit in a Chamber whose legality we did not recognize. The King, putting aside the people's suzerainty, meant to concentrate in himself all the power in order to become a King by the grace of God.

"Even had I considered immediate elections possible, I should have insisted on not accepting the premiership unless I were permitted to call into existence, at least for a short time, the unlawfully dissolved Chamber of May 31, that we might have a political precedent in the history of Greece as a lesson for the future.

"Those of you who have visited Westminster Palace, where the British Parliament meets, will recall that at the main entrance there is a tablet with words something like these — I do not remember them exactly: 'Here Charles the King of England was beheaded because he conspired to usurp the liberties of the English people.' Whenever the King goes to Westminster Palace to open and close sessions of Parliament, he passes by that tablet. It has remained there for two and a half centuries, because people worthy of liberty, as are the English people, do not mean to forget the lessons of their history, but to use them for future generations. I propose to make a motion in the National Assembly about to be called, that a similar tablet should be put in an appropriate place, so that when the Greek King comes to open the Chamber, he may see words like these: 'King Constantine, having violated the Constitution by dissolving for the second time the Chamber of 1915, in order to impose upon Greece his personal policy, lost his throne. The dissolved Chamber, called together again in 1917, continued its constitutional work.'"

Venizelos left to his Minister of the Interior, Repoulis, the care of explaining the attitude of the Cabinet toward punishments, as this would fall within the sphere of Repoulis. The new Minister of the Interior declared, replying to an interpellation:

"The policy of crime and the violation of the Constitution for over two years cannot pass without consequences. I do not know how great an effort is required of the present Government in order that it may undo all the harm that has come since 1915, and in order that it may serve the interests of Greece in the largest sphere possible. For the sake of the successful prosecution of the war into which we have now officially entered, it has been recommended that we should seek for harmony and refrain from persecution. Of persecution there will be none. The Liberals have brought an olive branch from Saloniki as against the bayonets of terrorization held by their rivals here. But those who recommend harmony cannot afford to recommend indulgence and pardon for the great criminals among the guilty ones. Yes, harmony among all, because that is what the interest of Greece demands. Yes, forgiveness to the unfortunate, to those who were blinded and dragged astray behind the chariot of despotism, because that is what justice and humanity demand. But we cannot leave our work unguarded against vipers, against new conspiracies and dangers. Such an attitude on the part of the Government and the Liberal Party would be a criminal jeopardizing of the future of Greece."

In the autumn, as soon as he felt that he could safely leave the country, Venizelos visited the Entente capitals,

where he received an almost royal reception. He was lionized in London. King George dined him at Buckingham Palace, the Lord Mayor received him at the Mansion House, and a banquet was given in his honor by the British Parliament. Mr. Balfour, Earl Curzon, and Winston Churchill spoke at the Mansion House reception. Lord Curzon, betrayed into an unusual warmth of language, said: "The feelings excited by Tricoupis, the deeds that he wrought, the emergencies with which he was faced, were as nothing compared with those which have been encountered and triumphantly overcome by our guest of this afternoon." In his reply Venizelos made the interesting assertion that the right moment for the intervention of Greece was the Dardanelles expedition. This would have won the war and "peace might have been secured in the course of the year 1916." If this be true, as it well may be, the struggle between King Constantine and Venizelos will appear as an event of fatal import in history. For already we realize that the prolongation of the war after 1916 was as disastrous to the final victors as to the vanquished.

On this triumphal tour, undertaken for business, the Greek Premier did not allow himself to be dazzled or frustrated by the honors done him. He had serious work to accomplish. He was trusted, but his country was not. The Entente had become accustomed to consider Greece as an object of suspicion and a football. The blockade was

not completely relaxed, and Greece as an ally suffered little less than Greece as a neutral from high-handed interference with her shipping and commerce. The war was still in a critical period.

Statesmen high in the councils of the Entente had neither faith nor interest in the Balkan end of the military operations. Notable among these was Clemenceau, a bitter opponent of the Saloniki expedition from the first, who had just succeeded Painlevé as Premier of France.

There is an old saying that a man who throws bouquets at himself misses the mark. He misses the mark, also, if he allows the throwing of bouquets by others to become a habit. Venizelos had to conceal his impatience, his hot blood, sometimes his disgust, behind a smiling exterior. He had to appear leisurely when he was in a hurry. He knew he could not storm at the hostile and the stupid in Rome and Paris and London as he did in Athens. He had learned in his dealings with the Powers in Crete that the sole motive of European diplomacy was self-interest, and that the Entente Powers were interested in his country only so far as the aid of Greece might help them against Germany and might further their interests after the war in the Near East. The enthusiasm and admiration of Entente statesmen for him personally was genuine enough. Had he not been a loyal friend from the beginning and was he not at last delivering the goods? But as Premier

of Greece he was a potential adversary with whom to measure swords. The solidarity of comradeship-in-arms never enters into diplomatic relations. Each for himself, and the devil take the hindmost. Venizelos had no intention of being the hindmost, and he received the compliments of his colleagues as a woman does those of other women.

Whatever they said in the press and at public receptions and dinners, Entente statesmen did not immediately adjust themselves to the fact that the revolutionary leader of Saloniki had become the head of an Allied State. For a long time a rebel against constituted if not constitutional authority and backed by only part of his nation, Venizelos had been dependent upon the French and British for the success of his perilous undertaking. Now he could speak as an equal to equals. Since August, 1917, Venizelos has been a thorn in the flesh to Entente diplomacy: for he has acted as the statesmen of the Great Powers have acted. He has insisted upon a full recognition of the rights and interests and aspirations of Greece, not abating his pressure a whit when what Greece needed and wanted seemed to interfere with particular interests and ambitions of the Entente Powers. A feeling of dismay and anxiety, which has never been allayed, arose in Entente diplomatic circles when it was realized that Venizelos could not be patted on the back and hushed up or diverted by being

told what a wonderful man he was. For he spoke as Greece about Greece, and not as Venizelos about Venizelos.

The imminence of a new German threat against Paris unnerved the French and British, and caused a more general acceptance in military and political circles than at any previous time of the dictum that "the war must be won on the western front." But Greece, through Venizelos, urged that the Macedonian front was never more important. Far from acquiescing in diminishing the Allied effectives at Saloniki or simply in keeping the armies up to their actual numerical strength, Venizelos pressed for reinforcements, for munitions and equipment for the newly forming Greek divisions, and preparation for a great offensive against Bulgaria. He had to contend with the aftermath of the Caporetto disaster, with the formidable German offensive of the spring of 1918, and with British preoccupation in Palestine. But he kept on opposing to the western front theory the theory that "the war began in the Balkans and will end in the Balkans."

He added the voice of Greece to the voices of Italy and France in the clamor for English coal. He entered the scramble for ships. Greece had suffered horribly from the blockade, and must now be fed. He reinforced his plea on this point by the two potent arguments that food for Greece was essential to sustain the prestige of his Government against Constantinists and pro-Germans, and that

the Allies could not put Greece off through the plea of losses from submarines. The ships of Greek registry existed in sufficient number, not only to supply the vital necessities of Greece, but also to contribute to the success of the Saloniki campaign, which was the one that interested Greece most. Let the British Admiralty apply to Greece the same elementary principle applied to Great Britain, the use of ships of home registry to look after the home folks first.

During the fourth year of the conflict, which was Greece's first year as an ally, the World War became a struggle for existence. And yet, it is remarkable that Allied statesmen, by a combination of habit and optimism, never lost sight of the spoils after the war. In the darkest days, when they knew not what the morrow would bring, they kept maneuvering for position, so as to be ready to advance particular interests to the detriment of friend and foe alike when arms should be laid down. It was a weird and complicated situation which cannot be accurately described and commented upon until we have more perspective. But it is not conjecture to assert that the situation did exist, and that Venizelos realized to the full that the *post-bellum* diplomatic battle would be fought most bitterly over the disposition of regions in which Greece was vitally interested, the eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire. Venizelos could do much person-

ally. But Greece must be strong when the war ended, and must go to the Peace Conference not as a suppliant, asking for alms, but as an ally with the prestige of having contributed by her arms to winning the victory.

In his proclamation to the Greek nation at the time of the abdication of King Constantine, High Commissioner Jonnart told the Greeks that an "era of peace" lay before them. This was criticized at the time as an egregious blunder. Was it that? Did Jonnart unwittingly handicap Venizelos by making a promise that would render difficult a new mobilization, once the Venizelist Government was reinstalled at Athens? It is not easy to answer these questions with any degree of certainty. The United States had just entered the war. The French General Staff was still hoping to end the war quickly by piercing the German lines. Italy entertained great hopes. Kerensky and Brusiloff were counted upon for a new Russian defensive. It might well be that in getting rid of Constantine the Entente Powers had in mind simply protecting the Saloniki base, and did not count upon Greek coöperation in a victorious offensive.

If they thought that Venizelos would prove a useful pawn, they made a miscalculation. His work at Saloniki should have forewarned them. Venizelos had only one thought all along, to get Greece into the war as a real factor in the fighting, so that when the Peace Conference ar-

rived, Greece would be claiming her due and not favors. The whole life of Venizelos taught him that the Great Powers did not dispense favors. Only the fighters had a share in the spoils, each according to his strength. Greece was very late, but there might yet be time to participate in the final campaign. And the silver lining of the cloud was the fact that the new Greek army could be counted upon to be fresh and unimpaired when the moment to talk about peace terms arrived. Events have justified the vision of Venizelos.

When Venizelos returned to Athens, the Treasury had a deficit of seven hundred million francs. A year later Greek money was at an unprecedented premium in exchange. During the decline of all European exchanges in 1919 and 1920, the drachma resisted depreciation with more success than the money of any Continental European belligerent. The 1918 crops were twenty per cent better than those of 1917. The railways, extended and reorganized, rendered invaluable service in the Macedonian campaign. The merchant marine was able to put almost one hundred and fifty steamships at the disposal of the Allies. The Greek fleet proved a precious aid in clearing the eastern Mediterranean of submarines.

At the time the Allies disembarked at Saloniki, fifteen Greek divisions were mobilized. We have told the story of the demoralization through intrigue and inactivity, and

the humiliating demobilization. During the winter at Saloniki Venizelos created three divisions on a war footing, recruited from Macedonia, Crete, and the Ægean Islands. With the remobilization of the summer of 1917 Venizelos had material for eight more divisions. These were officered and trained in the winter of 1917–18, were gradually introduced into the fighting in the late spring and summer of 1918, and when the Entente Powers were ready for the final defensive, Greece had eleven divisions on war footing, one in Epirus and the rest on the Macedonian front. Of three hundred thousand men under arms, one hundred and seventy thousand participated in the actual fighting.

Although, in urging the necessity of an offensive on the Macedonian front, Venizelos guaranteed the effective co-operation of Greece, Entente statesmen were too much impressed by the memory of the Constantinist demoralization to take Venizelos seriously. The worth of the three divisions from New Greece, formed at Saloniki when Venizelos was head of the Provisional Government, had been demonstrated. But their fighting qualities were explained by the fact that they were recruits from regions liberated in the Balkan wars, and had never been contaminated by Royalist officers and King Constantine's General Staff.

The first chance Venizelos had of refuting the assertion that other Greeks would not fight under his leadership

was during the early spring attacks of 1918. He directed that troops of Old Greece be used by General Nider on the Struma front. They covered themselves with glory on April 15. Then Venizelos persuaded General Guillaumat to confide to four Greek regiments the extremely difficult task of carrying the position of Skradi-Legen on May 30. The next day General Guillaumat telegraphed Venizelos that the Greeks had won a notable success and that "the new divisions arriving in turn on the front will draw from this victory, which fills all Greece with legitimate pride, a greater ardor still for work and combat." The Greeks lost in this fight six hundred dead and seventeen hundred wounded. Their dash and courage, their unwavering advance under fire, gave the Greek army confidence in itself and won the esteem of the Allies, who up to this moment had remained doubting Thomases.

The intervention of Greece under Venizelos on the Macedonian front had the same effect as the intervention of the Americans under Wilson on the Western front. As German *morale* was broken in France by the appearance of a new army, which would give the enemy an unquestioned superiority of numbers, so the Bulgarian *morale* was broken by the unexpected resurrection of Greece. Here was a new reservoir for the enemy to tap, which could not be prevented from being drawn upon by lack of transportation facilities and the work of submarines. The

Allies in France were given fresh courage by the arrival of the Americans. The Allies at Saloniki realized after May 30 that the Greece of Venizelos was going to enable them to make a victorious offensive.

Not until the middle of September was General Franchet d'Esperey ready for the offensive that was to make the fatal breach in the enemy coalition. Venizelos was unwilling to leave to chance or to last-minute changes a disposition of the Greek army that might detract from the rôle he intended it to play. He went to General Headquarters, and camped there until he was sure that the final orders designated five different points on the line of attack for the Greeks. Only then could he breathe freely. As he had it arranged, wherever the big break came a Greek division was bound to go forward with the first advance of Allied forces into the regions to be liberated.

The Premier was received with great enthusiasm when he visited the troops in the front lines *à la* Clemenceau. The old "Zeto Basileus!" was replaced by as spontaneous a "Zeto Venizelos!" which goes to prove that royal blood is a fetish that disappears easily before the magnetism of a man who has made good. Venizelos told the soldiers that the moment had come "when the Bulgarian who is polluting our sacred soil will feel the point of our inflexible bayonets." Their answer was, "To Sofia!"

In eight days the Bulgarians were routed all along the

line and were in full retreat. On September 23 Premier Malinoff tried to get into touch with President Wilson, but the Austrian wireless refused to transmit his message. On the afternoon of September 25 Generalissimo Todoroff, by order of his Government, made overtures for peace. He confessed that the *morale* of the Bulgarian army was completely destroyed, and asked for an armistice. General Franchet d'Esperey refused to treat on any other basis than unconditional surrender. On September 29 Bulgarian delegates signed at Saloniki a capitulation which delivered Bulgaria bound hand and foot to the Allies, and gave Germany and Austria-Hungary four weeks to withdraw troops, officials, diplomatic and consular representatives, and even private citizens. On September 30, at noon, the war with Bulgaria ceased. It was the beginning of the end for Germany.

The Greeks were active every day from September 15 to September 30. The Fourteenth Division, coöperating with the Sixteenth British Army Corps, was the first to cross the Bulgarian frontier. Both Franchet d'Esperey and General Milne declared that the Greek army had proved a decisive factor in the victory. The British general was most explicit. Writing to General Danglis on October 3, General Milne said: "Without the aid of the Greek forces, the present victory could not have been obtained."

After the collapse of Bulgaria the miracle of Venizelos was appreciated more than ever. Only Bulgaria was as yet out of the war. To enable the British and French to profit by the terms of the armistice and to cut off Turkey from the Central Empires, the presence of the important Greek contingents in a country they knew well was very precious. The Greeks occupied Eastern Macedonia, advanced to the Nestos River on the Bulgarian frontier, and, by concentrating at less than a hundred miles from Turkish Thrace, constituted a grave menace for Constantinople and hastened the Turkish capitulation. Other Greek divisions pursued the Austro-German troops in Serbia, engaging in rear-guard actions every day. The Greeks were still after the Austrians north of Nish when the Hapsburg Empire sued for an armistice. Another Greek force, in two columns, pursued the Austrians in Albania.

Aside from the moral prestige Greek coöperation in the Macedonian campaign won for Venizelos on the eve of peace negotiations, this disposition of his army in the Balkans was of inestimable political advantage. They occupied regions as part of the fighting forces of the Allies. They appeared as liberators to Macedonians and Serbians. They had the excuse of concentrating a force in Eastern Macedonia — a region Greece intended to demand from Bulgaria at the Peace Conference.

On October 6 Venizelos said to the Athenians:

"This victory is not limited to putting an end to the struggle against Bulgaria. Its influence extends far beyond the peninsula and marks the beginning of the collapse of the enemy coalition. The signature of the armistice crowns triumphantly the struggles of our national army. The Government desires to express to the national army its congratulations and the gratitude of the nation for the work that the army has accomplished. Reorganized in the midst of so many difficulties, the national army of Old as well as of New Greece has known how to reëstablish not only the military prestige of the country, but also the honor of Greece."

Taking advantage of the enthusiasm of the Greeks over their victory, Venizelos had the King issue a decree calling another class to the colors. Far from beginning to demobilize Venizelos determined to increase the armed strength of his country for eventualities which he knew were ahead.

He intended to go to Paris to talk peace terms with the Entente statesmen as the Premier of a country which had on war footing the most efficient united fighting force in the Near East.

CHAPTER XIII

VENIZELOS AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE[1]

SOME statesmen of small countries went to Paris with great expectations. They hoped that the Peace Conference would organize itself into a judicial body to hear and decide upon claims with the view of establishing a durable world peace guaranteed by all nations. The gospel from the other side of the Atlantic had hypnotized them. And the evangelist of the new diplomacy of "open covenants openly arrived at" seemed to be determined to force the issue with the old-fashioned statesmen of the Great Powers. The threat in President Wilson's speech of September 27, 1918, was not veiled. For the first time in history was there to be a peace conference in which the

[1] No writer, without committing unpardonable indiscretions or making guesses and errors of fact, could record at this time (October, 1920) the story of the life of Venizelos in detail since the beginning of 1919. Of the Peace Conference and its aftermath — especially the delicate negotiations carried on directly between individual states — we know very little, and of that little we cannot tell all. Not only are negotiations concerning the Near East still in a state of flux (despite the Treaty of Sèvres!), but also we have not come to the end of a military occupation whose diplomatic *status quo* is uncertain, and military campaigns against the Turkish and Arab Nationalists are still in progress. Consequently, the biographer is under a handicap in this chapter and chapter XIV. He can only promise the reader a new and more complete edition later. The story must be enacted before it can be told!

small nations would have a show? Heretofore decisions had been made on the basis of adjusting the claims of the Great Powers in conferences from which the representatives of small nations had been rigidly excluded. The proposals for the Conference of Paris had established: (a) open sessions; (b) equal consideration for all claims, since the Conference was to be guided by right and not might; (c) a peace guaranteed by a League of Nations that would do away with the necessity of heavy armaments and the old system of alliances to preserve the balance of power.

Venizelos, on the other hand, had no such illusions. Throughout the war he had been dealing with the statesmen of the Entente Powers, and had not observed any change of heart or change of methods to warrant belief in the creation of an atmosphere of international morality at the Peace Conference. Of course, he was quick to grasp the usefulness of the Wilsonian principles in presenting the cause of Greece, and he realized that a League of Nations would increase enormously the influence and importance of smaller nations like Greece. Before he left Greece, in speeches and interviews Venizelos said that he welcomed the intervention of President Wilson in peacemaking as in waging war, and that Greece made the American principles her own, believing them to be to her advantage as well as to the advantage of humanity. He promised that the Greek delegation would stand behind

President Wilson in insisting upon the creation of a League of Nations.

If the miracle was going to happen, Venizelos was ready to profit by it. More than this, he felt that an honest acceptance of the Wilsonian ideas would lead to the most satisfactory peace, so he intended to do all he could to bring about the miracle. But from the beginning he anticipated the defeat of Wilson, and had ready an alternate programme to that of the American President. He went to Paris prepared for an attempt to repeat the Congress of Berlin, and therefore made his plans to prevent the Great Powers from ignoring the interests and the voice of Greece, as they had done in 1878.

A month before the Conference opened, Venizelos was on the ground, installed in a simple suite of rooms at the Hotel Mercedes, near the Étoile. This was a long way off from the Quai d'Orsay and from the Italian, American, and Japanese headquarters. But it was one minute from the Majestic and three minutes from the Astoria, the large hotels that sheltered the British Peace Commission. Venizelos picked the winner before the race started.

The terms of the armistices granted to Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey revealed the aims of the Entente Powers and foretold the inevitable conflicts between them that were to follow. When the enemies collapsed, Great Britain and France and Italy hastily wrung concessions

from one another on some points, and where they could not agree began to act independently. By the time Venizelos reached Paris, and long before the Peace Conference opened its sessions, Greece was forced to make up her mind which of the three rivals was to be her best friend during the Conference. The things Venizelos had to accomplish could not wait indefinitely. In the Balkans and Asia Minor one has always to reckon with massacres and pillage and deportations. There was no protection for the populations of Græcia Irredenta in the armistice terms.

Venizelos decided that the only policy for the Greek delegation was to play in with the British. The Italians were hostile to all the Greek aspirations. The French would have to subordinate their Balkan and Turkish policies to the changing exigencies of the German and Russian situations. The Americans were without a definite policy, and did not attempt to assert one. Because Serbia was at loggerheads with Rumania and Italy, a united front of the Balkan States was impossible.

On the other hand, Venizelos recognized the community of interests between Great Britain and his country. Ever since Cretan days he had realized that if Great Britain were hostile to Greek ambitions, the unity of Hellas could not be achieved. Owing to the configuration of the country, mainland as well as islands were under the range of the cannon of the mistress of the seas. Greece could not live,

let alone prosper and expand, with Great Britain as an enemy. The incorporation of Crete and Cyprus and the other islands in Greece, the emancipation of the Anatolian littoral, the return of Hellas to Constantinople — in the coming true of these dreams Great Britain was an essential factor. Military considerations, political considerations, economic considerations, dictated to Athens firm and fast friendship with London. The fortunes of the men who stood behind Venizelos were dependent upon a policy of *entente cordiale* with the leading maritime and commercial and international banking Power. Added to all these compelling reasons, Venizelos cherishes a profound admiration for English institutions, and, while he accepts the essential dishonesty of all diplomacy, he has never lost his faith in the inherent sense of justice of the Englishman as an individual and the inherent sense of fair play of the British as a nation. This I have heard so often from his own lips that I am glad to record the tribute to my race.

Before Christmas I had the privilege of spending a morning with Venizelos in his office at the Mercedes. He gave me a copy of the memorandum he was going to submit to the Conference, but which had not yet been released for publication. "Put that in your pocket," he said, "to refresh your memory afterwards. Now I shall go over our case with you, and you may ask me any questions that arise in your mind." We sat at a table with a map before

us, and for three hours I listened to the exposition of Greece's claims. Venizelos needed no notes. Even when he was in the midst of a maze of geographical and statistical data, he did not hesitate for an instant. Names of places and figures of population were firmly embedded in his mind and produced with a dexterity that made me realize how the man, as he had always been, was the embodiment of his programme. And the programme was, as it had always been, the unification of Hellas.

During the long and weary months of compromising French and British and Italian national interests (for that was the *raison d'être* and unending agenda of the Paris Conference!) Venizelos was able to keep up his vitality and his enthusiasm. In August, 1919, with all the windows open and an electric fan going, he dazed me by naming *kazas* in Thrace and citing figures of population with the same ease and insistence as in December, 1919, with logs burning in the fireplace. Weather means nothing when one's work grips him, and a man interested in his work is never tired.

The thesis of Venizelos at Paris was that the complete victory of the Allied and Associated states afforded the occasion "to fix the political frontiers of European states in exact accordance, or as approximately as possible, with their ethnical character. In this way the indispensable basis of the Society of Nations will be created."

Taken literally, this statement is indisputable. Such a readjustment of frontiers in Europe was "the indispensable basis of the Society of Nations," and if an honest attempt to approximate political frontiers "in accordance with their ethnical character" had been made by the Paris Conference, the Covenant of the League of Nations in the treaties would not have been an anomaly or an instrument of oppression. Since Venizelos knew, however, that European statesmen were not going to try to draw frontiers by applying the same principle everywhere and using one weight and one measure, he set forth and defended reservations to his thesis. His first reservation was the modifying alternative, "or as approximately as possible," and his second reservation was the definition of "ethnical" by the test of national consciousness rather than of language or race. Venizelos did not believe it was possible to adjudge frontiers to Bulgaria on the basis of nationality; he denied the possession of Turkish national consciousness to great masses of Mohammedans; and he repudiated the application of the language test of nationality to Epirotes and to Bulgarian-speaking Mohammedans and Orthodox Christians. By making these reservations he ran afoul of the American experts, British Liberals, French and British Turkophiles and Bulgarophiles, Italian diplomats, and Albanian Nationalists.

Venizelos claimed that there were eight and a quarter

millions in "the Hellenic Nation," of whom only fifty-five per cent lived within the Kingdom of Greece. These were distributed as follows:

Kingdom of Greece	4,300,000
Northern Epirus and Southern Albania	151,000
Thrace and region of Constantinople	731,000
Bulgaria	43,000
Asia Minor	1,694,000
Dodecanese	102,000
Cyprus	235,000
Egypt and rest of Africa	150,000
North and South America	450,000
Southern Russia	400,000

In this table Venizelos did not include 88,000 Greeks in the territories assigned to Bulgaria by the Treaty of Bukarest, because it suited his case better to consider the Turkish province of Thrace as its boundaries were before the Balkan War of Liberation.

After excluding the million Greeks scattered all over the world, Venizelos set forth in detail the claims of Greece in the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor, and the Islands. Greece took for granted that the portion of Eastern Macedonia awarded to Bulgaria at Bukarest in 1913 now belonged to Greece. The Greek army occupied this region at the time of the armistice, and its incorporation in Greece was not a debatable question. This much was settled by the victory. *J'y suis, j'y reste!* The Greek claims in Northern Epirus had to be adjusted with Italy and Albania, in Thrace with Bulgaria and Greece, in Constantinople with the victorious

Powers, in Asia Minor with Italy and Turkey, in the Islands with Italy and Great Britain. The memorandum of December, 1919, which was used as the basis of Greek claims when Venizelos appeared a month later before the Council of Ten, did not mention Cyprus except in the table of distribution of "the Hellenic nation" at the beginning of the memorandum. Venizelos made no demand for Cyprus. Of the Dodecanese he said simply that "the Greek Government has no doubt that its great neighboring nation will itself take the initiative in proposing the retrocession of these islands to Greece." While stating that "the natural solution would be to adjudge Constantinople and its vilayet to Greece," Venizelos recognized that "if the Society of Nations is to be established immediately, Constantinople might, in consequence of the great international interests connected with the possession of the Straits, form, with the latter and a sufficient area of hinterland, an international state under the protection of the Society of Nations."

Like a wise general, Venizelos marshaled all his batteries upon the territories where resistance would be least formidable and reserved assault upon the others for a more favorable time. Only those who have had the opportunity to study Greek irredentism from within appreciate the firmness and tact called for by this shrewd policy of moderation. It required as much skill and patience, as much

BULGARIA
BLAC
PHILIPPOPOLIS
ADRIANOPLE
CONSTANTINOPLE
Bosphorus
SCUTARI
ISMID
SEA OF MARMORA
DEDEAGATCH
RODOSTO
Imbros
BIGHA
BRUSA
Dardanelles
BICHA
BRUSA
ASI
Gulf of Smyrna
SMYRNA
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
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courage, to resist the pressure of unredeemed Greeks outside the territories claimed in the memorandum and before the Council of Ten as to oppose the intrigues of Entente statesmen and the pleas of friends of the Bulgarians and Turks. It was natural that some unredeemed Greeks should be tempted to place the interests of their own localities above the greater good of Hellas, and to feel that Venizelos was betraying them because he refrained from asking for the liberation of their homes. By personal friends, who had been loyal to him in the dark days, who had aided him financially, and who had come with high hopes to Paris, Venizelos was urged to extend the claims of his original memorandum. When he refused to compromise the success of his programme by asking for the unattainable, he was upbraided, branded as an ingrate and even as a traitor to Hellas. But no man accomplishes great things in this world who is afraid of being misunderstood by his friends.

In Northern Epirus Venizelos did not ask for the northwestern corner (Kourvelessi and the northern parts of the *kazas* of Tepelini and Premeti), admitting that their population was "practically entirely Albanian." But he had really in mind to make concessions to the Italians who were determined not to allow Greece to come so near Valona. "There would remain in Northern Epirus a Greek population of 120,000 and an Albanian population of 80,000,

inextricably mixed to such an extent that it would not be possible to divide the country geographically in such a manner as to include Greeks in the Greek State and Albanians in the Albanian State," declared Venizelos, and he contended that "it would be contrary to all equity that a majority which possesses a higher form of civilization should have to submit to a minority possessing an inferior civilization."

We cannot go into the merits of the dispute between Albania and Greece over Northern Epirus, and into the intrigues of Italy to deprive Greece of this precious bit of her *terre irredente*. During the First Balkan War Greece occupied Northern Epirus, then a part of Turkey, but after the creation of independent Albania through the intervention of the Powers, a mixed European commission decided to incorporate the greater part of the province in Albania. The boundary was formally drawn up by the Powers at Florence, and Venizelos risked his popularity by ordering the withdrawal of the Greek forces. At the time he felt that it was the lesser of two evils to yield to the Powers, for he needed their good-will in arranging delicate outstanding questions with Turkey. But the Epirotes revolted against the decision and formed a Provisional Government. Once more the Powers intervened, and compromised in their usual way by declaring Northern Epirus autonomous under the suzerainty of Albania. The people,

however, including the authorities, just as had been the case in Crete, warned the Powers that autonomy was only a makeshift and union with Greece was the desideratum.

When Italy occupied Valona in October, 1914, after the outbreak of the World War, an arrangement was made between Venizelos and the Italian Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, by which Greece reoccupied Northern Epirus. Both countries were at that time neutral, but after Italy entered the war she extended her occupation of Albania, and the Greeks were compelled to evacuate *kaza* after *kaza*. Greece, still neutral and suspected of sympathies with the Central Empires, could do nothing. Although Italy officially notified Greece on August 26 and September 22, 1916, that the occupation was "purely military and provisional for the purpose of combating the spy service of the Austro-Bulgarian armies," the Italian authorities treated Northern Epirus as a part of Albania, and it was from Argyrocastro that General Ferrero proclaimed on June 3, 1917, "Independent Albania, with the friendship and *under the protection* of Italy."

This was the situation when Venizelos asked for Northern Epirus at Paris. He was willing to make concessions to Italy on the coast, although in doing so he incurred the enmity of fanatical Epirotes, but he told me, before the Conference met, that it would be impossible to allow Italy to control the interior of Northern Epirus, under the guise

of "independent Albania," because it would give Italy a strong military foothold in the heart of the Balkans, where she could be only a menace to the security of Serbia and Greece alike. Of course, nothing of this entered into the memorandum to the Peace Conference nor into the exposition of Venizelos before the Council of Ten. The Greek Premier could have presented to the Council proof that the Epirotes were being persecuted for their attachment to Greece, archbishops and bishops and priests deported or thrown into jail, Mohammedan bands organized and armed and incited against Christians who refused to declare for the Albanian (really Italian) Government — a formidable list of assassinations and intimidations with names and places.

But this would have been madness and would have accomplished no good result. For the organizer of the persecutions and massacres, Baron Sonnino, was one of the Ten who were to judge the merits of the Greek cause. He had a seat in the inner circle: Venizelos, like the premiers of all the small states, was an outsider. When the Council was narrowed down to four, Premier Orlando, the chief of Venizelos's enemies, was one of the four. The Epirotes grumbled loudly at Paris when they saw that Venizelos was not pressing the Greek claims to all of Northern Epirus. They remembered how he had bowed to the fiat of the Powers in 1913 and had accepted the boundary

drawn up at Paris. They became nervous and apprehensive. A warm friend and supporter of Venizelos came to my *atelier* one day. With tears rolling down his cheeks, he told me that, as a good Epirote, he would have to break with the Premier. I reminded him of how the whole trouble had arisen through the Constantinist policy of neutrality. Had Greece gone right into the war at the beginning, as Venizelos urged, there would have been no Epirus question at the Peace Conference. Italy would never have had the chance to occupy the province. I told the Epirote, what he already knew, that every province of unredeemed Greece was equally precious to Venizelos and regarded by him as the *chair* [1] of Hellas.

The representatives of the Dodecanese (the twelve islands off the southwestern corner of Asia Minor) also confided in me their worry over the attitude of Venizelos. They were deeply resentful of the cautious language of the memorandum, and joined with the Cypriotes in asserting that Venizelos gave the lie to his past in Crete when he did not *demand* the annexation of the Dodecanese and Cyprus. Had not Great Britain offered Cyprus to Greece three years before? And was not their title to the island as dubious as that of Italy to the Dodecanese? Ever since the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 the Cypriotes had over-

[1] This word loses its vigor, and to a certain measure its connotation, by translation. *Flesh* is not used in English in the intimate figurative sense that *chair* is used in French.

whelmingly been in favor of union with Greece. The inhabitants of the Dodecanese had never ceased to protest against the continued occupation of their islands by Italy. During the war they had voted their union with Greece, and had been persecuted by the Italians in the same way the Belgians were persecuted by the Germans. Venizelos had proofs of the policy of starvation, deportation, imprisonment, and expulsion that was being carried on in the Dodecanese by the Italians during the time the Peace Conference was meeting. Affidavits by the hundred were in his possession. The Greek delegation published white books, presented remonstrances to the Peace Conference, and issued bulletins to the newspapers about persecutions of Greeks by Bulgarians in Thrace and by Turks in Asia Minor. To those who suffered in the same way at the hands of the Italians — the Epirotes and the Islanders — Venizelos counseled patience. On the evening before he presented the claims of Greece to the Council of Ten, Venizelos said to me: "The larger questions must come first. Acquiescence must be obtained to our claims in Thrace and Asia Minor. Italy already opposes me in Asia Minor. If I cry out against what is happening in Northern Epirus and if I demand the Dodecanese, Italy may join you Americans in contesting my claims to Thrace. I must not give Italy an excuse for supporting Bulgaria."

Venizelos, however, was able to go much farther in the

case of Epirus than of the Dodecanese. There was an agreement during the first year of the war between the Entente Powers and Greece that Italy and Greece should share Southern Albania and Northern Epirus. The Dodecanese, on the other hand, was definitely allotted to Italy by Great Britain and France and Russia in the secret treaty of April 26, 1915. The Greek Premier was not in a strong enough position at the beginning of the Peace Conference — or in fact at any time during the deliberations in Paris — to protest openly against this cynical document, which violated the principles the Entente Powers had claimed to be fighting to maintain.

In his claim to Northern Epirus Venizelos advanced the famous theory of national consciousness as the test of nationality. "One may be tempted," he said, "to raise the objection that a substantial portion of this Greek population uses Albanian as its mother tongue, and is, consequently, in all probability, of Albanian origin; but the democratic conceptions of the Allied and Associated Powers cannot admit of any other standard than that of national consciousness." Venizelos went on to point out that the standard of race or language as the test of nationality was the "Germanic conception." He claimed that the Epirotes had been Greek long before the Kingdom of Greece was founded, that their leading families furnished the chief heroes of the War of Independence, and that Northern

Epirotes had been among the foremost benefactors of Greece, founding Greek schools and public institutions. "It may be useful to add that the present vice-president of the Greek Ministerial Council, Mr. Repoulis; the commander-in-chief of the Greek army, General Danglis; the commander-in-chief of the Greek naval forces and Minister of Marine, Admiral Koundouriotis; and the majority of the crews of the Greek navy, speak Albanian as their mother tongue." In my own personal experience I have had ample confirmation of the ardent Greek national consciousness of inhabitants of Epirus and also of Attica, whose language in the home was Albanian. When he expounded this theory to me, Venizelos explained what he meant by saying that the standard of race or language is a Germanic conception. He cited German authors on the confines of *Deutschthum*, who claimed for Germany by the language or racial test most of Switzerland, Flanders, Alsace-Lorraine, and even Holland.

The repudiation of the language test of nationality is the most important feature of Hellenic claims. Venizelos has applied the theory of national consciousness to his statistics in Thrace and to his aspirations in Asia Minor. When the Bulgarians broke away from the Greek Orthodox Church and formed their own church with an exarch, not all Bulgarians followed the new movement. Those who remained within the fold of the Orthodox Church are

claimed as Greeks, for they are supposed to have a Greek "national consciousness." Many of these Bulgarophones do claim to be Greeks, and as the separatist movement to form an exarchate was national rather than religious, the presumption from the fact that some remained faithful to the Patriarchate is that they preferred to be considered Greeks. Other Bulgarians, at the time of the Turkish conquest or later, accepted Islam. To these Mohammedans, known as "Pomaks," Venizelos also denies Bulgarian nationality. In his statistics he puts the Bulgarian-speaking members of the Orthodox Church with the Greeks and the Bulgarian-speaking Mohammedans with the Turks. The Bulgarians, of course, consider all who speak Bulgarian as their nationals. This accounts, in part, for the discrepancy in statistics.

The theory of national consciousness as the test of nationality is reasonable. Venizelos makes out a good case for it. But one may argue that if a man has sufficient intelligence to be conscious of his nationality to the point of considering himself of a nation other than that whose language he speaks, a plebiscite is feasible and could be undertaken. The difficulty comes in consenting to reciprocity. Venizelos, with his plea of national consciousness to justify the wide extension of the frontiers of Greece, admits the force of his own argument only when it works in his own favor. When it works against him, he puts forth other

considerations, which, *in that particular case*, outweigh the test invoked elsewhere to justify his claims.

If we grant that Venizelos has proved his case in Northern Epirus and that there is much in favor of the Greek claims in Thrace, what must be the attitude of the impartial student of the Balkans toward the exclusion of Bulgaria from Macedonia, which is really the main source of the difficulties that have followed the Treaty of Bukarest?

Speaking at the Collège Libre des Sciences Sociales in Paris in the midst of the war (December 12, 1917), Professor Djerich, of the University of Belgrade, presented as tellingly as it is possible to present it the Serbian point of view in regard to the ethnography of the Macedonian Slavs. He gave a wealth of statistics and authorities, especially on the etymological side of the controversy, and reviewed the history of Macedonia from the sixth century to 1789. It was an attempt to prove that almost all Slavic linguists consider the Macedonian dialect as standing between Bulgarian and Serbian, and that old Macedonian popular literature and current poetry is more nearly Serbian than Bulgarian. Professor Djerich asserted that the peasants of Macedonia never called themselves Bulgarians before the nineteenth century. But is it not the nineteenth century that counts? In considering any national movement in Central and Eastern Europe, the historian begins where Professor Djerich ends. Professor Djerich

justifies Serbia in Macedonia by the antithesis of the French justification for holding Alsace-Lorraine and the Venizelist theory of national self-consciousness.

I have never met a European observer familiar with Macedonia who did not believe that most of the regions of Macedonia held by Serbia and Greece were predominantly Bulgarian in national consciousness. This has been the virtually universal impression of travelers during the past half-century, and was the opinion I formed in my own travels in Macedonia. As to national consciousness, I know of no more trustworthy testimony than that of Lady Grogan, who did relief work in Macedonia during the terrible winter of 1903–04, who learned both Serbian and Bulgarian, and who devoted herself to the Serbian Relief Fund from 1914 to 1918. Although politically her sympathies were with the Serbians, Lady Grogan wrote in 1918:

"The peasantry of Macedonia believe themselves to be Bulgarians. They are Bulgarians in type, customs, language, dress, and traditions. That they were Bulgarians was never questioned by travelers who described and mapped the country before the contemporary era of national propaganda began. It was as Bulgarians that they rose against the Turks in 1903 and 1904, and they paid for their assertion of nationality by severe punishment and prolonged persecutions. It was as Bulgarians that they suffered at the hands of the Greek bands in the following years. There is no record of any Serbian or Greek rising in Macedonia against the Turks."

Since the biographer is endeavoring to write an interpretative record of facts and not a eulogy of a man or a nation, it is necessary to point out that Venizelos, faithfully representing the sentiment of the Greek nation, made a powerful plea for the incorporation of Thrace in Greece by the use of arguments the validity of which the Greeks indignantly deny when it is a question of Bulgaria using them to lay claim to any part of Macedonia. In his brief for Thrace, Venizelos says:

"It may be objected that, in the case of Thrace, the principle of nationality should give way before the economic interest of Bulgaria to have an outlet on the Ægean Sea. But this interest is not sufficiently essential to exact such a capital sacrifice from the population concerned by compelling them to live under an administration not in harmony with their national conscience."

But this "capital sacrifice" was exacted of the Macedonian Bulgarians in the Treaty of Bukarest, and because it was exacted of them, the future peaceful development of the Balkans was made impossible. Macedonia and Thrace form a crazy-quilt of nationalities, inextricably mixed up together, but a fair settlement by mutual sacrifice and compromise was not to be despaired of, as Venizelos himself showed in the two famous memoranda to King Constantine in 1915. In 1913 at Bukarest the "principle of nationality," whether it be decided by the test of language or national consciousness, was rejected as a basis of ter-

ritorial settlement. In 1919 at Paris it was alternately invoked and ignored by Venizelos and Pasitch.

Venizelos defended himself with spirit and eloquence against the charge of inconsistency in his radical change of policy toward Bulgaria after the victory:

"It may be asked why, whereas both before and after the Balkan Wars I was disposed to make important concessions to Bulgaria, I am in no way animated with feelings of this kind to-day. If, for the moment, after the beginning of the European War, I foreshadowed even the cession of Kavalla to Bulgaria, I did so with the hope of securing the entry of that Power into the war on the side of the Allies, in order thereby to assure and to hasten the victory of the Allies. . . . No such reasons remain to-day. To entertain still the same tendencies, to wish still to make concessions to Bulgaria, would constitute on my part a sort of sickly sentimentalism. My fellow-citizens would very rightly disavow me, for such a policy would sacrifice, without compelling reason, the vital interests of my country, only for the partial satisfaction of an insatiable neighbor, who would take advantage of it to exterminate the alien populations fallen under his domination and would draw new strength therefrom with a view to a fresh attack at a convenient moment."

For six months Venizelos worked tirelessly at Paris to secure recognition of the Greek claims with only one tangible result — the permission to land Greek troops at Smyrna. The Italians blocked the settlement of the Northern Epirus claim, making it contingent on the Adriatic

settlement, which became each month a more hopeless muddle. The Italians made no move to bring up the future of the Dodecanese for general discussion. For fear of falling out among themselves before they forced Germany to sign the treaty they were preparing, the Entente Powers sidetracked the Turkish settlement. The future of Thrace was contingent upon the disposition of Constantinople and the unformulated Turkish treaty. When the Treaty of Versailles was signed and the Treaty of Saint-Germain presented to the Austrians, the main work of the Paris Conference was generally regarded as finished. President Wilson returned to the United States with most of his experts. The delegates of the minor states retired, feeling that they might as well not have come to Paris at all.

But the Premier of Greece assumed a place, not only in public opinion, but also in the eyes of his colleagues, far out of proportion to the size and importance of his country. This was due in part to his personality. He was able to impose himself upon the Paris Conference as easily as he had done upon Crete and then upon Greece and the Balkan Federation. He took a foremost part in the deliberations over the League of Nations, seizing the opportunity the League Commission offered of putting Lloyd George under obligation to him and of keeping in close personal touch with the leading notables of the Conference.

From January to September, 1919, his principal rôle was that of an observer of the relations of the United States to the Entente Powers and of the Entente Powers to one another. While he appeared to outsiders and even to some of his own inner circle the active participant in the general work of the Conference, and the zealous protagonist of the League of Nations, Venizelos reserved much of his time and all of his energies to following the internal political and military developments in Great Britain and France and Italy, and the evolution of their policies in the Near East and Russia, and to watching each crisis for the favorable moment to advance this or that particular interest of Greece. More than once he seemed to let obvious opportunities pass, to the perplexity and confusion of his admirers. But he knew from experience that asking favors or making protests would get him nothing. From the rich man's table only crumbs fall to the suppliant. On the other hand, if he attempted to threaten or bluster or pout, his opponents or rival claimants would be able to arouse the fear or alienate the sympathy of those whose backing and consent he must win.

If the truth be told, Venizelos was through with the Peace Conference once he had done the obvious and banal thing of circulating a printed memorandum of claims and pleading those claims before the Council of Ten. Of course he was always ready to talk to newspaper corre-

spondents and American experts and send briefs to the various commissions. The wise man leaves no stone unturned. It was well to keep insisting pleasantly that his solution, in regard to each particular problem, conformed with the "Fourteen Points," and, besides, was the workable and practical solution.

But Venizelos felt the futility of resting his case on its merits. His dealings with the Great Powers had taught him that military strength, capable of getting tangible results, was the only argument to which they would pay attention. By fighting he had freed Crete and begun the unification of Hellas. Was there any other way of completing it? Certainly not at Paris! "International morality," said Venizelos in 1911, "does not exist." Several weeks after the Treaty of Versailles was signed, I reminded Venizelos of his opinion of long ago. His penetrating eyes, inscrutable behind gold-rimmed spectacles, held me for an instant. The pause made me hope that he was going to speak out.

"But we have the League of Nations now," he answered in his soft, caressing voice. "All the small countries are delighted. If we all disarm, the big will have no more influence than the small. As things are, for instance, what can I do with my bit of a navy and my few thousand soldiers? Greece is such a little country."

But on his table were minute reports of matters much

more interesting than the wearisome discussions and bickerings at Paris. Venizelos was studying the growth of the labor movement in England and Italy, with a view to learning how changing public sentiment was affecting the use of troops abroad. With the exception of Premier Bratianu of Rumania, Venizelos alone of the statesmen of the small countries seemed to realize that the Entente Powers had won a Pyrrhic victory and that they were exhausted militarily as well as financially. In the summer of 1919 they had the last hope of dictating their will to the world. If they succeeded in getting the treaties accepted, it would be because the vanquished and the small states to whom the Big Three intended to dictate the law and the prophets failed to see through the bluff of huge military resources and the pretense of harmony in foreign policies.

At the Second Plenary Session of the Peace Conference Clemenceau answered the protest of the small Allies, voiced by Venizelos and others, concerning the method of procedure which put *all* the power of decision into the hands of "the Principal Allied and Associated Powers," by the simple statement, "We had the force to win the war; we have the force to assure the peace." At the Eighth Plenary Session Wilson by the same argument denied the right of the small states to claim any part in framing the Treaty of Saint-Germain. But Clemenceau and Wilson supposed two things that did not exist: the

willingness of the electorate of the countries they represented to furnish more armies and money; and the possibility of pursuing a common policy in the solution of world problems.

The American experts opposed bitterly the demand of Greece for Thrace, and succeeded in preventing the Greek title to Thrace being written into the Treaty of Neuilly. The Bulgarians were forced to give up Thrace. Its attribution was "reserved" until the terms of the treaty with Turkey were decided upon. The American experts were equally hostile to Greek aspirations in Asia Minor. Venizelos and Politis did not antagonize Wilson. What was the use? Wilson's influence would last only if he could make a military contribution to the solution of Near-Eastern problems, and that was so improbable that it was unnecessary to worry unduly over the opinions of Wilson's experts. The Italians were uncompromising on Northern Epirus and the Dodecanese, and were engaged in dubious enterprises at Sofia and Konia against Greece. Instead of raising a row, Venizelos examined the internal political situation in Italy, and decided that Italian imperialism would fall of itself when Bissolati or Giolitti became premier — an event Venizelos prophesied as inevitable. When the Albanians made things too hot for the Italians and public opinion at home refused reinforcements, the question of Northern Epirus would be easy to adjust.

As for Thrace, Venizelos foresaw the moment when the enforcement of the treaties with Bulgaria and Turkey would call for the occupation of Thrace. Who would furnish the army for this work? Venizelos had his army ready mobilized on the frontier of Thrace. The French and British had no troops and the Italians would send none. Wilson would limit his interference to "moral" support of this or "moral" opposition to that. The alternatives were non-enforcement of the treaties or inviting Greece to intervene. And when Greece entered Thrace, she would stay.

CHAPTER XIV

GREECE AGAINST THE INTEGRITY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

AT the end of the first century of their Empire, the Osmanlis gained a decisive victory in the Balkans over the Crusaders from the west. But they were unable to put up a good resistance against invaders of their own race from the east. When Timur the Lame came to Konia, Nasreddin and his wife were agreed that it would be wise for the *hodja* to pay his respects to the conqueror. The only difference of opinion was concerning the offering that should be made to Timur. When Nasreddin stood in the presence of the greatest of Tartars, he carried a basket of figs. Timur, who was proud of being a good shot, amused himself by using Nasreddin for a target. As each fig splashed in Nasreddin's face, the *hodja* cried, "Allah be praised!"

"You fool," said Timur, "I don't see what you have to praise Allah about."

"My wife wanted me to bring apples," answered Nasreddin.

Every Turkish child knows this story of the most famous wit of his race. Many generations have chuckled over it.

They see only the funny side of it. Being a Turk, Nasreddin was neither angry nor humiliated. It was Timur's right to throw the figs. It was Nasreddin's duty to make the best of the fix he was in. He preserved his equanimity and his dignity. Nothing ever happens that could not be worse. The wise man realizes this truth and gets comfort and strength from it. He does not kick against the pricks.

The Turks have always been an easy-going and shiftless people, adapting themselves to circumstances, without ambition or zeal, and unfettered by family ties. They take life as it comes, not worrying themselves about the past or the future. Nasreddin is the hero of a hundred stories, many of which teach the same lesson as that of Nasreddin and the figs. Mohammedanism was the ideal religion for the Ottoman Turks to adopt. It imposed upon them no sense of responsibility for themselves or for others. Under Islam they were able to develop a system of government that harmonized with their Turanian character. The Ottoman system gave to those who wanted to make an effort privileges up to the extent of the effort they were willing to make and at the same time kept them free from irksome obligations. An eighth-century Turkish song reads: "I have no father, no mother, no home. I ride with my sword for companion. Who cares where I go or what I become?" This delightful philosophy attracted all sorts of adventurers to the fortunes of the first Ottoman Sultan

and has kept attracting them ever since. "Myself" and "to-day" became the *leit-motifs* of the Ottoman state. One was not bound by the past or by others. One did not have to think of the morrow or of others. Because the Turks did not want to bother with subject races and foreigners, they allowed from the beginning of their domination two serious derogations of authority, the constitution of the Christians into *millets* (nations) under their ecclesiastical leaders, and self-government and extra-territoriality for foreigners under the régime known as the "Capitulations." Most important of all, this philosophy prevented the creation and development of a homogeneous Turkish race, with national consciousness.

In the Balkan peninsula and along the Ægean Sea littoral of Asia Minor the so-called Turks have little in common with the Anatolian Turks. The Ottoman Empire founded and developed its power on the seacoast of Asia Minor, in the islands, and throughout the Balkans by the conversion of two classes among the Greeks and Slavs: the big landowners, who had everything to gain by embracing the religion of the conquerors, and the lowest stratum of the population, which followed the line of least resistance. The converts received the evils of Islam, paralysis of the will and stagnation, without an infusion of the virile Turkish blood or an inheritance of Turkish traditions. When the cross gradually won back the ground

lost in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to the crescent, some of these "Turks" remained under Christian rule. Others became *mouhadjirs* (refugees). They either were too ignorant to resist a sheep-like movement or had nothing to lose by abandoning their homes. These mongrel Turks form the majority of the "Turkish" population in the regions claimed by Venizelos. Very many of the others who call themselves Turks (religion and not race being the statistical test of nationality) are members or hangers-on of the Turkish administrative system, and have no conception of "my country" as we understand that expression. Thrace, Constantinople, the coast lands of Asia Minor contain no single element imbued with a feeling of nationality as strong and as numerous as the unredeemed Greeks.

The mistake of the American delegation at the Peace Conference, when it took a stand against "the imperialism" of Venizelos and his ignoring of "the principle of self-determination," was due to ignorance of the character and history of the Ottoman Empire. Can we impute to a civilization, or rather a system such as the Turks evolved, our own standards? Are we to take census figures, so many Turks and so many Greeks, as evidence of the existence of a majority and a minority each equally conscious of nationhood? Venizelos denied the possession of a common nationality by those lumped together as Turks.

Born and brought up among the Turks, he knew that the compatriots of Nasreddin would accept whatever authority was put over them, and that the others, mongrels and Ottoman officials and parasites of the system, would disappear when the system disappeared. And no analogy was admissible between the imperialism of European statesmen and the heart's desire of Venizelos to restore Hellas. The lands he claimed were Greece's, not only by right of prior settlement and twenty-five centuries of glorious history, but by right of the survival of the Hellenic race during nearly five centuries of Turkish overlordship — survival in the face of, progress beyond, and superiority to, the temporary master element.[1] The Ottoman Turks neither assimilated the races they conquered nor merged their race with the inhabitants to form a new nation. If the genuine Turks of Turanian origin were left their high plateau in Asia Minor, all that was Turkish by national consciousness would remain independent. Thrace, Constantinople, the valleys and ports of the Ægean coast of Asia Minor could be incorporated in Greece with no viola-

[1] In 1817, just before the disastrous War of Independence, Pouqueville visited Asia Minor, and found the Greeks of the Ægean littoral the most numerous and prosperous element. He wrote: "This people, for thirty centuries on the stage of history, is still the most vital element in the Eastern Mediterranean." The Anatolian Greeks suffered the brunt of the war in which a small portion of the Greek race was liberated. As Herzberg (*Geschichte Griechenlands*, I, 590) says, "300,000 Greeks lost their lives in order that 600,000 should be free."

ADRIANOPLE
Black Sea
CONSTANTINOPLE
SCUTARI
ENOS
Sea of Marmora
ISMID
Samothrace
Imbros
Lemnos
ARTAKI
BICHA
DARDANELLES
Tenedos
BICHA
BALIKESSER
BRUSA
BALIKESSER
AIVALI
Mitylene
PERGANNE
MAGNESIA
MAGNESIA
Chios
SMYRNA
PHILADELPHIA
SMYRNA
SCALANOVA
Samos
Icaria
AIDIN
AIDIN
DENESLI
Patmos
Kalymnos
BUDRUN
Kos
MENDECHE
ADALIA
Astypalaia
Symi
MAKRI
Rhodes
Karpathos
Kassos
THE CROSS LINED AREA SHOWS APPROXIMATELY THE DISTRICT AWARDED GREECE BY THE COUNCIL of SAN REMO APRIL 1920
GREEK CLAIMS IN WESTERN ASIA MINOR
++++++++++++ BOUNDARIES OF VILAYETS
---------- " " " SANDJAKS

tion of the principle of self-determination, with no concession to imperialism.

Beati possidentes as a doctrine of international diplomacy was abandoned more completely by the victors in the World War than by the statesmen of any other triumphant coalition of modern times. The treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, and Neuilly went back to the Middle Ages to set boundary lines and determine political allegiances. From Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians were taken the gains of centuries. Peoples that had been in subjection to alien rule since before Columbus discovered America were freed. In every debatable question, the decision was made upon the principle of *væ victis*. Arguments of all kinds, historical, strategic, and economic, were adduced to justify transfers of territory where strict adherence to the doctrine of self-determination would have left border districts to those who lost the war.

But when the Peace Conference considered questions affecting the Ottoman Empire, the attitude of the statesmen of Great Britain, France, and Italy was different. There had been no unwillingness to disregard the *status quo* and statistics of population where Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, and Bulgarians were concerned. The widest possible leeway had been given to Poland. Czecho-Slovakia was created with three million Germans within her frontiers. Large and compact masses of the former

dominant race in Transylvania were no argument against the formation of Greater Rumania. Against the Bulgarians, Serbian claims for strategical "rectifications of frontier" were allowed without debate. Bulgaria was forced to cede her only outlet to the Ægean. None of the Christian races on the losing side was spared at Paris. In the bitter atmosphere of the Peace Conference (with the exception of the Bulgarians when they resisted Greek claims) they had no defenders.

It was *à la mode*, however, to champion the cause of the Turks. Despite the Armenian and Greek [1] massacres and deportations, the Turks were gentlemen, who had fought gallantly and cleanly. British and French soldiers, diplo-

[1] The great interest taken by the United States in the Armenians, for whose relief enormous sums have been raised, made us fail to realize that the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire suffered on the same scale as the Armenians. Like the Armenians the Greeks were enrolled in labor battalions for military work, expelled, deported, massacred, deprived of their women. Only Constantinople and Smyrna escaped the deportation decree. In July, 1915, the privileges of the Greek schools were abolished, and this act was soon followed by a series of decrees which took from the Greeks the limited autonomy they had enjoyed ever since Mohammed the Conqueror. Conscription started in August, 1915, followed by requisitions, forced conversion to Islam, assault and kidnaping of women and girls, boycott and seizure of commerce, deportations *en masse*, pillage, burning of villages, and massacres. Several months after the armistice it was estimated that of 500,000 deported only 15,000 had returned to their homes. The rest either had perished or had no homes left to return to. Venizelos, in a special memorandum to the Peace Conference, estimated at 773,915 the number of Greeks expelled and deported by the Turks from Thrace, Asia Minor, and the Black Sea Trebizond region. The Bishop of Amassia testified that very few of the 160,000 from the Black Sea coast had survived the deportation.

mats, and writers, gave the Turks a good character, denied that they had violated the rules of the game as had the Germans, insisted that the Turks had gone into the war against their will, that they were really friends of the Entente Powers, and that it would be a crime to put any Turks under the rule of their former subjects. Armenians and Greeks were looked upon with disfavor, and their aspirations denounced and ridiculed. This was the situation faced by Venizelos throughout 1919. He knew that he would waste his time by trying to get an acknowledgment of Greek claims to Ottoman territory by pleading before the Conference or its committees or before the Supreme Council. The only way was to buy support and to call off opposition by direct and secret negotiations with the statesmen of the three Powers.

With the exception of the Serbians and Greeks the territorial claims of the smaller European allies could be allowed at the expense of discredited foes to whom none was disposed to show mercy. Moreover, the resurrection of Poland and Bohemia and the aggrandizement of Rumania, far from conflicting with the imperialistic ambitions of the victors, harmonized with the policy to crush Germany, destroy the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and create a new balance of power in Europe. But success in achieving the national unity of Serbians and Greeks meant the failure of Italy to receive the award agreed upon as the price of

Italian intervention. If they had simply relied on the justice of their cause or invoked the precedent of what the other small allies were getting, Pasitch and Venizelos would have failed to make progress before a tribunal one of whose judges was an interested party, while the other judges were bound by a secret treaty to decide in favor of Italy wherever the claims of Greece and Serbia conflicted with hers.

Venizelos was in a more difficult position than his Serbian colleague. The issue between Jugo-Slavia and Italy was clear-cut. It involved only the Adriatic. Greece and Italy, as we have already seen, came into conflict in Northern Epirus, the Dodecanese, and Asia Minor, while Venizelos never allowed himself to forget that Italy had a voice in the decision to be rendered about Thrace. He was constantly combating also the powerful influences being exercised upon all the Entente Powers to spare the Turks, or, as the alternative, to divide the Ottoman Empire into spheres of political and economic exploitation without regard to the aspirations of Ottoman subject nationalities. In the British Foreign Office and the French Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, for instance, there were men whose hostility to the policy of Venizelos was inspired by no other reason than the fear of the effect upon other subject nationalities of giving Greeks their way. In the case of Cyprus Venizelos appreciated the force of this

anxiety of contagion and refrained from pressing claims which, if granted, might embarrass Great Britain in Egypt and elsewhere.

Against the influences, open and occult, practical and sentimental and idealistic, that aimed to save Turkey, Venizelos fought with singular forcefulness and tenacity. He and Politis regretted deeply the attitude of President Wilson and the American delegation, which did nothing for allies like China on the ground of "American principles," but which intervened in an issue not clear, as was the Shantung issue, to defend Bulgaria and Turkey! Wilson had called Venizelos the greatest figure among the statesmen of the Conference:[1] but he opposed Venizelos tooth and nail with a zeal and energy that puzzled the Greek Premier as much as it was puzzling the Italian Premier. He saw that European finance and American mistaken idealism would prove too much for him if he waited indefinitely. The continuation of massacres and persecutions also demanded standing against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and "crossing the Rubicon" by some act that would commit both Greece and her allies.

At the beginning of May Venizelos told the "Big Four" that as no progress was being made in settling the terms of the treaty to dictate to Turkey, provisional measures were imperative to protect the lives of Christians in the region

[1] In informal talks with Senators at the Capitol, February 27, 1919.

of Smyrna. Against the opposition of Wilson and Orlando, but with the vigorous backing of Lloyd George, Venizelos wrung from the Council of Four the permission to land troops at Smyrna and occupy whatever points in the hinterland might be necessary to put an end to Mohammedan terrorism.

On May 14, 1919, a new chapter in the history of the Near East was begun by the landing of the Greek army at Smyrna. Fighting and rioting followed, but was soon suppressed.[1] The Greeks seized the railways, and in two weeks occupied Aidin. During June the Turkish Nationalists, who defied the authority of the Constantinople Government, gathered volunteers. The Greeks were compelled to evacuate Aidin on July 1, but returned — without the Turks waiting to give battle — two days later, when reinforcements arrived. When the Greeks left, the population of the city was 53,000, one third Turks, and the rest, with the exception of four or five thousand Armenians and Jews, Greeks. When the Greeks reëntered, on July 3, they found less than 4000 Christians and Jews, and two thirds of the town was in ruins. The Turks had taken with them all wealthy Greeks and most of the Greek women and girls.

[1] Excesses were naturally committed. They always are on occasions where the oppressed are suddenly liberated and given a chance in the confusion of a military occupation to turn the tables. But the charges of atrocities and lack of control and indiscipline made against the Greek army have been so completely refuted by impartial eye-witness testimony that it is unnecessary to answer them here.

Thousands of dead in the streets and the fields and along the roads met the eyes of the Greek soldiers. The Greek Boy Scouts, just before the Turkish evacuation, were gathered together and offered freedom if they would anathematize Venizelos. They refused, and were shot down. All around Aidin the Turks, instead of opposing the Greek advance, burned villages and shot up their Christian fellow-citizens. At Ormourlou, for instance, the whole population was murdered.

While these horrors were going on, the press of Europe and America was being fed with stories of *Greek* atrocities after the Smyrna landing. It was asserted that the Turks at Aidin could hardly be blamed for reprisals — as if the Turks, up to the time of the Smyrna landing, had not been responsible for the death of half a million Greeks! Even before the Treaty of Versailles was signed, a formidable propaganda was launched at Paris, which represented Venizelos as an imperialist and a visionary, who had plunged, not only his own country, but also the Entente Powers, into a hornet's nest at Smyrna. The financial ruin of Greece and the destruction of the Greek army were predicted by those who believed that the Powers would inevitably return to their old policy of endeavoring to preserve the political integrity of the Ottoman Empire. There was no more sympathy for the Greeks, among Stamboul-bewitched foreigners and

holders of Turkish bonds and concessions, than for the Armenians.

When the Conference of Paris adjourned at the end of November, the work of Venizelos was still ahead of him. On one point only had he scored. The Greeks were at Smyrna. But Thrace, although taken from Bulgaria, was not assigned to Greece, and no progress had been made in getting the Entente statesmen to agree to the terms of the treaty with Turkey, which their expert and commissions had drafted along the lines of the other treaties. Venizelos returned to Athens, after an absence of a whole year, and received an ovation that caused the Royalist conspirators to pass sentence of death upon him. When they saw that one hundred and twenty thousand followers, for the most part from Attica, flocked to the Piræus to greet the Premier, they began the series of plots to assassinate Venizelos that resulted in arrests and trials and sporadic attempts during 1920.

While Venizelos was in Athens the Opposition demanded a general election. They claimed that Venizelos was doing what he had accused Constantine of doing, ruling the country illegally, and that he should seek a new mandate from the people to see whether they approved what had been done at Athens. But Venizelos had nothing tangible to present, and he felt that it would be harmful to the interests of Greece for him to stay and fight out a

general election, when his presence was still demanded wherever the Entente premiers should meet to discuss and decide upon the questions a year of the Peace Conference had muddled or evaded. Venizelos promised to submit to the people in a general election the results of his work for Greece and Europe as soon as the work was completed.

The day after Christmas, 1919, found Venizelos in Paris again. He gave the keynote of what he had ahead of him when he said: "The Greek point of view on the question of Turkey is always the same. From the very beginning Greece has maintained that an Ottoman Empire in Europe must no longer exist."

CHAPTER XV

THE REPUDIATION OF VENIZELOS BY GREECE

DURING the early months of 1920 Venizelos faced complicated problems, the solution of which depended upon so many factors and contingencies that a collapse of the whole structure he had so skillfully and laboriously built up seemed unavoidable. Only faith in the man's genius and his star made his associates believe that achievement was possible. In his personal political fortunes he was confronted with a "damned if you do and damned if you don't" dilemma. Should he continue to absent himself from Greece, where he was sorely needed to correct abuses in internal administration? Absence played into the hands of the Constantinists. But if he gave up tagging the Entente premiers from one conference to another, there was little hope of a settlement in the Near East favorable to Greek aspirations. And lack of success in winning for Greece advantages commensurable with her sacrifices would mean disaster. There was disaster ahead, also, in his position at Athens if he failed to defend the claims of Epirotes and Ægean islanders. But how could he arrive at an understanding with Italy if he made no concessions? And if he could not placate Italy, agreement

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VENIZELOS IN HIS HOUR OF TRIUMPH

(Lord Derby is being congratulated on the British championship of Greece at San Remo. Reception at the British Embassy, Paris, May, 1920)

among the Entente premiers on the terms of the Turkish treaty was hopeless.

As if these troubles were not enough, Venizelos had to contend with two powerful influences beyond his control which affected the whole course of the haggling over the terms of the treaty with Turkey: (1) the conflicting claims of the Entente Powers and their subjects, national and private, in the matter of spheres of influence in Turkey; and (2) the paramount interests of the three Powers — France's interest in German reparations and disarmament, Italy's interest in controlling the Adriatic, and Great Britain's interest in opening the Straits and placating her Mohammedan subjects.

Venizelos followed the virtually continuous continuation conferences from Paris to London to Paris to San Remo. The Entente premiers, at San Remo at the end of April, 1920, at last agreed upon compromise terms to dictate to Turkey. Venizelos failed to get more than a protectorate over the Smyrna region, and the Dodecanese question was left for direct negotiations between Greece and Italy before the final signature of the treaty. But he secured what the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria had not given him, the incorporation of Western Thrace in Greece and the abandonment by Turkey of Eastern Thrace, which it was understood would be allotted to Greece. Constantinople, with a strip on both sides of the Bos-

phorus and Dardanelles, was to be the "Zone of the Straits," with an administration under the supervision of the League of Nations. Thus was the dream of driving the Turk from Europe to be realized.

The internal political situation in Italy necessitated two changes of cabinet during the long peace negotiations, and made more complicated and delicate the task of Venizelos. Orlando and Sonnino had given way to Nitti and Tittoni, with whom Venizelos, in a visit to Rome, had been able to come to a tentative agreement concerning moot questions, on July 29, 1919. When industrial and food conditions in Italy led to the downfall of the Nitti Cabinet, Giolitti and Sforza came into power. Count Sforza recognized the Tittoni notes of December 9, 1919, and January 20, 1920, by which Argyrocastro and Korytza were attributed to Greece, thus solving the difficulty of the boundary between Albania and Epirus. He agreed to the compromise of his predecessor in the matter of a Greek sphere in Asia Minor, and renewed the assent given by Tittoni to the occupation of Thrace by Greece. But Count Sforza warned the British and French premiers and Venizelos that Italy did not consider herself bound by Tittoni's notes to cede to Greece all the Dodecanese except Rhodes. As in the case of Fiume, Anglo-French diplomacy proved powerless to solve this question, and offered only to change the text of the Turkish treaty to read that Turkey re-

nounce her sovereignty over the Dodecanese, not in favor of Italy, but in favor of the Allies together, as had been done by Bulgaria in the case of Thrace and by Germany in the case of her colonies. This solution was acceptable neither to Italy nor to Greece. Signing the treaty was held up until finally Sforza and Venizelos agreed that Greece should have all the Dodecanese except Rhodes, which Italy would give up if a deferred plebiscite went against her or when Great Britain ceded Cyprus to Greece.

The treaty between the Entente Powers and Turkey was signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920. Two days later, as Venizelos entered the Gare de Lyon at Paris, on his way home, eight shots were fired at him by two former Greek officers. One bullet lodged in the left shoulder and another in the right side. Fortunately the wounds were not serious, and after a fortnight Venizelos was able to return to Greece on the cruiser Averoff, which was sent to Marseilles to fetch him. But the news of the attempted assassination had led to outbreaks against the Constantinists at Athens and to the sack of anti-Venizelist newspaper plants. More to save their lives from the crowd than because of complicity in the plot, the leaders of the Opposition were arrested. Among them was Jean Dragoumis, son of the former premier, who was most popular at Athens. In making the arrests the police killed Dragoumis.

It was to a troubled and embittered capital that Venizelos returned after two years of nerve-racking diplomatic effort. Although the populace yelled itself hoarse, as populaces are wont to do, even when the next movement is to rend their hero, Parliament was only half full when Venizelos appeared to present the Treaty of Sèvres, which assured the redemption of much of Hellas. Premier Venizelos, with his arm in a sling and a feeble voice, delivered a long address, as he laid on the table the treaty with Turkey and the agreement with Italy dealing with the Dodecanese islands. Only Venizelist deputies and a few Independents were there to listen, from the lips of the creator of modern Greece, to the story of his triumph in wrestling with the statesmen of the Great Powers. There was little enthusiasm when Venizelos, once more making himself the voice of Hellas, predicted confidently the termination of the martyrdom of centuries by the redemption of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire.

For Venizelos had not asserted that the signed treaties were the instruments of deliverance and marked the achievement of the unity of Greece. He made it plain that their significance was only in the assent given by the Allies to allow Greece to free her unredeemed children. The Greek armies were the liberators, not the Entente Powers. If a durable settlement was to come, it would have to be by a continuation of the sacrifices that Greece had been mak-

ing ever since Venizelos began to lead her. Venizelos emphasized the fact that for more than a year the statesmen of Europe had been hedging on the Thracian question, and that when the time came to sign the treaty, neither the Entente Powers nor the Sultan had the power to compel the Turks in Thrace to accept the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres. The army Venizelos had kept patiently on the frontier of Thrace was the only available force. On July 19 the Greeks had started the campaign in Thrace, and on July 26 King Alexander had entered Adrianople.

A month earlier, on June 22, had begun the Greek offensive against the Turkish Nationalists in Asia Minor. Kemal Pasha, leader of the Nationalists, who had secretly been encouraged and supplied with arms and ammunition by Italians and French, had long been embarrassing the British. He seriously threatened the British in the vicinity of Constantinople, drove them from Ismidt, and sealed the Dardanelles. The British had no troops to send to maintain their prestige. The Supreme Council turned to Venizelos. In less than ten days the Greek army, under General Paraskevopoulos, broke the military power of the Nationalists on a front of nearly three hundred miles. In July, Panderma, on the Sea of Marmora, was occupied and the Greeks marched on Brusa, which fell with slight resistance. Then they were in a position to render assistance to the small British contingents on the Asiatic side of the

Bosphorus, which had been harassed for months by the Nationalists and driven back to within sight of the minarets of Constantinople.

What Venizelos has stood for throughout his brilliant career is not more strikingly illustrated than in the campaign in Asia Minor. Because the salvation of Hellenism depended upon a strong Greece, he left Crete and went to Athens in 1910. The Balkan wars and the last two years of the World War proved that the final argument — in fact, the only argument that counted against the unwillingness of the Powers to see Greece expand and liberate her brethren under Turkish yoke — was the ability of the Greek army to fight. After nearly two years of negotiations that were virtually fruitless, the demonstration of the efficiency of the Greek armies in Thrace and Asia Minor had enabled Venizelos to lead the Entente Powers in Turkey to the peace table at Sèvres.

Seemingly, when Venizelos deposited the Treaty of Sèvres in the Chamber of Deputies, he should have experienced the greatest hour of a career that has known many great hours. But he had counted too little upon the deep resentment of Old Greece against the high-handed tactics of the Venizelists since the deposition of King Constantine in 1917, and against those who had frightfully maladministered Greece during the long absence of the Premier in Europe; and he had counted too much upon the willing-

ness of the Greek nation to make further sacrifices for the redemption of Hellas. The strain had been too long continued and too great. As Venizelos himself frankly admitted, the Treaty of Sèvres recognized Greek claims that were already being contested by the Nationalists, but did not bind the big allies of Greece to aid her in making them good. Quite the contrary, France and Italy were already known to be playing with the Angora Nationalists.

Venizelos was worn out by his work in the peace councils, and physically handicapped by the Paris shooting; so he could not make the personal electoral campaign that is vital in Greece and that had heretofore won him his majority. He played in tough luck when, just after signing the decree for the November election, King Alexander was bitten by a monkey and died of blood poisoning. The unforeseen raising of the dynastic question in the midst of the campaign was disastrous. Before Alexander's death, Venizelos was put in the awkward position of opposing the recognition of his marriage to Mlle. Manos and of refusing a father and mother access to the deathbed of their son. After his death, Venizelos was at the mercy of the dynasty whose members other than Alexander he had expelled.

Nor can the importance of the killing of Jean Dragoumis, in creating hostility to Venizelos on the eve of the election, be overestimated. In the Chamber after his re-

turn from Paris, Venizelos turned to Repoulis, who had been acting premier during his absence, and denounced the August arrests as foolish and impolitic. He said, "The bullet fired in Athens hurt me more than those fired in Paris." The open rebuke alienated Repoulis and his friends without appeasing the wrath of the many who loved Dragoumis and mourned him. Dragoumis proved to be Venizelos's Duc d'Enghien.

The Dragoumis tragedy illustrates the price Venizelos had to pay for the privilege of being present at the councils of European statesmen. When the cat's away, the mice will play. The prestige and power of Venizelos rested upon personal magnetism. He had won the Greeks by constant contact with them. At every crisis he was always ready to make a balcony speech to the Athenians. Whenever there was trouble in the provinces, his study door was open to the disaffected. Even when he could not remedy grievances, he did not fail to mollify the men who came to complain. His genius for administration and his power to call forth the best in those who served under him were the causes of his success in ruling Greece. The personality of Venizelos imposed itself upon the Peace Conference and the continuation conferences, and won for Greece more than Greece ever dreamed of gaining. But Venizelos could not be in two places at once. While he was advancing Greek interests in European council chambers, his substi-

tutes discredited him by mismanagement in government at home.

The long promised elections were held on November 14, 1920. Venizelos himself was defeated in his old district, the Piræus, and not a single member of his party was returned in the provinces of Old Greece. The Constantinists also gained the majority of the seats of Macedonia and Samos. Saloniki returned twenty-four Constantinists. The landslide against the Government was realized before midnight on election day. When Venizelos found that the Royalist coalition could count on two hundred and forty seats, while the Liberal Party had won a scant one hundred and forty, he placed the resignation of his Cabinet in the hands of Regent Koundouriotes, and appealed to his followers to accept the result without question. The next day Venizelos and most of his prominent office-holders went into exile in true Athenian fashion. Admiral Koundouriotes, who had been the companion of Venizelos in the venture of 1916 that led to a separate government at Saloniki, gave over the regency to Queen Mother Olga, who received it "in the name of my beloved son Constantine."

The Western world was bewildered by the suddenness and completeness of the defeat of Venizelos. The French press raised the cry of indignation and alarm, seconded by a number of British newspapers. The American press, as our country seemed to be unaffected politically or in its

honor and pride by the *débâcle* of Venizelos, speculated upon the probable causes of the repudiation of a leader at the moment of his greatest success, began to question whether there had been any success, and commented upon the proverbial ingratitude of the people in all countries and the mercurial disposition of the Greeks in particular. Even in Europe the Greek election was interpreted too much in its personal sense, as bearing on the fortunes of two of the most picturesque characters of contemporary history. Venizelos, who had been up, was down. Constantine, who had been down, was up. That was the news value of it all.

CHAPTER XVI

THE NEW ECLIPSE OF HELLENISM

GREECE mobilized for the first Balkan War in September, 1912. The second Balkan War, following directly upon the war with Turkey, came in July, 1913. The peace settlements with Turkey and Bulgaria left open a number of questions that made impossible returning the armies to a peace footing. Defeated foes smarted for revenge. Liberated regions were in disorder, and not all of them were satisfied with the change of sovereignty. The future of some regions, such as Northern Epirus and the islands off the coast of Asia Minor, was not settled by the peace treaties. Turkey refused to give up her claims to Mytilene and Chios and Samos, and Italy still occupied the Dodecanese. Because neither Bulgaria nor Turkey was beaten to her knees, because the victory had been that of an alliance with divergent aims, the peace treaties could be executed only by remaining, together with the other victorious nations, under arms, and by entering into treaties that imposed military obligations in the future.

The Greeks soon realized that, despite the defeat of their foes, despite the great accessions of territory, Greece had to keep an army on war footing, not only to maintain what

she had won and guard against the plans of revenge of the vanquished, but also to be ready to aid Serbia militarily in return for aid Greece might need from Serbia. Then came the European War, with no breathing spell, and the call from Venizelos to intervene on the side of the Entente: (*a*) to fulfill military Greek obligations to Serbia; (*b*) to achieve the redemption and unity of Hellas. Greece became involved. The new territories were invaded. The Greeks were called upon to make a fresh military effort. And, after the defeat of Germany and her allies, instead of demobilization, Greece faced the necessity of increasing her armies for the purpose of taking Thrace and winning the accessions of territory in Asia Minor awarded — with the dubious title — to Greece by the Paris settlement.

Every mother in Greece, every wife in Greece, was sick of the whole business. The soldiers, young and old, were sick of it. Those who paid taxes were sick of it. The people longed for profound peace and for the end of bearing arms. Endorsing Venizelos seemed like voting to continue the war. Constantine had always opposed the Hellenistic dreams of Venizelos. He seemed to stand for peace. In the election the people spoke, as they thought, for peace. War-weariness was the underlying influence. It was idle to say that the ignorant Greek peasants were prompted by special animosity for Venizelos or especial adoration for Constantine. The Greek people, who a short time ago

had been consumed with the holy fire of realizing the Hellenic ideal, began to question the desirability and the possible consequences of the redemption of Hellas. The islands remembered their liberator as did Epirus and Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. But the non-Hellenic elements in Western Macedonia voted Constantinist, while every district of the Greece of 1910 turned against Venizelos. The great strength of Constantine was his appeal to the narrow, selfish interests of the electors of Old Greece, to whom his propagandists said: "What good has the policy of Venizelos done you? All you get from it is taxes, long military service, broken health, death."

If the redemption of Hellas could all have been accomplished during the Paris Conference, with the Entente Powers supporting Greece unquestioningly against Turkey as they supported Poland against Germany and Serbia against Bulgaria, the Greeks might not have listened to the anti-Venizelists. If it could all have been accomplished without much further fighting or remaining under arms for weary years, every Greek would have regarded the achievements of Venizelos in expanding Greece and freeing Ottoman Greeks from the Turkish yoke as glorious and the performance of a sacred duty. The verdict of November 14 seemed to be that a war-weary, taxridden people were unwilling to go on with the work of incorporating provinces of the Ottoman Empire into Greece. Venizelos

had called upon the people to follow his leadership until there was a renaissance of the Byzantine Empire. The people refused.

The Greeks had resented bitterly the assumption that they ought to admire, to respect, to be grateful to the Entente Powers. Whatever Venizelos secured for Greece during the peace negotiations, as he himself had pointed out to them, was due to the fact that Greece had a large army mobilized in the Near East, and that he was simply being paid for services rendered. Had the British and French and Italians been able to agree upon a distribution of the spoils and to send and keep in Asia Minor and Constantinople and Thrace several hundred thousand soldiers, Greece would have been ignored. Venizelos shouldered the opprobrium of being the friend of the Entente. He could not tell his people what he really thought about the statesmen and policies of the Great Powers, because he had to work with these men and fit in where it was possible to do so with these policies. He stood for much in order to realize the aspirations of Hellas. He had been silent where the words his heart longed to utter might have explained everything to his fellow countrymen. The Greeks hated France for all her acts during the war, and Great Britain for the rigors of the blockade. The memories of 1916 and 1917 kept thousands of Venizelists from voting for their leader. They were perplexed. As the

negotiations over the Turkish treaty dragged on endlessly, and no advantage was given to Greece except when her armies acted in Thrace and Asia Minor unsupported seriously by Great Britain and actually opposed by Italy and France, the people of Greece began to fear that the Great Cretan was pursuing a wild-goose chase, or, if not that, paying too dearly for what he won. The Constantinist propagandists had spread throughout Greece the impression that Venizelos, refusing to come back without a victory, had assumed secretly obligations to do things for Great Britain, as he had assumed obligations to do things for Serbia before the second Balkan War.

The movement of Mustapha Kemal Pasha against the Treaty of Sèvres had become formidable. In a diplomatic as well as in a military sense Angora, which the Nationalists had made their capital, was threatening the security of the Greek army in Asia Minor. If the Greeks had not been wronged by the Entente and tricked by the Entente statesmen in every international conference to the point of bitter disillusionment, they would not have become panic-stricken and have lost confidence in the skill of their Premier when the new Smyrna crisis arose and a fresh military effort was demanded. Venizelos was damned by the company he kept.

When Greece welcomed back her exiled King, sworn enemies of the Entente Powers appeared in the highest

places in the Near East. General Papoulas, officially accused by the French Government of being a "German spy," superseded General Paraskevopoulos as commander-in-chief in Asia Minor; Prince Andrew, denied admission to French and British soil, was given an army corps on the Anatolian front; Victor Dousmanis, released from his Cretan prison, where he was held for complicity in the massacre of Entente troops in the December, 1916, Athens affair, appeared at the head of the Greek military mission in Constantinople; General Metaxas, whom the Entente considered their worst enemy, ready to stab the Saloniki Expedition in the back, returned from exile to his army post; and former Premiers Gounaris and Kalogheropoulos, whom the French press called "traitorous reptiles," became Ministers of War and of Finance in the new cabinet. Prison doors were opened, and decrees of banishment rescinded. The men on the Entente blacklist of those who worked for the King of Prussia came back to be fêted and given good jobs, while those who had rendered public service to the Entente Powers fled the country or retired discreetly from public attention. The venerable Metropolitan of Athens, Theoclitis, who had called Great Britain and France the enemies of his country, prayed for their defeat, and anathematized Venizelos, was immediately reinstated as head of the National Church.

The Entente Powers and the United States did not rec-

ognize the new régime. During the nearly two years of the second reign of Constantine they remained firm in their decision to give no official support to the Greek Government. France and Italy were openly hostile; Great Britain abstained from official military and diplomatic support of Greece, although her interests seemed to dictate this course; and the United States stood coolly aloof. The return of King Constantine deprived Greece of the diplomatic and political advantages she had enjoyed up to that time, and which she sorely needed in her effort to prevent the Turkish Nationalists from upsetting the disposition of the Near Eastern question agreed to by the Entente premiers at San Remo and formally set forth in the Treaty of Sèvres.

Although Signor Nitti had been outspoken in his dissatisfaction with the San Remo agreement at the time it was made, and although Governor-General Lyautey of Morocco had lobbied powerfully against the ratification of the treaty in the French Chamber of Deputies, the Treaty of Sèvres was none the less an international document, which could not be modified without allowing the Greeks a large part, at least, of what it guaranteed them. But with the repudiation of Venizelos, Italians and French seized upon the argument that the treaty no longer held because it was based upon the assumption that the Greek Government was friendly to — in fact allied with — the

Entente Powers. Venizelos was no longer in a position to defend the interests of Greece. And the powerful Turcophile elements in British official and parliamentary life, who had long been clamoring that the Lloyd George Cabinet's pro-Greek policy was dangerously offensive to British Mohammedan subjects, had a new weapon to use in the distrust and dislike of British public opinion for Constantine and all his works. It may be true that Lord Curzon assured M. Gounaris that the British Foreign Office would stand by Greece no matter what her Government was,[1] but the fact remained that philhellenism suffered an eclipse in England after the forced exile of Venizelos. The prestige of Venizelos, too, diminished almost to the vanishing point in London and Paris.

Greece was in sore need of money for military expenses in Asia Minor, especially if she hoped to match the armaments the Turks were receiving openly from Russia and surreptitiously from Italy and France. But the United States used the change of government as an excellent pretext for not allowing Greece to draw further upon the credit granted her as a war measure. About $30,000,000 was thus suddenly rendered unavailable.[2] At the same time

[1] During his trial for high treason, on November 11, 1922, former Premier Gounaris tried to present to the Athenian court-martial proof of Lord Curzon's backing, officially given as British Foreign Secretary.

[2] This statement is proved by the full explanation of how the American State Department refused to honor its contractual obligation to Greece,

France, invoking the pretext that the Constantinist Government was illegal, refused to pay back to the Bank of Greece the large sums of money advanced to the French army at Saloniki when the rate of exchange had been unfavorable to the conversion of francs into drachmæ. The Constantinist régime floated an internal loan, borrowed from Greeks and Greek sympathizers abroad, resorted to the drastic measure of a forced loan by cutting in half all the money in circulation; but finally ended in bankruptcy. It was the refusal to recognize Constantine that brought Greece in less than two years from an enviable position financially among the lesser nations of Europe to an empty treasury and utter lack of means of continuing the campaign in Asia Minor.

Constantine and his friends soon found that there was no practicable way of retiring from Asia Minor. The Turkish Nationalists at Angora had signed what they called the National Pact, and Greece could have secured peace only by abandoning Thrace as well as Asia Minor, and leaving the Greeks of Asia Minor and Constantinople wholly at the mercy of the Turks. They did not dare to do this. Not being able to recede, they had to go forward. An attempt was made to revive the flagging spirits of the Greek people by a new offensive in the summer of 1921.

written by Dr. Edward Capps, former American Minister to Greece, and published in the New York *Times*, November 12, 1922.

Up to a certain point its success was striking. The Greeks advanced from Brusa and Smyrna to Eski Sheir and Afium Kara Hissar, cutting off the Nationalists from railway communication with Constantinople and Konia. A brilliant battle, that might well have proved as decisive as that of Lulé Burgas, was fought and won on July 8, 1921. But against the advice of General Papoulas, who was overruled by the Athens Cabinet, the Greek army was ordered to push on to Angora. It wore itself out by a foolish march through the salt desert of the Sangarius River, and was forced to abandon the undertaking almost in sight of the goal.

This did not need to have been the turning-point in the fortunes of Hellenism in Asia Minor. For the Greeks were not pursued in their retreat. They were able to choose strong mountain positions and fortify them at leisure east of the Anatolian Railway. With Eski Sheir and Afium Kara Hissar in their hands, they enjoyed rail communications behind their lines and with Smyrna; and by the same token, the Turks were at a great disadvantage, having no communications — not even good roads. For another long year the Greeks held these positions, hoping that peace would somehow be concluded. Great Britain was friendly to Hellenic aspirations, even to the occupation of Constantinople by Greece. But Great Britain had her hands tied. She did not come out openly to help fight

Greece's battles. On the other hand, France and Italy made treaties with the Angora Government, which pledged them to support Turkey in tearing up the Treaty of Sèvres.[1]

Throughout 1921 efforts were made by the Entente Powers to end the Greco-Turkish War on the basis of a modification of the Treaty of Sèvres, restoring Turkish sovereignty (with restrictions) in Asia Minor and Constantinople. But the Powers themselves were irresolute and half-hearted, and the Turks and Greeks were obdurate. With the victories of January, March, and July, the Greek stomach for fighting on seemed to revive, while with each disaster Turkish nationalism was intensified. In these circumstances, the Entente Powers realized that, if they did not come to some definite understanding to put an end to the war in the Near East, Turks and Greeks would both be ruined, France and Great Britain would get "in dutch" with their Mohammedan peoples, and Russia bid fair to fish to her advantage in troubled waters. These considerations led to a meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in Paris, who decided that an armistice must be

[1] It is impossible to go into the details of the three-cornered diplomatic struggle among Great Britain, France, and Italy, in which Turkey and Greece were used as pawns. The various phases of Entente policy in the Near East from May, 1920, to the Conference of Lausanne, at the end of 1922, are discussed in full in my *Introduction to World Politics* (New York and London, 1922), pp. 428–41, 453–56, 549–52. See also my article on "The Freedom of the Straits," in *Asia* magazine, December, 1922.

agreed to by Greeks and Turks on the basis of Greece relinquishing all claims to territory in Asia Minor, and Turkey all claims in Thrace. The Angora Government declared that it would agree to the armistice (but not to the preliminaries of peace) only if the Greeks gave up immediately the Anatolian Railway and evacuated Asia Minor within four months. The Greeks refused to evacuate Asia Minor, invoking the certain destruction of the indigenous Christian population that would follow.

The Entente proposals reached Athens on March 23, and the Easter holidays were marked by an astonishing renewal of the flagging patriotism and war spirit. This was helped by the impassioned appeal of the Greeks of Asia Minor, who had banded themselves together in an organization to defy any evacuation order that might come from Athens. Reports of a systematic programme of extermination of Greeks in the parts of Asia Minor under Kemalist control made a great impression in England and the United States as well as in Greece. Had ample financial support and British and American aid been forthcoming in June, 1922, Kemal Pasha would have remained powerless to expel the Greeks from Asia Minor.

But neither one nor the other was forthcoming. The Greek Government had no money and no credit abroad for food supplies and war materials. The fair words of Premier Lloyd George and the private assurances of Lord

Curzon were positively harmful. For they gave to Government and people in Greece a false sense of security and kept alive hopes of a solution more favorable to Hellenic aspirations than the international diplomatic situation warranted.

At this critical moment Constantine and his advisors had the choice of feasible alternatives that might have saved the day. If Constantine had confessed frankly his failure to lead Greece to victory or to win the support of the Entente Powers in saving at least a part of what Venizelos had gained for Greece, he could have abdicated gracefully, pleading that the cards were stacked against him. Or he could have thrown himself and his country upon the mercy of the Entente Powers, putting the dynastic question up to them and accepting their March proposals of the evacuation of Asia Minor. But the King and his ministers deceived the people as to the real state of affairs both in regard to army supplies in Asia Minor and the international diplomatic situation. Instead of following the prudent and self-sacrificing course dictated by the logic of events, they conceived the mad scheme of transferring to Thrace forty thousand of the best troops, and marching on Constantinople.

This grandstand play, calculated to impress the Powers, intimidate the Turks, and raise the morale of the Greek army and people, was justified by those who conceived it

on the ground that the economic situation was desperate, and that something had to be done quickly. But its authors, just as in the summer of 1921, had refused to listen to the warning of General Papoulas, who told them that it would be fatal to weaken the army in Asia Minor. Instead, General Papoulas was relieved of his command. And they refused also to admit the fact all the world outside of Greece knew, that the maintenance of Constantine on the throne was the real cause of the inability of Greece to gain abroad diplomatic and financial aid.

The threat against Constantinople proved to be a fiasco. General Harington, speaking for the Entente Powers, declared that if the Greeks advanced they would find themselves at war with the Entente Powers as well as with the Turks. It is true that Lloyd George as late as August 5 expressed in the House of Commons undisguised sympathy with the aspirations of Hellenism. But facts at Constantinople spoke louder than words at London. Great Britain would not risk taking the initiative in disrupting the Entente alliance. The Greeks at Constantinople (and at Smyrna!) were regarded by the French and the Italians as agents of the British. For the overseas expansion of Greece meant the complete dependence of Greater Greece upon the dominant sea Power.

The failure at the gates of Constantinople took the heart out of the Greek army in Asia Minor, which had been on

starvation rations for some weeks. The Kemalists got wind of the Greek plan to retire from their strong position east of the Anatolian Railway. They attacked at Afium Kara Hassir on August 26. Greek resistance in covering the retreat was feeble from the first. The entire Greek army was suddenly taken with a panic, such as the Turks had experienced in the first Balkan War and the British, French, and Italians on more than one occasion during the World War. But the Greeks had no fresh and uncontaminated reserves, and no allies, to stand behind them. Much of their war material and a third of their army fell into the hands of the Turks, who entered Smyrna triumphantly on September 9. Four days later the European and Christian quarters of Smyrna were burned, and from all parts of Western Asia Minor began a *sauve qui peut* of Christians, Circassians, and anti-Kemalist Turks. Within a month Asia Minor was lost to Greece, and hundreds of thousands of refugees entered Greek territory in Europe. Then began the exodus of Greeks from Eastern Thrace. In the autumn of 1922 there was a migration in the Near East such as had not been known in modern times, and at Christmas, for the first time since the Christian Church was founded there, in apostolic days, no mass was celebrated on a Christian altar in Asia Minor.

In the face of this catastrophe King Constantine accepted the resignation of the Cabinet, but attempted to

replace it by a group of ministers as strongly anti-Venizelist as their predecessors. Ignoring Greece, the Entente Powers began to negotiate with Kemal Pasha, and offered to return to the Turks not only Asia Minor, but also Constantinople and Eastern Thrace. When this news reached the defeated army, which was mostly gathered on the islands near the coast of Asia Minor, a revolt broke out at Mytilene under Colonel Gonatas. The rebels got the support of the navy, which mutinied at the same time, and were transported to Athens. Constantine was forced to abdicate and leave Greece on September 27, and the premiers and ministers of former cabinets, together with General Hadjanestis, who had replaced Papoulas and was in command in Asia Minor at the time of the disaster, were arrested.

The revolutionaries, supported by the people when the extent and irremediable character of the new eclipse of Hellenism was realized, brought to trial for high treason before a military court three former premiers, and several other ministers who had been close to Constantine; also Constantine's brother, Prince Andrew, General Hadjanestis, and Admiral Goudas. When it became evident that the court-martial intended to condemn these men to death, strenuous protests were made by eminent Greeks as well as by the representatives of the Powers. Fortunately, Prince Andrew's trial was postponed. But the charges

were pressed against the others. On November 24 Premier Krokidas resigned, and no responsible statesman would consent to form a cabinet. So Colonel Gonatas assumed himself the premiership. King George, who had succeeded his father, was powerless. On November 27 former Premiers Gounaris, Stratos, and Protopapadakis, former Minister of War Theotokis, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Baltazzi, and General Hadjanestis were condemned to death in the middle of the night, and shot a few hours later. The British Minister left Athens as he had threatened to do, and several prominent diplomats abroad, who had agreed to represent Greece, resigned.

The revolutionary court-martial not only condemned to death these men who had served Constantine, but they imposed upon them fines which amounted to the confiscation of their private fortunes. Undaunted by the storm of protest that was universal, Colonels Gonatas and Plastiras declared on December 10 that all persons connected with the disaster in Asia Minor would be brought to trial, and that elections were indefinitely postponed.

In the meantime, although the revolutionaries had seized the government on the plea that they were going to save Thrace, they needed so sorely the services of Venizelos that they agreed to the condition he imposed, i.e., submission to the Entente order to evacuate Thrace east of the Maritza River. The armistice conference met at Mu-

dania on October 3, and the following day Venizelos consented to represent Greece in London and Paris.

When Venizelos left Greece after the November elections in 1920, he took up his residence in Nice. After the murder in Athens of Colonel Fatseas, one of his prominent followers, on January 5, 1921, Venizelos wrote to the Athens *Patris* that he had decided finally to retire from politics. In the spring he married Mlle. Skilitzi, an old friend whose understanding and sympathy with his vision of the future of Hellas had long been a precious inspiration. The strain of the past decade, especially of the period of the peace negotiations and continuation conferences, had been so great that his physicians prescribed a long and uninterrupted rest. Even though he had announced his retirement from politics, it was almost too much to ask of the creator of the new Greece that he abstain from taking a personal interest in the fortunes of his child. The penetration of the Greek army into the interior of Asia Minor caused him grave misgivings, which were far from being allayed by the unsolicited news he was constantly receiving from hundreds of sources.

To get him far removed from it all, a voyage to America was planned. This had long been a dream of Venizelos. During the Peace Conference he had spoken of it several times. He went to the United States, not as Premier of Greece, but as a repudiated leader, and this was empha-

sized by the fact that his arrival in New York happened to coincide with the arrival of delegates to the Washington Conference, some of whom had been his colleagues in earlier international parleys. His reception in New York, however, was greater than that of Balfour or Briand, and his trip across the continent was notable by the vociferous receptions accorded him by American Greeks wherever he stopped. From California he traveled to South America, the Panama Canal, the West Indies, and Florida, returning to New York on his way back to Europe after six months of American hospitality.

I had a day with Venizelos in July in Paris. For years I had not seen him in such robust health. His skin was clear, his eyes bright, his voice pitched lower than I had ever known it. Physically the man had gained miraculously by his two years of abstention from the grilling and harassing burden of political responsibilities. And he had lost nothing of his intensity, his fire, his assertiveness. On the other hand, there was that about him that made one feel that he had paid a big price for the rest so manifestly beneficial to him. His mind was on Greece. He was apprehensive. He saw the shipwreck ahead. He could not bring himself to intervene for a reason that did him honor. He told me that he could not again be the cause of a civil war and bloodshed. Any attempt of the Venizelists to force the hand of the Government would undoubtedly have had

as its immediate consequence the death of still more of his followers in Greece. There was, too, always the risk of demoralizing the army on the front by a change of government at home.

What must have tortured Venizelos, although he did not confide this to me, was the thought that he might have prevented the approaching catastrophe to Hellenism had he remained at Athens as leader of the Opposition after his repudiation in the general election of November, 1920. It would have been a risk to life; it would have been a sacrifice to pride. But was there not a chance then to save Greece? From the tribune in the Chamber Venizelos had frequently called the attention of the Greeks to the British Parliament as a model for Greece to imitate and to British evolution of representative institutions as an example for Greece to follow. Why should a reverse at the polls necessarily mean the elimination of the defeated party and the exile of its leaders? One remarks, "Ah, but you do not know Greece!" The answer is that if Greece were to prove capable of filling the rôle in the world Venizelos had planned for her, Greece would have to be changed morally as well as in her geographical boundaries. The Greece that Venizelos found could become Hellas only by going beyond the chrysalis stage. It is true that the eclipse of Hellenism was due to the repudiation of Venizelos by Greece. But should the pilot have deserted the ship?

Weeks passed after Venizelos left before Constantine returned. And when Venizelos left, the Kemalists had already announced their intention of driving the Greeks out of Asia Minor. The future of Hellenism was in peril. What would happen if the Greeks were defeated had been clearly foreshadowed by the fate of Aidin in 1919.

If the eclipse of Hellenism proves to be definitive during our day and generation, the responsibility of Venizelos would seem to be that he left Greece after the election of 1920 went against him rather than that he had been the statesman who sent the Greek army to Smyrna. All his life he had been working for the redemption of Hellas, and the breaking up of the Ottoman Empire was the legitimate goal of Greek foreign policy. Thrace, Asia Minor, and Constantinople were logical steps, following Macedonia, Crete, Epirus, and the islands of the Ægean Sea. And when the dream seemed to be realizable, and the attempt was made to realize it, it must be remembered that Venizelos had tangible grounds upon which to act. A legend has grown up around the Smyrna expedition. The responsibility for it does not rest with Venizelos alone. The initiative in it was not his, but Lloyd George's; and Venizelos ordered the Greek army to Smyrna at the request of and with the approval of the Entente Powers and the United States.

On May 5, 1919, Lloyd George gained the consent of

Clemenceau and Wilson to the occupation of Smyrna by Greece. This decision was prompted by the news that Italy had landed troops at Adalia and other points and had sent warships to Smyrna. Signor Orlando had withdrawn from the Paris Conference in a huff, and it was not known whether he would return to be present when the treaty was to be handed to the Germans on May 7. On the morning of May 6, Venizelos received an urgent message from Lloyd George to meet him at the Quai d'Orsay a little before the plenary session of the Conference, which was to receive communication of the Versailles Treaty. When Venizelos arrived, he found Lloyd George awaiting him, and was informed that the Supreme Council invited Greece to occupy Smyrna, sending troops there.

"When?" asked Venizelos.

"As soon as possible," answered Lloyd George, who insisted that there was perfect harmony on this point between himself and Wilson and Clemenceau. He spoke in their name. The undertaking would have their united backing. Marshal Foch, General Wilson, and General Bliss were summoned to meet Venizelos to examine the details of the expedition, which was to be made two days later. (Athens is only twelve hours from Smyrna.) But when it was learned that Orlando was returning, the French Foreign Minister, Pichon, declared that it would be impolitic to go ahead with the plans until they had been mentioned to

him. This was done. Orlando agreed. Greece went to Smyrna, then, at the formal invitation of the Allied and Associated Powers.[1] This was afterwards recognized by the terms imposed upon Turkey in the Treaty of Sèvres.

Entente diplomacy, in which President Wilson concurred, was responsible for the Smyrna expedition, just as European diplomacy had always been responsible for earlier interventions of every character in the Ottoman Empire. Having called down the wrath of their Moslem masters upon the heads of various Christian (and non-Turkish Moslem) elements by these interventions, in which the subject races were asked to coöperate, it is impossible to acquit Europe and America of obligations thus formally assumed toward the peoples they had promised to free. If Great Britain, France, and the United States did not intend to see the Christians of the Orient through on the question of emancipation from Turkish rule, the war speeches of their statesmen were criminally dishonest, and the action of Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson in regard to the Smyrna expedition made them accessories before the fact to massacre and wholesale expulsion from

[1] Ray Stannard Baker, in *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, vol. II, pp. 189–94, sets forth, from President Wilson's own notes, the story of how Venizelos was invited to go to Smyrna, and how it was kept from the Italians. Mr. Baker does not seem to know that Lloyd George evidently regarded the discussion of May 5 as final, and communicated the decision to Venizelos on the morning of May 6. Nor does Mr. Baker point out that the Allied generals suggested and directed the details of the occupation.

Asia Minor of many hundreds of thousands of Greeks and Armenians.

The return of Venizelos to the scene as diplomatic representative of Greece and defender of her interests, even though he began his work by assuring the Entente Powers that Greece would evacuate Eastern Thrace, and even though Constantine had disappeared, did not change the situation so desperate for Greece. The Mudania Armistice was signed on October 11. During the week of negotiation France had stood behind Turkey, and Great Britain sacrificed everything else in her determination not to allow the Turks to get once more complete control of the Straits. Italy was in the midst of a radical governmental change, brought about by the Fascisti movement. It was decided that the peace conference would meet at Lausanne on November 13. This date was afterwards changed to November 20 in order to allow Great Britain and France to come to some agreement.

When the conference assembled, the United States, although she had been invited to send plenipotentiaries, was represented by "observers," whose task was to give good advice to both sides, to set forth what the United States expected the negotiators to do for her interests, and to emphasize the fact that America would neither be bound by the treaty nor be counted upon to do anything to enforce it. Premier Mussolini, successful leader of the Fascisti,

went to Lausanne with the idea of impressing upon Great Britain and France the equal partnership of Italy in the Entente alliance. The points at issue for Great Britain were the freedom of the Straits and the maintenance of the Sèvres frontier between Turkey and Mesopotamia. For Turkey laid claim to the rich Mosul oil region. Russia came with the intention of using Lausanne as a means of winning back her old place in the councils of Europe. All the Powers, including the United States, were insistent upon maintaining the capitulations (or the same thing under another name) by which their nationals enjoyed extraterritorial rights in Turkey.

Consequently, it was manifest that none was going to support, except for the purpose of bargaining, the interest of Christian and Mohammedan non-Turkish minorities in Turkey. The powers gave way to Turkey on the question of minorities, and accepted with equanimity the announcement of the Turks that they intended to expel the remnants of Christians left in Asia Minor, and also those in Thrace and Constantinople, if it pleased them to do so later. Only the announced intention of the states forming the Little Entente to intervene militarily to prevent it kept the Powers from agreeing to extend the Turkish frontier considerably west of the Maritza River. International greed and callousness have never been more strikingly revealed than in the negotiations at Lausanne. The diplo-

macy of the Great Powers has no heart. It has no morality. The holocausts of the World War were proved to be in vain, if it was believed that by our sacrifices we should be enabled to establish a new world order and a durable peace.

In this atmosphere Venizelos, once more at the helm, fought like a lion to protect the remnants of Hellenism in the country that had once been the Byzantine Empire. He opposed the Turks with his old-time skill and vigor. But no Great Power was interested in the Greek cause, while all of them were determined to win favors from the Turks, or, if they could not do that, to prevent their rivals from getting any advantage, political or economic, in the Near East.

The only hope of Venizelos has been that, as they had done so often in recent years, the Turks would overreach themselves, and prove to be stupidly and hopelessly arrogant and blind to the fact that their strength lay, not in their military force, but in the possibilities for Europeans of the exploitation of their country. In that case the Conference of Lausanne would break up without having set definitely the seal upon the eclipse of Hellenism. With a new war the luck of the Greeks might easily turn. Fortune changes sides so suddenly and so unexpectedly in the Near East.

In his Christmas message to the American Red Cross from Lausanne, Eleutherios Venizelos said: "We face the

future with courage, but we are conscious of its perils." He might have added, for it must be in his mind from his own life (to go no farther back into history): "We are conscious also of its possibilities." The present eclipse of Hellenism does not mean the death of Hellenism. The renascence of Hellenism cannot end elsewhere than in Constantinople.

THE END

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
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